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In 1964 the Supreme Court handed down its much noted decision
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.' Writing over a single
dissent,2 the late Mr. Justice Harlan held that under the "act of state"
doctrine the courts of the nation, state and federal alike, were not to
judge whether the expropriatory decrees of a recognized foreign gov-
ernment were valid under customary international law in cases where
the property in issue was located within that government's territory.'
Less than a decade later, the Justices concluded in First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba4 that the courts could judge the
validity of the very decree of the Cuban government 5 which Justice
Harlan had declined to review.
Contrary to the position taken by the Executive in Sabbatino,6 the
Department of State's Legal Adviser had indicated to the Court in
Citibank that the nation's foreign policy interests did not require appli-
cation of the doctrine under the special circumstances of that case.7
This eleventh hour intervention was an open invitation for the Court
to reshape the doctrine-to make it a rule concerned only with avoiding
embarrassments to foreign policy and to reject the more expansive cata-
logue of considerations upon which, in the view taken here, Justice
Harlan had relied in footing the doctrine upon the "'constitutional'
underpinnings" of the separation of powers principle.8
Perhaps the results were to be expected. Mirroring the decade-
long attack on Sabbatino, four Justices appeared to accept the Legal
Adviser's invitation. Justice Rehnquist, writing the plurality opinion,9
plainly did so. He denied that the doctrine rested upon any constitu-
tional footing whatsoever and offered "deference" to the Executive and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami; B.A. 1954, Albion College;
J.D. 1957, University of Chicago.
1. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
2. Id. at 439 (White, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 428.
4. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
5. Law 851 of July 6, 1960, Official Gazette of Cuba, reproduced in Sabbatino,
376 U.S. at 403 n.7.
6. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 30, 32, 33, Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
7. Letter from John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State to E. Robert Sea-
ver, Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, Nov. 17, 1970, reproduced in Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. First Natl City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 536 et seq. (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd,
406 U.S. 759 (1972).
8. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
9. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice White.
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"international comity" as alternative predicates.' 0 Justice Powell was
more subtle. While professing agreement with the principles of
Sabbatino, he declined to embrace the results in that case, offering a
rationale for doing so that would seem to pose no less a challenge to
that decision than does Justice Rehnquist's effort."
Provoked by this retreat and determined to preserve the broader
considerations enumerated in Sabbatino, Justice Brennan, writing for
the four dissenters, appeared to push a step beyond Justice Harlan's
position in the earlier case.12 Where the latter had expressly declined
to view act of state as compelled by the Constitution, treating it only
as a rule of "federal common law,"' 3 Justice Brennan insisted that it
could, in appropriate circumstances, signal the presence of a non-
justiciable "political question" which the Executive could not by
"simple stipulation" convert into a "cognizable claim.' 1 4  Citibank, in
his view, was just such a case.
This is where the Court stood, divided-perhaps evenly divided15
---over the merits of Sabbatino, when last term it assigned the case of
10. Justice Rehnquist found the roots of the act of state doctrine "not in the Consti-
tution, but in the notion of comity between independent sovereigns." Id. at 765. In
his view, this foundation was
buttressed by judicial deference to the exclusive power of the Executive over
conduct of relations with other sovereign powers and the power of the Senate
to advise and consent on the making of treaties.
Later, however, this "buttressing" consideration appears to have become the whole of
the rule:
The act of state doctrine is grounded on judicial concern that application of
customary principles of law to judge the acts of a foreign sovereign might
frustrate the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the
government. We conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it
is with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly
represents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine would not
advance the interests of American foreign policy, that doctrine should not be
applied by the courts. In so doing, we of course adopt and approve the so-
called Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine. We believe this to be
no more than an application of the classical common-law maxim that "rt]he
reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases." Id. at 767-68, citing
BLACK'S LAw DicrxoNARY 288 (4th ed. 1951).
11. See id. at 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring); see notes 31-32 infra and accompany-
ing text.
12. Justice Brennan wrote for himself and for Justices Stewart, Marshall and
Blackmun. 406 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13. 376 U.S. at 423, 425-27.
14. 406 U.S. at 787-89.
15. The final and decisive vote in favor of an adjudication in Citibank was supplied
by Justice Douglas, who took the position that the case was controlled by National
City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). In both Republic of China and
Citibank, Justice Douglas saw a foreign government requesting the assistance of Ameri-
can courts in vindicating its legal rights. Therefore, in the Justice's view, fair dealing
required that any counterclaim or set-off be subject to an adjudication up to the amount
of the claim asserted by Cuba. A dispute over any amounts in excess of Cuba's claim
would not be justiciable under Sabbatino. 406 U.S. at 770-73.
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Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba for reargument and
asked the parties to brief and discuss the question of whether
Sabbatino should be reconsidered.18 The Dunhill decision has now
been issued,1 7 but without the projected reconsideration of Sabbatino.
Instead, the Court appears to remain deadlocked over the merits of
that decision and the fundamental definition of the act of state doc-
trine's theoretical underpinnings. With Mr. Justice Stevens concurring
in the result on technical grounds, '8 Dunhill supplies an appropriate
occasion for re-examining the Court's continuing struggle with that
venerable but elusive doctrine. This is especially true since the Legal
Adviser indicated to the Court that his department anticipated no
"embarrassment to the conduct of foreign policy" if Sabbatino were over-
ruled,' and the Solicitor General recommended a sweeping "commer-
cial obligations" exception to the doctrine.20 The decision itself,
moreover, offers another, although distinctive, illustration of the basic
theoretical error undergirding the challenge to that decision.
The act of state doctrine, it must be emphasized, is concerned with
the consequences of judicial action. Theories of the doctrine are short-
hand statements of a number of decisional elements. They serve to
identify those public and private interests that are to be protected from
judicial action, and are implicitly undergirded by particular assumptions
regarding the effects of such action. They also identify the broader
social outcomes, judicial obligations and values which largely determine
when the anticipated consequences of an adjudication are unacceptable.
And implicit in most theories of the doctrine are particular views regard-
ing the nature of law and of the international legal order, views which
can-and often do-critically influence the content and weight as-
signed the other decisional elements.
16. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S. 981 (1974), assigned for
reargument, 422 U.S. 1005 (1975) (Court Order: "In addition to other questions pre-
sented by this case, counsel are requested to brief and discuss during oral argument:
Should this Court's holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964), be reconsidered?").
17. 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
18. With Justice White, writing for the Citibank plurality, and Justices Powell and
Stevens each concurring separately, the Court determined that the "act of state" doctrine
should not be applied to Dunhill's claim. 96 S. Ct. at 1856-67. Justice Marshall, writ-
ing for the Citibank dissenters, would have applied the doctrine on the authority of Sab-
batino, see id. at 1871-82. See notes 43-44 infra and accompanying text.
19. Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to the Solicitor Gen-
eral, Nov. 26, 1975, reproduced in Dunhill, 96 S. Ct. at 1867, app. 1.
20. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27, 28, Alfred Dunhill of Lon-
don, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
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This is precisely what is found in the Court's debate. Led by their
values, their desire for certain social outcomes, their general view of
the legal order, the Justices challenging Sabbatino have sought to
narrow the judicial perspective, expressed in terms of the catalogue of
relevant consequences, to a degree that cannot be reconciled with
Justice Harlan's opinion. Their tolerance for such consequences as are
admitted must be seen as a repudiation of many of the basic sensitivities
underlying Sabbatino.
When the challengers' alternative prescriptions are tested against
a number of benchmarks, they cannot, it is suggested, stand. Their
preference as among the competing interests at stake in both Citibank
and Dunhill, their disregard for the integrity of the American judiciary,
their refusal to recognize the import of their theories for the wider
interests of this nation and for the "rule of law" among all nations, com-
bine to demonstrate the wisdom of Justice Harlan's more comprehen-
sive paradigm. At bottom, the challengers have espoused a course
of action that can, as Citibank illustrates, serve only to undermine the
foundations of judicial legitimacy in the American scheme of govern-
ment. They would compel the courts to choose between decision
according to reasoned principles, on the one hand, and protecting some
of the most delicate and momentous policies that any nation may occa-
sionally be compelled to pursue, on the other. They have proffered
a course that can scarcely enhance the cause of justice and good order
in the international community.
From the analysis upon which these conclusions rest, several
broader formulations follow. First, act of state is a doctrine concerned
with the limits of legitimate judicial action, and as such rests upon a
constitutional predicate that can certainly encompass a political question
but need not do so. If the political question doctrine has typically been
applied to forestall judicial inquiry into acts of federal and state govern-
ments, act of state may, in the appropriate case, be the precise constitu-
tional analog forestalling inquiry into the acts of foreign governments.
But it has a wider ambit. While drawing upon the same set of basic con-
stitutional ideas as the political question doctrine, act of state is never-
theless unique in its concern with the role domestic courts should play
in the search for a more workable international order. It is, in short,
a rule with "constitutional underpinnings" which may converge with the
political question doctrine in a way that is instructive but not definitive.
Second, the fact that a particular legal challenge to an act of a
foreign state rises to the status of a political question is not, in most
cases, an operationally significant conclusion. It is submitted that, con-
Vol. 1976:807]
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trary to Justice Brennan's implicit suggestion (with which Justices Mar-
shall and Powell appear to concur), the role that Congress and the
Executive are to play in the management of the doctrine cannot be
made to turn exclusively upon the distinction between a constitutional
ordinance (i.e., political question) and a mere rule of judicial legisla-
tion.
Finally, precisely as Sabbatino and Citibank serve, by their distinc-
tive factual context, to show how securely Justice Harlan's holding was
rooted in a constitutional command, they warn that the same mandate
may become less compelling on the periphery of the doctrine's
applicability. Indeed, a substantial gap must be bridged before it may
be said that the analysis of those two cases, and the equally distinctive
pre-Sabbatino decisions of the Court, supply a sufficient basis for
Justice Harlan's sweeping interdiction. Because it also arose out of a
quarrel with Cuba, Dunhill does not close the gap. Nevertheless, when
the essential lessons of Citibank and Dunhill are extended to the wider
possibilities for the doctrine, the wisdom which undergirds the Sabba-
tino decision is apparent. Even if, in these peripheral areas, it should
be concluded that Justice Harlan's broad interdiction is not the product
of a constitutional edict, its underpinnings are nevertheless to be found
in the Constitution, and in that larger search for order and justice which
is the ultimate object of the rule of law among nations.
In developing these arguments, this Article begins in Part I with
a review of the content and theoretical implications of the Court's
debate. Part II examines the compatibility of the Cuban decisions, par-
ticularly Citibank and Dunhill, with certain basic notions of justice in
American society. Part I. considers the manner in which these deci-
sions raise the larger issue of judicial legitimacy. It analyzes the unfor-
tunate choice which those Justices who challenge Sabbatino would
impose upon the courts, and places that choice in the historical context
of the political question doctrine. It also lays the groundwork for a dis-
cussion of the conceptual uniqueness of act of state. Part IV offers a
"Summary and Forward Look." Its initial object is to indicate how sub-
stantially the holding in Sabbatino extended the doctrine beyond the
immediate needs of that case or the leading decisions upon which it
was predicated. To test the merits of that extension, a rough catalogue
of foreign state acts is offered along with an assessment as to when,
in dealing with such acts, the courts are likely to confront a political
question in the classic model described in Part Ill. Part V takes the
concluding step, suggesting that resort to the act of state doctrine in
the more peripheral categories of its application is compelled by that
(Vol. 1976:807
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need to preserve the integrity of the courts which the Cuban cases so
pointedly illustrate. Finally, this concern for judicial integrity is recon-
cildd with the territorial limitation which Justice Harlan engrafted upon
his holding, suggesting in rough outline those circumstances under
which that limitation should be discarded.
I. THE DEBATE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
A. The Content of the Debate
In holding that the courts were not to entertain international law
challenges to foreign expropriatory decrees,21 Justice Harlan devoted
much of his opinion to what might be called the direct embarrassments
to foreign policy which could flow from a contrary holding-that, gener-
ally, judicial pronouncements upon so sensitive a subject could only
strain good relations with foreign governments and render efforts at a
negotiated settlement more difficult. To read the Justice, however, as
concerned solely with these direct effects is to ignore much of what he
had to say, in particular his concern for the subtler effects upon foreign
policy and the broader national interest, his fears for the integrity of
the courts, and his sense of what justice for private Americans and good
order in the international community might require.
Responding to the thought that the American courts could be used
to deter foreign governments from confiscating American property, Jus-
tice Harlan tendered a very precise calculus. The political depart-
ments, Congress and the Executive, possess the only truly effective
21. Sabbatino involved a dispute between Banco Nacional, an agency of the Cuban
government, and an American-owned Cuban firm (C.A.V.), one-time owner of a cargo
of sugar sold to an American brokerage firm (Farr, Whitlock & Co.). The district court
held that the sale had occurred after the expropriation of the cargo by Cuba. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). After Farr, Whit-
lock, with the permission of the Cuban government, sold the sugar and turned the pro-
ceeds over to a New York receiver representing C.A.V.'s interests (Sabbatino), Banco
Nacional sued to recover the proceeds. Both Farr, Whitlock and C.A.V. (as amicus
curiae) resisted the claim on the ground that, because the expropriation violated inter-
national law, Cuba had never obtained valid title to the cargo. The district court gave
judgment for Farr, Whitlock; the Second Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. 307
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court reversed. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Be-
tween the time of the Supreme Court's decision and the decision of the Second Circuit
on remand, Congress enacted the so-called Hickenlooper/Sabbatino amendment, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1970), amending The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2151 et seq. (1964). See note 63 infra. Relying on that amendment, the Second Cir-
cuit again gave judgment for Farr, Whitlock. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d
166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
Vol. 1976:807]
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instruments of deterrence. If the threats of boycotts, embargoes,
seizure of assets, or termination of foreign aid had succeeded, the need
for judicial action would not have arisen. If they had failed, it was fan-
ciful to think that piecemeal judicial actions could succeed. All that
the courts could do in such cases was demonstrate their impotence at
the expense of both American foreign policy and those injured
investors who were depending upon a negotiated settlement. But
there is more; the Justice moves on to invoke an even broader concern
for national policy and the role of courts in the service of that policy.
Had Congress and the Executive not resorted to the more powerful
instruments available to them, the courts, even if confident of succeed-
ing in their deterrent purpose, were bound to respect the national
interest determination implicit in the political departments' exercise of
restraint.22
Next, there is the connection between the observed refusal of
many nations to accept the traditional international law of expropriation
and the Justice's dismissal of the suggestion that American courts could
aid in fashioning a more adequate consensus on the point. He found
the differences of viewpoint to be rooted in the fundamental disparities
of international life---differences of economic and political power and
ideological commitment. 23  He treated almost with scorn the idea that
courts in the world's leading exponent of private enterprise and the
world's leading exporter of capital might act as tutor to other nations
on so sensitive a subject.24
Yet he did not abandon all possibilities for an American contribu-
tion to the development of a more adequate international law. He
turned, rather, to the dynamics of consensus building and the role of
various institutions in that process. If the question were characterized by
fundamental, structurally rooted disparities of national viewpoint, then
consensus building in the Justice's view, would be a process involving
the advocacy by each nation of norms reflective of its own national
interest. For the United States this responsibility lay with the Execu-
tive.25 Under the basic postulates of American democracy, the courts
could serve the cause of justice and good order only through the rea-
22. 376 U.S. at 435-36.
23. Id. at 429-30.
24. Id. at 434-35.
25. See id. at 432-33:
When articulating principles of international law in its relation with other
states, the Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally
accepted and traditional rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate




soned application of agreed principles and only as they were prepared,
through that process, to decide like cases alike. 6 For the American
courts to become advocates of a parochial national viewpoint which
might shift with each change in the nation's interests could very well,
Justice Harlan implied, thrust those courts into the position of having
to choose between the national interest and their own basic integrity, a
choice destructive of any contribution they might make to the rule of
law among nations.
A final element in the opinion was the Justice's concern for all
the victims of an expropriation, not just those before the court. Con-
fined to piecemeal adjudications, unable to aid all those victims, the
courts could only prejudice other efforts toward a broader redress of
grievances . 7 And this concern, he seemed to say, must be given weight
irrespective of the prospects for a general diplomatic settlement in the
particular case or of the State Department's willingness to seek such
a settlement.28
In contrast to all of this, Justice Rehnquist in Citibank offered a
mixture of comity and deference 29 that was patently intended to force
the judicial perspective into the least spacious confines possible.
Under the constraints of deference, a court's concern for the unrepre-
sented victims of an expropriation would cease once Executive concern
had ended. The deference theory's connotation of subservience to the
Executive eliminated any link between the act of state doctrine and the
protection of judicial integrity. In this view, the doctrine is not con-
cerned with conflicts between a court's duty to decide like cases alike
26. Immediately preceding his review of the disparity of national viewpoints on the
international law of expropriations, his description of the deeper causes of that disparity
and his reflections upon the sensitivity of the question which that disparity evidenced,
Justice Harlan explained the relevance of his comments in the following terms:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus
concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is
for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then
focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact
rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent
with the national interest or with international justice. Id. at 428.
27. The political departments could engage in diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral,
and could resort to economic and political sanctions in efforts to obtain general redress
for American victims of the foreign state action. "Judicial determinations of invalidity
of title [could], on the other hand, have only an occasional impact." As "[pliecemeal
dispositions . . . involving the probability of affront to another state [they] could se-
riously interfere" with the efforts of the Executive. Id. at 431-32.
28. Notable is Justice Harlan's disregard of Justice White's contrary argument in
dissent. See id. at 460-61; compare the position of the United States in its amicus brief,
supra note 6, at 32-33.




according to antecedent principle and its duty to serve the national
interest.
Gone also was Justice Harlan's fear that the American courts
might hinder, rather than aid, the processes of transnational conflict
resolution and the development of more adequate norms on subjects
where consensus was lacking. Under the deference theory, any
observed disparity among national viewpoints would be relevant only
if it indicated that an adjudication might embarrass the Executive.
Where the Executive had ceased to be concerned with the matter, that
disparity would serve only as an indication of a somewhat difficult prob-
lem in finding the applicable law. Deference, in sum, was used by
Justice Rehnquist to divorce act of state from any larger, organic ques-
tions of institutional competence and authority.
In adding comity to deference, Justice Rehnquist nowhere ex-
plored the intricate and possibly conflicting ideas that these two con-
cepts tend to import into the decisional process. Suffice it to suggest
here that if he was not merely using comity as a meaningless descrip-
tion of a result, his opinion could be read as laying the foundation for
a later return to a modified international law exception to act of state.30
Placing Justice Powell's Citibank opinion"1 along this spectrum
of views is admittedly a difficult task. Since he professed to concur
in the principles of Sabbatino, Justice Powell's announced dissent from
the results of that decision may have reflected nothing more than a dis-
agreement with Justice Harlan's assessment of the particular dangers of
an adjudication in that case. Plainly, he was not prepared to treat the
Legal Adviser's invitation to adjudicate32 as controlling, and he
acknowledged the possibility of a convergence with the political ques-
30. Consider the following possibility: As an emanation of international comity,
act of state would seem to mandate only that respect which the courts of one nation
ought to accord the public acts of another in the interests of a just and viable interna-
tional order. Since deference to the Executive appears to exclude all of those larger
institutional concerns outlined in Sabbatino (except the concern for foreign policy),
there would seem to remain only the substantive norms of international law for
comity to import into the search for a more viable international order. Comity mixed
with deference becomes, in short, a code word for the principle that the courts of the
United States ought not to respect any foreign act promulgated in defiance of interna-
tional norms. And it is this principle that is to be weighed against the dangers to policy.
Since deference and comity can conflict because the judicial vindication of international
norms may disrupt foreign policy, there is no automatic exception to act of state for
clear violations of international law. On the other hand, because act of state is not
predicated upon deference alone, there is no automatic foreign policy exception to the
responsibility of the courts to vindicate those norms. There is rather a weighing of the
two. For a fuller discussion of the comity doctrine see note 61 infra.
31. Citibank, 406 U.S. at 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
32. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
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tion doctrine. Yet like Justice Rehnquist, he saw the protection of
foreign policy as the central purpose of the doctrine. In reaching the
same result as the plurality, he found support in a broader rationale.
The American judiciary should, he contended, take a more active role
in vindicating the substantive rules of international law and should
especially aid in developing a "respected body" of law in what he char-
acterized as a "long-neglected area. a3  Any fears that he may have
shared with Justice Harlan in the abstract seem to have been sublimated
in the hope of achieving progress through the judicial perfection of
international law. Subtly, but unequivocally, he appears to have
crossed the line from a narrow plea against Justice Harlan's particular
assessment of the dangers in Sabbatino to a plea for a greater tolerance
of those dangers.
More importantly, when the potential consequences of Justice
Powell's decision are evaluated, it becomes clear that he did not share
some of the basic sensitivities underlying Justice Harlan's work. His
preference as among competing private interests, his view of the public
interest and his sense of danger to judicial integrity were all much more
akin to Justice Rehnquist's ideas on these matters than to anything
offered by Justice Harlan. Perhaps more adroitly than Justice Rehn-
quist, and certainly more subtly, Justice Powell seemed to have joined
in the challenge to Sabbatino.
In light of the debate which surfaced in Citibank, it came as no
surprise that when the Dunhill petition was filed, the Court appeared
ready to reconsider Sabbatino. Dunhill arose out of the Cuban govern-
ment's seizure (called "intervention") of certain Cuban owned cigar
companies. In a three-way suit, the lower courts held that the "inter-
ventors" (agents of the Cuban government) were entitled under the
act of state doctrine to receive from three American importers all
amounts due for cigars shipped after intervention. 4 The district court,
however, held that the importers had a claim against Cuba in quasi-
33. Citibank, 406 U.S. at 775 (Powell, J., concurring). ,
34. The controversy started when the former Cuban owners of the factories brought
a number of actions to recover from the importers the value of these post-intervention
shipments (approximately $700,000) and for alleged trade-mark infringements. The in-
terventors then sued to enjoin the law firm representing the owners from pursuing their
actions. In this litigation the District Court held, inter alia, that since Cuba's seizure
of its own citizens' property could not give rise to a violation of international law, the
Hickenlooper/Sabbatino Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970) (see note 21
supra), did not apply, and under Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine foreclosed any judi-
cial scrutiny of the owner's claim that the seizure violated American public policy. F.
Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 375 F.2d
1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967). In that litigation it was assumed
Vol. 1976:807]
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contract (unjust enrichment) for all payments on pre-intervention ship-
ments (i.e., accounts receivable), which it said belonged to the former
owners but which the importers had mistakenly paid to Cuba. 5 On
appeal the Second Circuit agreed with the Cuban government that the
interventors' refusal to return these mistaken payments constituted an
act of state, but relied upon Citibank to give each importer a right of
set-off up to the amounts owed by it on the post-intervention ship-
ments. 6  Dunhill, one of the importers, appealed the limitation. It,
unlike the other importers, had a counterclaim for mistaken payments
that exceeded the sums owed Cuba by some $55,000. Contending that
Cuba's repudiation of the quasi-contractual obligation was not an act
of state, Dunhill argued that it should properly be allowed to recover
this sum out of the balances owed by other importers to Cuba. The
Court gave judgment for Dunhill. s7
Writing for the same plurality that joined Justice Rehnquist in Citi-
bank, Justice White first concluded that the interventors' refusal to
return the mistaken payments was not an act of state. 8 He then pro-
ceeded to propose a blanket "commercial obligations" exception to the
doctrine, relying upon the deference theory. The purpose of act of
state was, he said, citing Sabbatino,39 to foreclose judicial actions that
by all concerned that any amounts owed by the importers on the date of interven-
tion in respect of shipments prior to that date were insignificant. Later, however,
it was discovered that those amounts were approximately $477,600. It was the dispute
over this sum that gave rise to the Dunhill litigation.
35. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afrd oi
this point sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
36. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1371-73 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. Dunhill, 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976). In addition, the interventors had petitioned
for certiorari, challenging the award of the pre-intervention accounts receivable to the
former owners and the importers' right of set-off generally. Republic of Cuba v.
Saks & Co., No. 73-1287 (2d Cir. 1976). The other importers had also petitioned the
Court to overturn the judgment against them on these amounts. Saks & Co. v. The Re-
public of Cuba, No. 73-1289 (2d Cir. 1976). On the same day that it announced its
decision, the Court denied both of these petitions. 96 S. Ct. 2201 (1976); see Dunhill,
96 S. Ct. at 1859 n.6.
38. Two grounds were cited by the Justice. First, such refusal was seen merely as
a reiteration of their original claim to the pre-intervention accounts receivable. Second,
there was, according to the Justice, no evidence in the record-no statute, decree, order
or resolution-showing that the Cuban government had repudiated the obligation to
repay the importers. Counsel's statements to this effect were only a "litigating position,"
while the interventors themselves were only commercial agents not empowered to exer-
cise sovereign authority. 96 S. Ct. at 1860-61 & n.8.
39. He also noted Justice Harlan's suggestion that the more certain the international
law in question the more surely the courts may act, observing that in the matter of com-
mercial dealings there is not the uncertainty that might attend the "exercises of govern-




might embarrass the Executive in the conduct of foreign relations.
Taking note of the fact that the Executive had, apparently without peril
to foreign policy, adopted the so-called "restrictive theory" of sovereign
immunity (i.e.,'denied immunity in suits arising out of a foreign gov-
ernment's commercial operations) and noting the reasons behind that
position, the Justice concluded that nothing in national policy required
American courts to recognize a foreign governments repudiation of
its commercial obligations. 0
In a separate opinion Justice Stevens agreed that the interventors'
refusal to return the mistaken payments was not an act of state, but
declined to embrace any sweeping commercial obligations exception to
the doctrine.4 Justice Powell, perceiving difficulties in drawing the
line between commercial and political acts, concurred separately. He
emphasized that the central purpose of the doctrine was the avoidance
of judicial "interfere[nce] with delicate foreign relations conducted by
the political branches," concluding, on the basis of his Citibank opinion,
that the allowance of Dunhill's claim posed no threat of such inter-
ference.42
Writing for the four Justices who dissented in Citibank, Justice
Marshall insisted that the interventors' refusal was not only an act of
state, but an integral part of the expropriation of the cigar companies,
and hence indistinguishable from the seizure of the other assets of those
firms situated in Cuba. It was, in other words, an act squarely within
the Sabbatino interdiction.43 In rejecting Justice White's proposed
commercial obligations exception, Justice Marshall relied principally
upon Justice Brennan's Citibank dissent. Act of state, he emphasized,
may serve purposes quite independent of the reasons for sovereign
immunity, including the occasional identification of political questions
not cognizable by the courts. Justice White's proposal was, according
to Marshall, predicated upon reasons derived from an inapposite
analogy which might very well intrude the courts into disputes consti-
tutionally withheld from their purview.44
40. Id. at 1866-67.
41. Id. at 1871 (Stevens, J., concurring).
42. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 1878 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1876-77. Justice Marshall made two additional points. Dunhill's coun-
terclaim, he asserted, was indistinguishable from an affirmative claim independent of any
claim by Cuba. As such it was beyond the limited purview of the Citibank exception
and squarely within the scope of Sabbatino. Id. at 1880. Second, in its brief the gov-
ernment of Cuba had supplied the Court with a letter from the Treasury Department,
stating that under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101 et seq.
(1963), the Department would not permit Dunhill to execute any judgment it might ob-
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Overall, it seems fair to view the Court as still evenly divided over
the fundamental predicates of the act of state doctrine. The plurality,
unable to command a majority favoring total subservience to the Execu-
tive, nevertheless used the deference theory to fashion an analogy to
sovereign immunity and utilized that analogy to mount yet another
broad attack on the Sabbatino holding. Justice Powell, while refusing
to abandon his professed agreement with the broader principles of
Sabbatino, has again evinced a willingness to apply those principles in
a way that would seem incompatible with the basic sensitivities from
which they were derived. If anything, his emphasis upon act of state as
a means of avoiding embarrassments to foreign policy reflects a narrow-
ing of his avowed disagreement with the plurality's thoroughgoing def-
erence theory. The four dissenters remain unmoved in their insistence
upon the broader Sabbatino formula and its constitutional under-
pinnings, while Justice Stevens has yet to commit himself on the funda-
mental issues.
B. The Larger Implications
As already noted, the basic theme of this Article is the wisdom
of Sabbatino and the folly of the challenges to that decision. Such a
conclusion, however, compels recognition of the fact that the act of
state and political question doctrines are constructed from certain
common ideas. In the interests it protects, the Sabbatino formulation
reflects the same concern for judicial legitimacy that may be seen to
underlie the political question doctrine. Both doctrines direct judicial
inquiry along the same lines; both derive their reason and definition
from the distinctive experience of the American nation under the
separation of powers principle.
The equation is, however, only a sometime thing. Not every con-
troversy over a foreign state act will qualify as a political question under
the strict test of textual commitment to another branch of govern-
ment.4 5  And not every such controversy is likely to exhibit the large-
ness of subject which alone would seem to warrant abstention under
a broader, more prudential view of the political question doctrine.46
Yet, even if these criteria are not met, Sabbatino, Citibank, and
Dunhill serve to illustrate certain basic principles concerning interna-
tional law, the international legal system and the role of domestic courts
tain against the funds paid to Cuba by the other importers. The Justice contended that
Dunhill's claim was, therefore, virtually moot. Id. at 1881-82 & nn.25-27.
45. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969). See note 123 infra.
46. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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in transnational disputes which can supply persuasive reasons for extend-
ing act of state beyond the confines of a classic political question.
Much of the dissatisfaction with Sabbatino apparently rests upon
a conviction that the rights of private property embodied in the tradi-
tional international law of expropriations-the so-called "non-discrim-
inatory, full, prompt and adequate compensation" standard47-- are
rights to be preserved in any just ordering of international society and
are rights, therefore, to which the Court should have lent its support.
The conviction that these traditional rights are important is, as a per-
sonal preference, shared by the author. But the judicial role in vindi-
cating those rights is a more complex matter altogether. For when an
international norm touches a subject about which American law has
something to say, American courts may well find themselves engaged
in a highly intricate problem of institutional and cognitive dynamics
ignored by the challengers of Sabbatino and their animating convictions.
Thus, if a domestic court enforces international norms against a
foreign government in the name of some paramount set of values but
refuses to call its own government to account on the same basis, it has
issued perhaps the ultimate expression of contempt for the judicial
process. Yet the avoidance of such hypocrisy can present other and
possibly more intractable difficulties. When a domestic court is pre-
sented a question with implications for its own government's policies
and those policies have been sanctioned by its own constitution, it is
manifestly difficult for that court to judge the issue according to an anti-
thetical international norm. Unless allowed to escape from judging, the
court may well find itself acting as a negative force in the processes
of international consensus building and conflict resolution. 4
Where the conflicting international norm is supported by a strong
consensus, the felt exigencies of the case may create a tension which will
cause-indeed, compel-the court to abandon, distort, or otherwise un-
dermine that norm. On a more insidious level, a court may intrude its
own narrow nationalistic perspective into the task of fact perception and
characterization.49
47. See, e.g., 8 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1143 (1967); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 187
(1965).
48. Compare Sabbatino, Citibank and Dunhill with Sardino v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966) (upholding United
States' freezing of Cuban assets in this country). For a fuller discussion of Sardino,
see Part III. A. in/ra.
49. If disposed to view the disparity between domestic and international norms as
evidence of the need for change in the latter, the question for the court is whether other
institutions and processes are better fit to assume the role of advocate.
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Where consensus is lacking, the difficulties of escaping the advo-
cate's role are even greater. • And while such a situation may offer
an opportunity to aid in the development of a new and more adequate
consensus, an imperfect resolution can, depending upon the subject,
serve to polarize opinion and exacerbate existing difficulties. It may
also undermine the use of existing norms to facilitate negotiation and
compromise, results which those norms may nurture more effectively
than any rule the court can fashion in conformity to domestic law.
All of this was illustrated with some force in Citibank. The
integrity of the American judiciary was very much at issue in that
case.50 The avoidance of a threat to that integrity, however, would
have set the courts on a course of decision posing severe problems for
American foreign policy, problems which the Legal Adviser's letter had
ignored. 51- In Dunhill, on the other hand, the interventors' refusal to
return the mistaken payments was not treated as a violation of interna-
tional law. The integrity of that law was not at stake, but the integrity
of American law and of the American courts was involved, and the
decision offers an intriguing opportunity for extending the lessons of
Citibank.
Also running through the opposition to Sabbatino is a sense that
in that case the Court abdicated its duty to the litigants who had invoked
its aid. Yet this sense rests, it would seem, upon a wholly unsophisti-
cated propensity to equate a court's duty in a transnational dispute with
its duty in a wholly domestic conflict. In the latter context, a court can
usually assume that the equities which define its duty to the litigants
will be the same for all persons similarly situated. It can generally
assume that all those with comparable claims will have access to com-
parable relief, if they choose to act in a timely fashion, and that its
action on behalf of the litigants will not work to the detriment of others
equally deserving. In the transnational setting such assumptions may
not be so readily indulged. Jurisdiction may be so fortuitous, remedial
opportunities so episodic---"piecemeal," as Justice Harlan put it52 -that
justice for the litigants may become an act of injustice for non-litigants
with equally meritorious claims.
This was obviously Justice Harlan's concern when he spoke of the
adverse effects that an adjudication might have upon efforts at a
broader negotiated settlement of a particular controversy. But there
are other dangers as well. Certainly, in defining its duty to litigants,
50. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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a court must consider what effect its decision may have on any remedial
mechanism already established by the political departments, a require-
ment dramatically ignored in both Citibank and Dunhill. A court
cannot disregard the possibility that the legal principles it is compelled
to apply may so undercut other more adequate remedial devices that
its effort to do justice in a single case becomes tantamount to a positive
act of injustice extending well beyond relations with a particular
foreign government or a particular dispute over that government's
actions.
In broader terms, the alleged failure of the Court in Sabbatino to
vindicate traditional values and to aid deserving litigants is seen as a
failure of the Court to advance the rule of law among nations.53 Yet
this criticism is rooted in a peculiar, and rather limited, view of law and
the international legal order. It is a view central to Justice Rehnquist's
deference-comity paradigm, and it asserts that the advance of the rule
of law among nations is to be measured exclusively by national adher-
ence to the rules of international law, secured largely through judicial
action. Only when the nation's most urgent foreign policy objectives
dictate otherwise are the courts to stay their hand.
It is a simple formula which, in Falk's apt phrase, equates the
"extension of law in international relations . . .with the maximum
application of universal substantive standards."54 Any danger that the
equation might prove unworkable is seen not as invalidating the equa-
tion but only as evidence of a defect in extant rules which the courts
can with diligence overcome. The formula necessarily draws heavily
upon a view of law as rules, and then only such rules as are vouchsafed
judicial enforcement. It rejects as a contradiction in terms any thought
that the rule of law among nations may depend less upon the judicial
enforcement of international legal norms than upon a deliberate refusal
to do so in the proper case. That the courts might so refuse in order
to protect foreign policy is a concession to expediency yielded up grudg-
ingly, a matter of mere deference whose purview is to be defined as
narrowly as possible.5
53. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 439-41 (White, J., dissenting).
54. R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
5 (1964).
55. For some of the better known and more forceful critiques of the older tradition,
consult M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1961); Hoffman, International Systems and International Law, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SYSTEM (K. Knorr & S. Verba eds. 1961); McDougal, International Law, Power
& Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COuRS 133 (1953).
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The view that the act of state doctrine rests on constitutional
underpinnings, on the other hand, is rooted in a rejection of this
positivist perspective which has too long plagued international legal
thought. It begins, instead, by accepting the possibility that the en-
forcement of international legal norms by domestic courts may neither
serve justice nor secure a more viable international order. It refuses
to define this possibility solely in terms of disrupting foreign policy,
insisting that courts can serve the cause of justice and good order only
as they pay strict attention to the constitutional foundations of their
own legitimacy. Above all else, it relies upon a highly comprehensive
perspective in which the international legal system is seen as a multiplic-
ity of institutions and processes, of diplomats and politics no less than
of courts and decisions by reasoned principles. It implies that the rules
of international law are not ends in themselves to which nations owe an
unvarying obligation of conformity, but facilitative devices serving a
variety of purposes. They may serve as principles for the reasoned
decisions of courts. But as reflections of community expectations they
may only serve to bring nations to the negotiating table, or act as weights
in the calculus of bargain and compromise. It implies, in short, that the
progress of law is not to be equated with the progress of rules but with
the progress of justice and good order and that, therefore, constitu-
tional legitimacy is an inextricable element in the search for law in the
international community.
Finally, it is true that because act of state deals with "laws
in space," as Beale aptly defined the general province of the conflict
of laws, 6 it may be thought of as merely another conflicts rule. On
the other hand, such a characterization adds nothing to understanding.
In fact, it can mislead if it results in a denial of the doctrine's unique
constitutional underpinnings and invites attempts to fix the ambit of the
doctrine by reference to the modalities and policies usually employed
in formulating more traditional conflicts rules.57  At the same time, of
56. 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON ThE CONFLICTS OF LAW § 1.1 (1935).
57. For perhaps the most extended effort to fit act of state within traditional private
international law rules, see Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q.
REv. 42 (1943). The effort, on the whole, does not succeed, being dependent upon a
quite extraordinary reading of the leading British case, Duke of Brunswick v. King of
Hanover, 9 Eng. Rep. 993 (H.L. 1848), and upon the insistence that Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), was actually decided on sovereign immunity grounds.
Mann's analysis is also based on a wholly inapposite comparison which at once approved
the decision of a Belgian court, de Bauffremont v. de Bauffremont, [1880] Arrets des
Cours d'Appel, Recueil General 319 (Bruxelles), which passed upon the validity of a
German naturalization decree as preliminary to determining the validity of a marriage,
and criticized the refusal of a Dutch court in Papadopoulos v. N.V. Koninklijke Neder-
landsche Stoombootmaatschappij, [1925-26] Ann. Dig. 27 (No. 19) (Dist. Ct., Am-
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course, there is an intimate operational relationship between act of state
and these rules, a relationship considered at several points in this
Article.58
Likewise, references to international comity as a predicate for act
of state can mislead. The reference is often quite meaningless. Any
time the doctrine is applied, a court is granting comity to a foreign state
act, but why it should do so remains unexplained. 59 If, however,
comity is seen, under Justice Story's view," as the principle undergird-
ing all of the more traditional conflicts rules, and the reference to
comity is a shorthand means for denying the doctrine's unique constitu-
tional predicates, it will not do. And, if the reference is to the elements
in the broader Storian prescription, there is good reason to suggest that
act of state is wholly distinct from comity. 61
Within the framework established by these larger implications of
the Court's debate, we turn to the cases.
sterdam), affd on other grounds, [1927-28] Ann. Dig. 34 (No. 17) (Ct. App., Amster-
dam), to review a charge of embezzlement against the British occupation forces in Tur-
key. At bottom the attempt confessed its own analytic weakness with the following
statement:
On the other hand, it is, of course, understandable that a judge will be re-
luctant to question and perhaps condemn a foreign act of State. But this is
a somewhat political consideration which, in the last resort, will often weigh
heavily with him but which should not be allowed to be twisted into a denial
of his powers . . . . Mann, supra, at 52-53.
Surely, it is the province of legal scholarship to consider what weighs heavily with the
judges, to pursue the implications of what judges do, and to work these considerations
into a doctrinal form that will aid in formulating principled decisions which are also re-
sponsive to reality. Compare the development of a wholly contrary point of view in
Holdsworth, The History of Acts of State in English Law, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1313
(1941). Act of state, Holdsworth concludes, is an emanation of the English Constitu-
tion.
58. In general terms the relationship has the following incidents. As Justice Har-
lan's holding indicates, the act of state doctrine does not normally apply to extrater-
ritorial acts of a foreign sovereign. Not infrequently, therefore, the courts are compelled
by this principle to consult traditional conflicts rules for guidance in fixing the situs of
the property or transactions affected by a foreign state act. Those rules serve as a "trig-
ger" to the doctrine except in the narrow category of cases where the territorial limit
is to be ignored. Moreover, all challenges to a foreign state act must rest upon some
assertion of a right derived from some law, either international or municipal. Where
it is the latter, (e.g., Dunhill), a court may very well be compelled to resort to tradi-
tional choice of law rules before it can determine whether there is any issue for it to
resolve. The discussion in Part V of this Article suggests an important relationship be-
tween act of state and the traditional conflicts rule against the enforcement of foreign
"penal" laws.
59. See, e.g., Laylin, Justiciable Disputes Involving Acts of State, 7 INT'L LAW. 513
n.2 (1973).
60. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 38 (5th ed. 1857).
61. Drawing upon the axioms of the great seventeenth century Dutch jurist, Huber,
Story asserted that the question of when the courts of one nation will recognize the laws
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HI. JUSTICE FOR AMERICAN CLAIMANTS
A. The Citibank Decision
In his letter to the Court in Citibank, the Legal Adviser suggested
that since foreign policy did not necessitate resort to the act of state
doctrine in that case, "considerations of fairness and equity" required
of another is a matter of the comity-not the law-of nations. Id. §§ 29 et seq. It
is the product of an "ought" rather than of "obligation superseding all discretion." The
reason for the distinction was self-evident: "[E]very nation must judge for itself, and
certainly is not bound to recognize [foreign laws], when they would be prejudicial to
its own interests." Id. § 36 at 43. Yet, this sense of "ought" is rooted in the same
considerations that give rise to international law. It is derived, Story suggested-and
here the criteria for its application emerge---"from mutual interest and utility, from a
sense of the inconveniences which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a
sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return."
Id. § 35 at 42. As a reflection of mutual utility and reciprocity, therefore, the actual
practice of comity traces its "origin and authority" to the "consent of nations." Id. §
36 at 43.
The difficulties of working act of state into this formulation are best illustrated by
Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino. Anxious to find an international predicate for act
of state, Justice White argued that the doctrine rests upon "the deeply imbedded postulate
in international law of the territorial supremacy of the sovereign." 376 U.S. at 445.
Other nations, without act of state, use this postulate to "afford substantial respect to
acts of foreign states." All that act of state does is to foreclose a "challenge to ....
foreign law on the ordinary conflict of laws ground of repugnancy to the public policy
of the forum." It merely takes the "deeply embedded" territorial concept "one step fur-
ther." Id. at 446.
But this is remarkable. If the "territorial concept" is descriptive of a nexus between
a foreign law and its objects which serves to lend that law's demand for recognition a
certain persuasive force-but not a force sufficient to overcome its repugnance to the
"public policy" of the forum-the obvious question is why the American courts under
act of state have found that persuasive force undiminished even if repugnant to policy;
why have they taken the "one step further"? It is not a step, Justice White noted, sup-
ported by any consensus raising it to an obligation of international law. Even if it were
said that the American practice represented the leading edge of an evolving international
consensus, it must still be asked what considerations underlie that movement. If one
then searches further for some footing in that mutual necessity, convenience and reci-
procity which Story thought underlay international comity, one must still ask what dis-
tinguishes the American perception of those expedients from the perception Justice
White attributes to the rest of the world.
Curiously, and quite unintentionally, Justice White supplies the answer. The bal-
ance of his opinion is devoted to fashioning a particular view of the international legal
system and of the place of norms in that system, in order to demonstrate that the cause
of international order would best be served if courts paid greater heed to their constitu-
tional task of deciding controversies on the merits and less attention to the problems
of judicial legitimacy which so animated Justice Harlan. Moreover, White nowhere ad-
vocates an automatic "international law exception" to act of state. He does not argue
that because act of state rests upon an international predicate, it should be set aside in
the face of foreign state acts which are themselves expressions of disrespect for the pre-
cepts of international justice. His quarrel is not with act of state itself, but with the
scope given to it by Justice Harlan. And the scope he would assign the doctrine is ulti-
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that it not be applied. 2  Judge Lumbard, in reviewing the matter both
before and after the Legal Adviser had intervened, however, thought
that equity had another dimension. Banco Nacional had sued to
recover approximately $2 million of excess proceeds remaining after
First National City Bank of New York (the "Bank") had sold and
applied certain collateral against the unpaid balance of its $10 million
loan to Banco Nacional. By way of counterclaims the Bank sought to
offset against this $2 million the value of Bank properties located in
Cuba and seized by the Castro government allegedly in violation of
international law. It was to these counterclaims that Banco Nacional
had interposed the act of state doctrine.3 Critical to Judge Lumbard's
appraisal was the fact that if judgment had been given to Banco
Nacional, the $2 million would have been blocked under the Cuban
mately derived from his view of the constitutional responsibilities of the courts. Thus,
the answer to why the American courts have taken the "one step further", is that in con-
suiting their own constitutional traditions, they have in particular cases set aside those
practices which reflect the consensual "ought" upon which Storian comity rests in favor
of a more generous posture. If one must speak of comity-of that "ought" flowing
from mutual necessity, convenience and reciprocity-it is that traditional practice of
states which defines the limits of comity, and the rejection of that practice under the
press of constitutional considerations, that explain the rise of the act of state doctrine.
This is not to suggest that act of state could not be predicated upon the broader
Storian formula. The basic elements in the controlling constitutional perspective just
reviewed all reflect a concern for the quality of the international order. One can argue
that a fully matured act of state doctrine would so serve the needs of the international
community that it should rest upon an international predicate. But plainly, this percep-
tion is not shared by the majority of states in that community. The reason lies in the
disparate nature of national legal systems which makes it difficult or unnecessary for
national courts to effect a linkage between the elements of constitutional legitimacy
within a democratic order and the search for law in the international community. Even
were a consensus around this point to emerge, the ultimate standard would remain con-
stitutional. On comity generally see Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Re-
ciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087
(1956), and Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 9 (1966).
62. Letter from John R. Stevenson, supra note 7.
63. In Citibank the district court had held for the Bank on the ground that the case
was covered by the HickenlooperlSabbatino Amendment. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1007-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). That statute re-
quires the courts, notwithstanding the act of state doctrine, to make a determination on
the merits of any claim of right to property confiscated by an act of a foreign state in
violation of international law, unless the President files a suggestion with the court that
application of the act of state doctrine is required in the interests of foreign policy. 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1970). This decision was reversed by the Second Circuit in an
opinion written by Judge Lumbard. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court
then granted certiorari and remanded to the Second Circuit for consideration of the
Legal Adviser's letter. 400 U.S. 1019 (1971). The Second Circuit, again speaking
through Judge Lumbard, declined to change its earlier determination, 442 F.2d 530 (2d
Cir. 1971), and the Supreme Court reversed.
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Assets Control Regulations. 64  Assets blocked and later "vested" in the
government have often provided the principal source of general redress
for all American claimants in cases of this sort.65 Thus, the Bank's
attempt to avoid the act of state doctrine represented to Judge Lum-
bard nothing less than a demand for a preference over other Americans
who had also suffered from Castro's expropriations.66
The point to note is that all American claimants against Cuba, as
a group, had and continue to have certain expectations with regard to
blocked funds. These expectations are based upon a considerable
history supported by official action, although without any official
commitment to make the funds available for the payment of claims.
64. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101 et seq. (1963). Under the blocking regulations, the funds
payable to the Cuban bank would have been frozen in the United States and made avail-
able to satisfy American claims arising out of the Cuban expropriation program.
65. Blocked assets have been used principally to satisfy American claims against the
Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. The settlement of claims against
the Soviet Union was effected exclusively out of the assets in the United States assigned
to this country under the Litvinov Assignments. See note 100 infra. A number of set-
tlement treaties with Eastern European countries are outlined in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 433-34 (2d ed. 1976). In 1948 Yugoslavia agreed to
the establishment of a $17 million fund for the payment of claims; ninety per cent of
this amount was represented by blocked assets. Treaty with Yugoslavia on the Setttle-
ment of Pecuniary Claims Against Yugoslavia, July 19, 1948, 62 Stat. 2658 (1948),
T.I.A.S. No. 1803. Yugoslavia later agreed to pay $3.5 million against additional
claims. Treaty with Yugoslavia on Claims of United States Nationals, Nov. 5, 1964,
[1965] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 5750. In settlement of American claims Rumania
agreed to pay $2.5 million and consented to the establishment of a fund of $22 million
from vested assets located in the United States. Treaty with Rumania on Settlement
of Claims of United States Nationals and Other Financial Matters, March 30, 1960,
[1960] 1 U.S.T. 317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451. Bulgaria agreed to a settlement of $3.5 mil-
lion, of which only $400,000 was paid by Bulgaria. The balance came from vested
assets. Treaty with Bulgaria on Claims, July 2, 1963, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S.
No. 5387. In the case of Hungary, settlement was to be made out of $3,320,000 of
vested assets and $18.9 million paid by Hungary. Treaty with Hungary on Settlement
of Claims, March 6, 1973, [1973] 1 U.S.T. 522, T.I.A.S. No. 7569. Poland agreed to
the payment of $40 million of American claims in exchange for the release of blocked
assets and other U.S. undertakings. Treaty with Poland on Settlement of Claims of
United States Nationals, July 16, 1960, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 4545. Total
claims against Poland were fixed by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission at
$151,789,507. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N DECISIONS & ANNOTATIONS 457
(1969). In the case of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, American claimants were paid
out of vested assets before any general settlement was reached with the foreign govern-
ment. See generally LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT
TO THE HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 1ST SEss., EXPROPRIATION OF
AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTY BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(Comm. Print 1963), reproduced in 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1066 (1963); R. LILLICH,
THn PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1965).
66. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 403-04 (2d
Cir. 1970), on remand, 442 F.2d 530, 534-35 (2a Cir. 1971).
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Thus, shortly after issuance of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
Congress authorized the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to
determine the amount of individual claims against Cuba.67  Histori-
cally, this procedure has, with one exception, been a prelude to the
later negotiation of a lump-sum settlement of claims, with blocked
assets invariably serving as a principal measure and even source of
payment.
The courts have also lent their support to claimants' expectations.
In Propper v. Clark, 8 a "freezing" order was held to prohibit the courts
of New York from transferring the assets of a foreign corporation to
a receiver in liquidation until the Government could determine whether
the assets were needed "to compensate our citizens . . . for the dam-
ages done by the government of the nationals affected." 9  In Sardino
v. Federal Reserve Bank,70 the constitutionality of the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations was upheld, in part, upon the authority of Propper
v. Clark and the "unquestionable right of a state" to protect its
nationals in their persons and property in a foreign country.71 Surely,
if the purpose of protecting American citizens is necessary to sustain
the constitutionality of a seizure of foreign assets, the Americans to be
protected by that seizure might be thought to have a certain "entitle-
ment" 72 to the assets seized. Until deliberately returned to the original
67. 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (Supp. I, 1965), amending 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1964). The
amendments provided for determination of the amount and validity of claims against the
government of Cuba by U.S. nationals.
68. 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
69. Id. at 484. If in Propper v. Clark the purpose of securing the payment of Amer-
ican claims against a foreign government was a purpose sufficient to deprive the Ameri-
can creditors of a foreign corporation any rights in blocked assets, one wonders whether
the Citibank Court's willingness to give the Bank benefit of assets that would otherwise
be blocked (i.e., put the Bank ahead of other claimants) signals a willingness to reverse
Propper.
70. Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
898 (1966).
71. 361 F.2d at 112-13.
72. Arguably, because the Treasury's claim of right to blocked assets is dependent
upon foreign ownership and therefore subject to any defects in the foreign owners' title,
those American claimants who have no prior title in the specific assets before a court
have no greater right to those assets than either the Treasury or the foreign government.
Arguably, in other words, those claimants have no rights of which they could be deprived
if a court, refusing an act of state plea, were to sustain the former American owner's
assertion of a defect in the foreign government's title.
Of course, in Citibank, the Bank was not laying a claim of prior title to the bond
proceeds, but was, as Henkin has observed, suing upon an "international tort." Henkin,
Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 CoL. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 175, 184
(1967). Hence this argument cannot be employed in defense of the decision in that
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owners or applied to some other public purpose, that interest might
even be thought to bear some analogy to such unguaranteed expecta-
tions as that of a welfare recipient in an on-going welfare program, 73
the interest of a tenured teacher 74 or a government employee 75 in his
job, or that of a student in his publicly financed education.7 6
Against this background the questions left unanswered by the
Court in Citibank proliferate. What answer is to be given to Judge
Lumbard's suggestion that judgment for Citibank would conflict with
the policy declared in the Trading With the Enemy Act and the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations? 77  Since the Legal Adviser was competent
to speak only about the effects of an adjudication upon foreign policy,
was his letter even germane to the Court's responsibilities under those
enactments? If, under the deference theory, the Executive could con-
trol application of the act of state doctrine, might not other American
claimants adversely affected by that control have a constitutional right
to be heard on the issue?78 After all, the Legal Adviser clearly had
a view of what fairness required. Could his view of foreign policy have
been affected by his view of justice?
case. Nevertheless, it is applicable to cases like Sabbatino and to situations covered by
the Hickenlooper/Sabbatino amendment. But the argument begs the question. It takes
the notion of "title" as used by the American legal system to resolve conflicts within
a framework of respect for private property and transports it uncritically into an inter-
national conflict between sovereign states where, other means of settlement having
failed, the United States determines to disregard this tradition of respect and subject all
of the property of the other sovereign state within its territory to the redress of its citi-
zens' grievances. Since both groups of American investors are equally aggrieved, the
argument is simply another way of saying that those whose confiscated products enter
the American market are, within the framework of this new and extraordinary remedial
regime, entitled to a preference over those not so fortunate. Actually it is an argument
that the act of state doctrine should not apply because that decision would maximize
the prior owner's recovery at the expense of others aggrieved. If there is some rational
basis for this result it is to be found in the purposes and objectives underlying the new
remedial regime or elsewhere in public policy, and not in the entirely fortuitous fact that
the foreign government happened to bring the expropriated property or its products into
the United States from which point some claimants can formulate their grievances in
terms of a claim to prior title.
73. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
74. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-601 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (dictum); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S.
551 (1956).
75. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-53 (1974); id. at 166-68 (Powell, J.,
concurring); id. at 171 et seq. (White, J., concurring in part); id. at 203 (Douglas, I.,
dissenting); Id. at 206-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975).
77. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 403-04
(2d Cir. 1970).
78. See cases cited in notes 73-76 supra.
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Moreover, having authorized the establishment of an extraordin-
ary remedial regime largely for the benefit of Americans injured by
Cuba's action, could the Government, through any of its branches,
exempt certain assets from the operation of that regime solely to favor
one set of equally aggrieved Americans over another? There is some-
thing disturbingly discriminatory and unequal about such an action,
intuitively suggesting equal protection and due process problems. On
the other hand, the alien and complex political and economic milieu
in which governmental efforts to facilitate the redress of investors'
grievances occur, and the potential impingement of those efforts upon
foreign policy, all caution against any easy answers to the question.
Following the example of the Second Circuit, which did not even
consider the point in upholding the constitutionality of the I-Iicken-
looper/Sabbatino amendment,7 9 all questions concerning the substan-
tive validity of that amendment in this aspect of its operations are set
aside. Nevertheless, the issue of fairness remains. All the Justices
appeared to agree that the Hickenlooper/Sabbatino amendment was
n6t applicable in Citibank. It was only the fairness of the Court's own
actions that was at issue in that case. The setting was limited and the
controlling principle quite clear. The idea that governmental means
must bear some rational relationship to governmental ends represents,
it is suggested, an irreducible core in the nation's defenses against arbi-
trary official action. And by this standard, the hard question is whether
the adjudication in Citibank and the consequent injury to other claim-
ants represented a rational advance toward any larger public purpose
whatsoever.
For purposes of argument it may be conceded that, in the general
case, a number of legitimate public purposes might be served by having
the courts pass on the legality of foreign expropriatory decrees.
Foreign governments would be prevented from marketing in the
United States property taken from Americans in violation of international
law. The United States would be prevented from becoming, as Senator
Hickenlooper called it, a "thieves market. ' 80 Unless immune, any prop-
erty of such a government located in the United States would be made
available for the redress of American grievances. The knowledge that
they would be denied access to the American market or would lose assets
held in the United States might deter governments from confiscating
79. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 955 (1968); see note 63 supra.
80. 110 CONG. REc. 19, 555 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hickenlooper).
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American property. Such denials might even promote the settlement
of disputes and aid the Executive in its negotiations.
Granting all of these possibilities arguendo, the difficulty is that
the decision in Citibank does not seem to bear a rational relationship
to any one of them. Long before that case, the blocking of Cuban
assets had practically foreclosed Cuba from the American market and
denied it the use of any assets located in this country. Only in the case
of property entering the country in the hands of an American or third-
country purchaser from Cuba, where payment had been made outside
the United States, might an adjudication have added to the realization
of those objects. But this was not the case in either Sabbatino or Citi-
bank. And while the larger deterrent and protective purposes might
be served by a general rule allowing courts to adjudicate where foreign-
owned assets had not been blocked, if blocking had already occurred,
an adjudication would not advance those purposes one whit. It is
hardly necessary to give one American a preference over others in
assets that would otherwise be blocked in order to demonstrate to
foreign governments that the courts will act where blocking is not a
threat. 1
In sum, if rationality in judicial means depends upon effecting
some advance toward a legitimate judicial end, the decision in Citibank
seems irrational when judged by these preventive and deterrent pur-
poses. There is an element of arbitrariness here that can hardly escape
due process inquiry.
And so the question persists. What other public purpose might
have been served by the adjudication of Citibank's counterclaims?
Vindication of the Bank's rights under international law or vindication
of that law more generally are purposes which beg the question. The
81. In this context the Legal Adviser's suggestion that an adjudication would aid the
Executive in protecting American investors is scarcely to be believed. Perhaps he ex-
pected the Court to sanction the traditional non-discriminatory, full, prompt and ade-
quate compensation standard espoused by the Department. But that was a large as-
sumption in light of Justice Harlan's comments in Sabbatino. As discussed in Part Ill,
it was a dangerous assumption as well. Moreover, as far as the particulars of the Citi-
bank controversy are concerned, he nowhere explains why an adjudication would have
an added protective or deterrent effect where the foreign government was already fore.
closed from the American market. Nor does he say how an adjudication in Citibank
would add to the credibility of a rule permitting the courts to act where blocking had
not occurred. Finally, the advantage he deduced is carefully confined to cases where
the American owners' rights had been asserted as a counterclaim in a suit initiated by
the foreign government. Yet, if an adjudication positively aids in the protection of for-
eign investments, that advantage would seem to argue for permitting claimant-initiated




issue is one of choosing between the Bank's expectations under interna-
tional law and the expectations of other claimants fostered under the
regime established by Congress. To cite one set of expectations does not
explain a denial of the other. Ironically, in their anxiety to uphold
international law, the challengers were quite prepared to disregard
American law. And in the context of this, the real choice in the case,
there was something distorted in the Bank's appea 2 to the holding in
National City Bank v. Republic of China3 which Justice Douglas had
embraced. 4  The equities that dictate setting aside the defense of
sovereign immunity in a suit commenced by a foreign government bear
no resemblance whatsoever to the equities in Citibank.
The unanswered questions therefore remain. Significantly, it is
the existence of the questions, quite apart from the answers, that estab-
lishes the inadequacy of the deference-comity theory. It is well to
keep in mind that if the answers ultimately demonstrate that the Bank
was in fact demanding an unjust preference, then, given the Court's
view of the pleadings,8s application of the act of state doctrine was the
82. Petitioner's Brief at 6, Citibank, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
83. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
84. Citibank, 406 U.S. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring); see note 15 supra.
85. As already observed, see note 72 supra, the Bank, unlike C.A.V. in Sabbatino,
was not laying a claim of prior title to the bond proceeds. It was essentially asserting
a claim in tort, predicated upon international law, see Henkin, supra note 72. Hence,
had that claim been adjudged a demand for an unjust preference, whether constitution-
ally proscribed or not, the case might have been disposed of without invoking the act
of state doctrine. It might have been said that the Bank simply had no cause of action,
and that Banco Nacional's title to the bond proceeds was clear under the terms of the
pledge agreement construed according to New York law. At this point those proceeds
would have been blocked. Such a decision would not, of course, have prejudiced the
Bank's right to assert its claim before the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission or to
share in any remedies eventually established by Congress or the Executive (contrast the
problem in Dunhill described at note 174 infra). Nevertheless, the Court apparently as-
sumed that the Bank had an otherwise valid cause of action, and the question was treated
as though act of state were Banco Nacional's only defense to that claim. In this posture,
act of state was essential to forestall the unjust preference.
It is to be noted that in cases such as Sabbatino, act of state could not have been
avoided in this fashion. There Banco Nacional's title to the sugar proceeds rested ex-
clusively upon Cuban Law 851 and the implementing decrees of the Cuban government.
Any denial, therefore, of C.A.V.'s claim to title on the ground that such a claim was
a demand for an unjust preference would not have sufficed to permit blocking, even if
that denial were said to rest on the Constitution. It would still have been necessary
to affirm Banco Nacional's title on the ground that Law 851 supplied the controlling
rule of decision in the case. Act of state in this context served two purposes: (i) it
foreclosed any judicial pronouncements regarding the validity of Law 851 (i.e., it served
as a rule of abstention), and (ii) it supplied the conflicts rule necessary to achieve a
just result. On this latter point consult Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304,
309 (1918). For the reasons why C.A.V.'s claim in Sabbatino also constituted a de-
mand for an unjust preference, see note 72 supra. For a fuller discussion of the act of
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only means of forestalling that demand. Yet, if the only purpose of
the doctrine is to secure to foreign governments a proper respect for
their acts (i.e., comity) or to guard against judicial embarrassments to
foreign policy (i.e., deference), the doctrine is rendered impotent to
perform either function. The defect in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, in
other words, lies not only in his failure to answer the question but more
fundamentally in the fact that his theory excluded the question from
judicial review altogether.
B. The Dunhill Decision
As in Citibank, all of the set-offs allowed the importers in Dunhill
(not just Dunhill's $55,000 excess) effectively reduced the amounts
that would have been available, through blocking, for the general
redress of American claims against Cuba, a point acknowledged by the
Second Circuits and made clear by the Treasury letter.87  Neverthe-
less, the cases are arguably different.
It will be recalled that Cuba had purported to expropriate the
accounts receivable to which the importers' mistaken payments related.
The payments preceded any judgment disallowing Cuba's claim to those
accounts and were in the opinion of the district court based upon amis-
take of law. All but $40,000 was paid through New York banks8 8 and
not remitted directly through Cuban banking channels. Whatever
other motives they may have had, the importers had arguably not
exposed themselves to the vagaries of a foreign legal and political sys-
tem with the deliberateness that characterized the actions of the Bank
or most of the other victims of Castro's decrees. There was, in other
words, an arguably rational basis for granting to the importers a prefer-
ence over the other claimants.
This line of reasoning, of course, supplies the basic justification
for the preference implicit in any denial of extraterritorial effect
to a foreign state act where the assets would otherwise be blocked.
And it is a line of reasoning that finds support in the Cuban Insurance
Cases.A0 There, the fact that, under the policies, benefit payments
state doctrine as supplying the controlling conflicts or choice of law rule, see note 251
infra.
86. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1373 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
87. See note 44 supra.
88. 485 F.2d at 1367 n.16.
89. See, e.g., Pan-Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966), cited
as controlling, Oliva v. Pan-Am. Life Ins. Co., 448 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1971); Pan-
Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Recio, 154 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. quashed,
156 So. 2a 857 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990 (1964); Theye y Anjuria v. Pan-
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were to be made at the insurance companies' home offices in the
United States or Canada, frequently in dollars, was thought to show that
these insured had deliberately contracted for protection against the
vagaries of the Cuban political and economic system. This was used,
in turn, to justify visiting on the companies, not the insured, the loss
occasioned by Castro's expropriation of the companies' Cuban reserves,
although the insured individuals were at the time of contracting resi-
dents of Cuba.
The analysis, however, cannot end here. The whole problem in
Dunhill arose only because the lower courts, under a wooden applica-
tion of the territorial limitation, denied Cuba's act of state claim
to the pre-intervention accounts receivable. The only effect of this
denial was to shift the loss of those accounts from the original Cuban
owners to the importers and then, by granting the latter a set-off, to
all other Americans with claims against Cuba. Cuba obtained the
money in all events, while the original Cuban owners of the confiscated
firms obtained a preference as against the American victims of Castro's
deprivations. A curious result at best, and certainly not one necessi-
tated by established principles. 90
The broader lesson seems plain. In dealing with transnational
disputes, particularly disputes over foreign expropriatory acts, the courts
cannot disregard the impact of their decisions on alternative remedial
mechanisms established by the political departments of the Government.
To the extent that act of state is essential to preserving those mechanisms,
it is responsive to the fact that in the international sphere, the judicial
power is subject to certain very practical limitations. Its purpose is to
secure, in light of those limitations, that working relationship between
the departments of government which will best serve the ends of justice.
Even if, in this single aspect, the doctrine does not signal the presence of
a political question, it nevertheless has constitutional underpinnings
which no theory of deference to the Executive can adequately embrace.
III. LAW, POLICY AND TIE POLITICAL QUESTION
With the decision to block Cuban-owned assets located in this
country, the Government of the United States embarked upon a policy
which eventually forced some unenviable choices upon the courts:
choices among international law, foreign policies pursued under consti-
tutional warrant, and their own decisional integrity. Lurking just
Am. Life Ins. Co., 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70 (1964). But cf. Confederation Life Ass'n
v. Ugalde, 151 So. 2d 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), rev'd in part, 164 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1964); Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934).
90. For a broader discussion of "territorial limitations" see Part V.C. infra.
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beneath the surface, these choices were all but ignored in both Citibank
and Dunhill. Since, however, the courts did not treat the refusal to
return the importers' payments in Dunhill as a violation of international
law, the cases must be analyzed separately. Citibank, in particular,
illustrates the extent to which a concern for the progress of law in the
international community and an equal regard for judicial legitimacy
may be joined in the act of state doctrine.
A. Citibank-Of Cuban Confiscations and American Deprivations
In contrast to- the insensitivity of the courts, the political depart-
ments early exhibited some uneasiness with the position into which they
were working themselves with the passage of the Cuban assets control
legislation. In 1964 Congress amended the International Claims Settle-
ment Act to include a provision vesting in the United States all Cuban
government assets that had been blocked the year before.91 The
following year, the Executive proposed eliminating this provision on the
ground that "vesting . . .could set an unfortunate example for coun-
tries less dedicated ...to the preservation of property rights." It
could, the State Department said, "place the Government of the United
States in the position of doing what Castro has done."'92  Congress
agreed, and the vesting provision was eliminated. 93
But Cuban-owned assets remained blocked, and the distinction
between vesting and blocking proved to be ephemeral when, in Sar-
dino, the constitutionality of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations was
challenged. Dismissing the distinction, Judge Friendly said:
The due process clause speaks in terms not of taking but of deprivation;
we find it hard to say there is no deprivation when a man is prevented
both from obtaining his property and from realizing any benefit from it
for a period of indefinite duration which may outrun his life.94
Nevertheless, the Judge thought that blocking was not such a depriva-
tion as was proscribed by the Constitution. Apart from being a
legitimate way of compensating our own citizens, blocking could be
justified on broader political grounds. It "does not follow," the Judge
said,
. .that in dealing with the property of an alien the United States
must be blind to the acts of the country of which he is a national; the
91. Act of Oct. 16, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-666, § 511(b), 78 Stat. 1113 (codified
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643 etseq. (1970)).
92. S. REP. No. 701, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
93. Act of Oct. 19, 1965, § 5, 79 Stat. 988, amending 22 U.S.C. § 1643j (1964).




Constitution protects the alien from arbitrary action by our govern-
ment but not from reasonable response to such action by his own
.... We are not formally at war with Cuba but only in a technical
sense are we at peace . . . The founders could not have meant to
tie one of the nation's hands behind its back by requiring it to treat as
a friend a country which has launched a campaign of subversion through-
out the Western Hemisphere . . . .Hard currency is a weapon in the
struggle between the free and the communist worlds; it would be
strange reading of the Constitution to regard it as demanding deple-
tion of dollar resources for the benefit of a government seeking to create
a base for activities inimical to our national welfare. The Supreme
Court's approval of wartime seizure of assets of a non-enemy alien
"as a means of avoiding the use of the property to draw earnings or
wealth out of this country to territory where it may more likely be used
to assist the enemy than if it remains in the hands of this government,"
... is broad enough to justify the refusal of a license to Sardino.9 5
Distinctions of form-between the taking of title and other forms
of deprivation-should not obscure the fact that in Sardino the court
sanctioned the confiscation of private property 6 Moreover, while
relying on cases such as Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark9" and
Guessefeldt v. McGrath,9 Judge Friendly was clearly taking the war
power a step beyond those cases, crossing the line between formal
peace and war. Perhaps he should not have done so. On the other
hand, much of the distance had already been traversed.99 A contrary
95. 361 F.2d at 111-12 (citations omitted).
96. The word "confiscation" is too often used without precision. Perhaps it means
any uncompensated taking, by regulation, contract repudiation or expropriation, that is
illegal. Analytically, this is merely equating the definition with a conclusion. To avoid
this confusing usage, the word is used throughout this Article to mean any uncompen-
sated deprivation of property, whether violative of law or not. Such usage, it is sug-
gested, properly highlights the problem of values with which we are concerned.
97. 332 U.S. 469 (1947).
98. 342 U.S. 308 (1952).
99. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.s. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), the Court appears to have
affirmed the right of the government to confiscate all alien "enemy"-owned property,
private as well as governmental, tangible or intangible, found within the United States,
so that upon the termination of hostilities the property did not have to be restored to
its former owners. By 1814 Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. United States, 12 U.S.
(8 Cranch) 110 (1814), was casting the right as applied to privately owned property
in qualified terms. The right to confiscate private debts was not absolute since the alien
owners' right thereto revived on the restoration of peace. Marshall then extended this
principle to privately owned tangible personal property located in the country at the out-
break of hostilities, and distinguished such property from ship cargoes, which were sub-
ject to seizure as prize whether within or without the nation's territorial waters. Id. at
123. Ambiguously, however, he did admit of a power of "confiscation," but insisted that
it is not a right conferred by international law as an incident of war, but a right which
sovereign states could exercise in time of war. Hence the right to confiscate could not
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decision would have cast grave doubts, as the Judge was careful to point
out, upon a long history of political department actions, including the
arise in the absence of congressional action. Id. at 125. Further compounding the am-
biguity of the opinion, the Chief Justice confessed that it is a "harsh" right, not one
which "modem usage would sanction," and one which tends to visit "obloquy" on those
who exercise it. Id. at 123, 125. Against the background of this ambiguous judicial
record, Borchard has pointed out that
the practice of the United States, as evidenced in Acts of Congress, treaties of
the United States, Executive declarations and the uniform abstention from
confiscation, notwithstanding occasional dicta of the courts as to the sup-
posed privilege conferred by international law, sustains the view that there
was in the United States, prior to 1914, an "established usage of exempting
the property of non-resident enemies from confiscation." Borchard, Treat-
ment of Enemy Private Property in the United States Before the World War, 22
AM. J. INT'L L. 636, 641 (1928).
At the same time, measures of sequestration and control for the duration of the war ap-
pear to have been taken. 6 G. HACKwoRTH, DiGcsT OF INTmRAiiONAL LAW 576
(1943).
Certainly Borchard's position conforms to the position taken by the State Depart-
ment at the outbreak of World War I, see [1918] FOREIGN REL. U.S., Supp. II at 256,
and to the fact that as originally enacted, the Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106,
40 Stat. 411 (1917), made the Alien Property Custodian only a "conservator" of private
property seized, with a power of sale limited to prevent waste. Id. § 12. (For a
description of the Custodian's powers see United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc.,
272 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1926)).
With the amendment of the statute, Act of March 28, 1918, ch. 28, 40 Stat. 459,
however, American practice changed. Rather than merely sequestering privately owned
enemy property during wartime, the practice developed of retaining property even after
hostilities had ceased for such purposes as the government saw fit. To the extent prior
practice may be construed as an expression of the limits of national power under inter-
national law, this amendment certainly represented a departure from that law. Never-
theless, the courts were not disposed to impose the prior practice as a legal limitation
on Congress. Thus, Judge Cardozo in Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 244-45, 128 N.E.
185, 192 (1920), acknowledged the "right" to retain alien property, but was of the opin-
ion that it was a right "seldom brought into play in the practice of enlightened Nations."
In an early post-World War I case, United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S.
1 (1926), the Court asserted the right as a constitutional matter in upholding a post-war
sale for the benefit of American companies of German-owned chemical patents seized
during the war. The patents were sold "to eliminate hostile alien interests and . . . to
advance chemical and allied industry in the United States." Id. at 6. Justice Frank-
furter in Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308 (1952), thought that it was of little con-
sequence whether the refusal to return property was "simply to secure claims of Ameri-
can citizens against Germany or was regarded as the rightful withholding of spoils of
war." Id. at 314.
In Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947), the 1941 amendments
to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Act of Dec. 18, 1941, ch. 593, § 301, 55 Stat. 839,
amending 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1940) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1970)), designed to
reach property nominally in the hands of "friendly" aliens but "tainted" by enemy con-
trol during any "period of national emergency" (not just formal war), were upheld as
a proper exercise of the war power. The latter, it was said, permitted any "reasonable
preparation for the storm of war," so that even a friendly alien could be subjected to
a seizure designed to avoid the removal of "earnings or wealth out of this country to
territory where it may more likely be used to assist the enemy than if it remains in the
hands of this government." 332 U.S. at 476. The "friendly alien's" only recourse was
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Litvinov Assignments. 00 To have approved those Assignments and
then denied the right to block or vest Cuban assets would have been
to draw a totally unmanageable distinction between confiscations to
facilitate the establishment of diplomatic relations with a foreign power
and confiscations used in defense against a hostile power. Both the
Litvinov Assignments and the Cuban blocking regulations, in short,
give fair warning to the courts that in this matter of the confiscatory
to obtain compensation upon proving the absence of an enemy taint. Id. at 480. Thus,
even before Judge Friendly's decision, the practice of merely sequestering enemy-owned
private property had been transformed into that of retaining (i.e., confiscating) it after
hostilities had ended, while the property of even "friendly aliens" could be seized, subject
to a right to sue for compensation, in preparation for the "storm of war." To the ex-
tent that international law up to World War I might be thought to have precluded such
action, the courts were not prepared to interpose that law against Congress. Query:
Was Sardino an extension at all?
100. 361 F.2d at 113. The Litvinov Assignments, negotiated as a consideration for
American recognition of the Soviet government, assigned to the United States all assets
located in this country to which the Soviet Union had claims under its various national-
ization decrees. The assigned assets were to be used to pay American claims against
the newly recognized Soviet government. The agreement is set forth in an exchange
of letters between Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and President
Franklin Roosevelt, reproduced in [1933] 2 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 812-14. In addition to
the Litvinov Assignments, other peacetime vestings involved the seizure of certain
Czechoslovakian assets some nine years after World War II, and the seizure of Bulgarian
and Hungarian-owned assets well before the declaration of war against those powers.
361 F.2d at 113.
In the Litvinov Assignment cases, of course, the United States was simply claiming
title to assets which the Soviet government had purported to confiscate. In blocking
Cuban assets, the United States initiated the deprivation. This, however, is not a basis
of distinction, as Judge Friendly recognized and as a comparison of United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) makes
rather plain. In Belmont the challenge to the Litvinov Assignments was proffered by
a private American banking firm, with whom the assets in dispute had been deposited
by the expropriated Russian company. As "stakeholder," the firm laid no claim to the
assets in its own right, but challenged the Assignments on the ground that they violated
the fifth amendment and that their enforcement would be tantamount to a judicial recog-
nition of the Soviet decrees, contrary to the public policy of New York. The latter point
was answered on grounds of act of state and the preclusive authority of the federal gov-
ernment over the conduct of foreign affairs. Id. at 331. The constitutional argu-
ment was dismissed, rather disingenuously, on the ground that the Constitution did not
protect a Russian company from the confiscatory acts of the Russian government. Id.
at 332. The Court quite ignored the fact that it was the United States government that
was seeking the benefits of that confiscation through the aid of the American courts.
In Pink, the constitutional objections were advanced by foreign creditors of the expropri-
ated Russian firm. Justice Douglas was quite prepared to accept this fact as distinguish-
ing Belmont, forthrightly acknowledging that he was dealing with a constitutional chal-
lenge to an action by the American government which, if given effect, would deny to
private individuals their judicially recognized right to certain assets located in the United
States. 315 U.S. at 226. If not the initiating expropriatory power, the United States
in Pink was clearly the enforcing expropriatory state.
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power, they may tread upon an important instrument of policy which
sovereigns guard with some jealousy. Certainly Sardino can be taken
as stating the law of the land with more than that high order of prob-
ability normally attending the decisions of the Second Circuit.
To treat Sardino as persuasive of constitutional precept, however,
is to intrude some difficult choices into the invitation to judge Cuba's
actions. It is to be recalled that the sweeping confiscatory decree
involved in both 
ACT OF STATE
five, the American courts were not prepared to gainsay what the politi-
cal departments thought necessary to be done.
But, surely, from the Cuban perspective, the necessities were no
less compelling. At the time of Castro's rise to power nearly 40 per-
cent of Cuba's sugar production was in American hands. The entire
island was "enmeshed in a monetary economy dependent primarily
upon the export of sugar."' 08 By its attacks on this American penetra-
tion of the Cuban economy and on the corrupt and repressive Batista
regime which had long enjoyed official and private American support,
the Castro revolution was at first hailed by most Cubans as promising
true independence and the restoration of dignity and integrity to Cuban
society.' 0 9
From this initial point, it is not difficult to attribute to the final
sweeping confiscatory measures of July, 1960 a necessity in the Cuban
mind scarcely distinguishable from Judge Friendly's recital. From the
Cuban perspective, that Government's efforts to deal with its central
problem, vigorous only by necessity, had been met by retaliatory actions
unequivocally threatening the very economic life of the island. The
United States, because of its inability or unwillingness to control Cuban
refugees, was a base for military actions against that government. The
self-expressed American intent to fight communism everywhere in
Latin America presaged a campaign of subversion against the emerging
forces of social and political change that were, to many Cubans, not only
epitomized by their own revolution but given to their special charge.
From the American perspective, Cuba's hostility toward the United
States merited exempting the confiscation of Cuban property from the
literal strictures of the Constitution's guarantees; surely one must doubt
any denial of Cuba's right to confiscate American property if the matter
is but viewed from the Cuban perspective.
None of this, of course, is to suggest that Sardino was incorrectly
decided or that Judge Friendly should have considered the Cuban per-
spective in reaching his judgment. He was not being asked to judge
the legality of Cuba's decrees. The lesson is rather to highlight the
distinctive task which faced the courts when they had to judge Cuba
under international law. Either Sardino invoked a standard of national
necessity not recognized by international law or, alternatively, the
108. Dawson & Weston, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: New Wine in Old
Bottles, 31 U. Cm. L. Rv. 63, 71 (1963), quoting TANNENBAuM, TEN KEYS TO LATiN
AMERICA 223 (1962).
109. For a careful analysis of the Cuban perspective see Dawson & Weston, supra
note 108, at 67-73.
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Sardino rationale can be fitted within the extant body of international
custom. If these alternatives are self-evident, the decision in Citibank
shows that their further implications were not so plain.
B. Citibank and the Uses of International Law
1. Sardino as Contrary to International Law
If Sardino cannot be squared with international law then it seems
rather clear that both Cuba and the United States violated that law.
Indeed, some of the more careless claims advanced on behalf of the
non-discriminatory, full, prompt and adequate compensation stand-
ard11° compel that conclusion. More seriously, if one embraces the
view taken by the Second Circuit in both Sabbatino and Citibank that
Cuba violated international law principally because its decree was in
retaliation for the quota reduction, then a dual indictment seems inevit-
able."" It will not do to suggest that Cuba was engaged in illegal
retaliation while the United States was legally protecting the interests
of its nationals. This is to suggest that a government may resort to con-
fiscatory measures to protect its citizens' foreign investments but may
not do so to protect the integrity of its entire economy. Certainly the
magnitude of Cuba's retaliation was not disproportionate to the injury
which prompted its confiscatory action.
Moreover, the United States' right to defend its broader political
interests was no less important to the decision in Sardino than the goal
of obtaining redress for American citizens. Judge Friendly's reliance
upon Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark"2 is especially telling. In fact,
he quite possibly felt obliged to invoke this broader rationale, since the
only line of judicial authority available dealt with the confiscatory power
in the context of the larger necessities of war or its aftermath. Sardino
would represent an extraordinary extension of these decisions if read
as lending constitutional warrant to a, confiscation of foreign-owned
110. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
111. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 859-68 (2d Cir. 1962),
followed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 183-85 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Natl City
Bank, 478 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1973) (the remand of Citibank). For differing views
on the matter of retaliation in the international law of expropriations consult RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 200 (1965);
McNair, The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, 6 NETHEL ADS INT'L
L. REv. 218 (1959). But see Dawson & Weston, supra note 108, at 91-96. Compare
Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L
L. 305 (1960), with Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts
-A Reply, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 801 (1960).
112. 332 U.S. 469 (1947). See note 99 supra.
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property for the sole purpose of aiding the redress of private losses.
It seems rather plain, in sum, that if Cuba violated international law
because its confiscations were in retaliation for the quota reduction, the
United States did likewise when it retaliated against Cuba for the
latter's acts of hostility and subversion.
In this view of the matter, the difficulties implicit in the challenge
to Sabbatino are considerable. Possibly the challengers were prepared
to concede that Cuba did not violate international law-a doubtful
matter at best. Even so, the possibility implies a reading of inter-
national law which invites a further set of complications yet to be dis-
cussed. If, on the other hand, the challengers were not prepared to
grant this possibility, their decision is either an expression of total con-
tempt for international law-an implicit statement that the United
States courts enforce that law only against a foreign government, not
their own-or an open invitation for someone to test the international
legality of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. And if the latter,
then what of the constitutionality of these Regulations? Are the chal-
lengers prepared to reverse Sardino, overturn United States v. Pink"'a
and United States v. Belmont1 14 and cast doubt on the constitutionality
of all the other peacetime vestings of foreign assets under the Trading
with the Enemy Act? Or are they acknowledging that the constitu-
tional precept may not measure up to the high standards of international
law? If the latter, what of the assumption that the rights of private
property embodied in international law are rights deserving of strong
judicial support? Or is the matter more properly viewed as a classic
confrontation between principles and national necessity in which judi-
cial abstention might well be recommended? Whether such abstention
might be grounded upon the political question doctrine is a point con-
sidered later. Suffice it to suggest here that if the latter doctrine is
inapposite, abstention still finds justification in Justice Harlan's compre-
hensive and non-positivistic view of law which recognizes that without a
strict regard for the real limits that attend the judicial power, domestic
courts can become breeders of contempt for international law.
2. Sardino as Conforming to International Law
There still remains, of course, the possibility that international law
can be interpreted to accommodate the national welfare calculus articu-
lated in Sardino. If this is the case, then the invitation to judge the legal-
ity of Cuba's actions is a task the dimensions of which deserve scrutiny.
113. 315 U.S. 203 (1941).
114. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
Vol. 1976:8071
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
It was probably true that when Castro first came to power, many
Americans (as well as Cubans) recognized that a fundamental change
had to occur in the relationship between the two nations. Yet, even
assuming arguendo that the confiscations prior to the sugar quota with-
drawal were a necessary means to that end, what of the other elements
in the pattern of Cuban behavior: Castro's declared ideology, his
avowed determination to support revolution throughout the Hemi-
sphere, the purchase of Soviet arms and the grant of Cuban territory
as a base for Soviet military action? The issue is whether these factors
supply a context in which the July 1960 confiscations had to be viewed
as aggressive acts extending far beyond the necessities of the political
and economic independence acknowledged by the controlling Sardino
criteria. This is certainly the American view of the matter.
On the other hand, while Cuba's actions could not be divorced
from Cuban ideology, the ideological component did not automatically
deprive those actions of legitimacy if tested by a neutral standard. Nor
did it mean that the confiscations, even if part of a larger pattern of
belligerence toward the United States and of hemispheric subversion,
could not stand on their own merits. Were they measures necessitated
by the very strength and determination of the entrenched American
interests, freedom from which was their legitimating object? At
bottom, it is the choice between these competing characterizations that
is the critical question for any American court bent upon judging Cuba
according to an international standard which conforms to the standards
it would employ in judging its own government under the Constitution.
To define the issue in these terms, however, is not enough. The
matter of perspective is perhaps more important. If there is to be judg-
ment according to international law, the contending national perspec-
tives must, perforce, be subjected to some international standard defin-
ing what combination of circumstances signals that national necessity
of which the rule is an acknowledgment. To judge Cuba's acts accord-
ing to the American characterization of the case, no less than to adopt
a Cuban characterization, is to abandon all pretense at decision based
upon international law. This means, of course, that the courts must
abjure the guidance of their own political departments. Except as they
may draw upon the views of some international political authority or
upon a broader international political consensus, they must depend
largely upon their own resources of perception and evaluation. The
task is a formidable one.
If the legitimacy of Cuba's asserted claim of acting in defense of
its own sovereignty is to be judged fairly, then judgment requires an
[Vol. 1976:807
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understanding of Cuba's historical relationship with the United States-
a sense of the cumulative impact on the Cuban psyche of over fifty
years of intercourse with American institutions and culture and an
awareness of the actual American economic and political penetration
of Cuban society. If the court is to measure the proportionality of
Cuba's response to the forces arrayed against it, then it must have some
sense of how much those forces were rationally to be feared. To judge
is to assess the threat implicit in the quota termination, the OAS sanc-
tions, the hostile acts of Cuban refugees and the failure of American
authorities to prosecute them, and even the Bay of Pigs adventure.
To judge, in short, is to differentiate between rational defensive
behavior and hostile actions serving principally to secure Castro's
domestic political power or to satisfy the aggressive instincts of his Com-
munist ideology. It is a formidable task, indeed, and one in which
there is no room for careless indictments of arbitrariness and
discrimination.
Finally, to define the judicial task in these terms compels recogni-
tion of the reciprocal nature of the problem. Any judgment validating
Cuba's actions under the controlling Sardino rationale carries with it a
strong and perhaps decisive implication that the countermeasures by
the United States were excessive and, from an international perspec-
tive, of doubtful legality. In other words, the controlling characteriza-
tion of the foreign government's action may very well depend upon a
prior characterization of the American action. A decision validating
the foreign government's act may be only one small step removed from
a decision invalidating the American act. Certainly, a decision of
validity would be an open invitation to challenge the international legal-
ity of the latter, notwithstanding that they may have met constitutional
standards applied according to an American characterization of the
conflict.
Once again, abstention would seem to be an expedient of consid-
erable merit. The setting is a limited one. The importance of the con-
flict and the climate of hostility which attended it-its proximity to a
"state of war"-had caused the United States to confiscate the proper-
ties of foreign citizens. It was a setting in which any judgment invali-
dating those actions would, by historical evidence, have impaired the
political departments' ability to deal with conflicts which could have too
easily escalated into war. If, in this setting, the foreign government's
actions were to be judged objectively from a perspective which presented
a fair possibility of validating those actions, the inherently complex and
subtle nature of the question juxtaposed with the impingement of the
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decision upon an important exercise of foreign policy would seem to
prescribe a classic occasion for abstention.
Even more broadly, the case illustrates the important part that a
rule of judicial abstention can play in promoting a more viable inter-
national order. The question is whether American courts, having
validated their own government's political acts under their own Con-
stitution as interpreted from a national perspective, should be called
upon to invoke an international perspective which might well invalidate
those same actions. Where judgment is attended with some uncer-
tainty and the consequences for the national interest are large, the
inescapable fact is that domestic courts generally, if compelled to decide,
are more likely than not to decide at the expense of a truly international
perspective. Their authority is rooted in the nation. Subtly, however
anxious they are to employ a broader perspective, such courts, unless
permitted to escape judgment, can rarely escape giving effect to the
felt needs, the political perceptions and the sense of outrage which, in
the nature of the case, must attend the acts being judged. The very
thought of the Supreme Court of the United States announcing that
Cuba acted more in self-defense against American aggressiveness than
in pursuit of its own subversive designs would no doubt shock many.
Yet the point is plain. If the Supreme Court cannot in fact say such
things, it has no business pretending that its judgments would advance
the cause of international law. It can only parochialize that law and,
in the matter of expropriations, polarize it as well.
C. Citibank and the Political Question Doctrine
1. Introduction
It remains to test these observed implications of the Citibank case
against the historical uses of the "political question" doctrine. Initially,
it is worth observing that The Paquete Habana,"5 often cited as the
Court's foremost affirmation of allegiance to customary international
law," 06 is in fact persuasive authority for the suggestion that the Court
in Citibank should have abstained from applying that law.
In The Paquete Habana the Court declared the Navy's seizure of
private fishing vessels during the Spanish-American War invalid as an
offense against international law only after scrutinizing the record and
115. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
116. See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423; Skirotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73
(1941); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907); District of Columbia v. Inter-
national Distrib. Corp., 331 F.2d 817, 820 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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finding a total absence of a "treaty or other public act of the Govern-
ment" in relation to the matter.117 Indeed, the Court took care to read
into the applicable Presidential orders an implied absence of authoriza-
tion for the seizures, a point that much exercised the dissent.118 It also
invoked the aid of Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Brown v. United
States."19 Extending that decision to the case of prize, the Court in
Paquete Habana held that the absence of any congressional authoriza-
tion for the seizure of the Cuban fishing vessels and Chief Justice Mar-
shall's insistence that such an authorization was required combined to
furnish the ultimate justification for invoking international law against
the Navy. 120 It seems beyond doubt, in other words, that had the Court
been confronted with clear presidential or congressional authorizations
for the seizures, it would not have interposed customary international
law to invalidate the Navy's actions. International law would have
given way to policy.
This reading, of course, squares with the refusal of the Court in
the later Trading with the Enemy Act cases cited in Sardino to hold
Congress to the international law reflected in the uniform practice of
the United States prior to 1914.121 Indeed, any suggestion that
Paquete Habana would warrant interposing customary international law
against a congressionally authorized wartime seizure would mean that
that case had been overruled by these later decisions. But if not overruled,
any effort to limit its implied sanction to the precise wartime context
of the case would mean reversing Sardino and striking down the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations on international law grounds. Thus, unless
prepared to take this latter step, the Court, if desirous of applying
international law evenhandedly, might well have refused to interpose
international law against the acts of the Cuban government in Citibank
and cited Paquete Habana as controlling authority.
More importantly, the several opinions in Paquete Habana will
readily suggest to the discerning reader how difficult it may sometimes
be to decide when the judicial institution should subject the nation to
the consensual mandates of the international community. The diffi-
culty inheres in international law itself. By the very fact that inter-
national law purports to limit the unilateral use of national power in
the international arena-to limit sovereignty-that law also impliedly,
117. 175 U.S. at 711.
118. Id. at 716-17 (Fuller, I., dissenting).
119. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 109 (1814).
120. 175 U.S. at 710-11.
121. See note 99 supra.
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if not expressly, sanctions other unilateral exercises of power. Inter-
national law affirms, not denies, the existence of sovereignty. The
problem is always, therefore, one of defining the power and the limits
of its exercise. At some point when the definitional task becomes suf-
ficiently uncertain and the consequences for the nation sufficiently
momentous, domestic courts must, in loyalty to the basic sources of their
own authority, either abstain from judging altogether or confirm their
own political departments in the power sought. Paquete Habana is
simply an example of the latter course. As such, it invites further
inquiry into the boundaries of that region where domestic courts must
issue the necessary concession, whether by affirmation or abstention.
We turn to the latter.
2. Of Analytic Modes
Some years ago, one eminent authority suggested that the leading
political question cases in the foreign affairs area were to be explained
by the juncture of the Constitution's textual commitment of foreign
policy to the political departments and the imperative of unity in
national expressions on such matters.1 22  But this formulation would
seem to prove too much.
It is doubtful that every question which is susceptible of principled
resolution, but which happens to touch foreign policy, is constitutionally
withheld from the courts.123  If, on the other hand, what is intended
is a more selective search for a particular textual reference, the test
122. Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARv. L REv. 296, 318-19 (1925).
123. To find a commitment to the political departments that implies a textual denial
of judicial authority on these questions, Weston avers that the "relevant provisions of
the Constitution . . . divide the power of administering foreign affairs, to the complete
exclusion of the judiciary" (emphasis added). Id. at 319 n.89. It is difficult to disprove
this proposition by reference to existing case law. That courts frequently decide the
merits of questions touching foreign policy may cast doubt upon it. But Weston can
explain this by the second prong of his test-the absence of a need for a unity of expres-
sion. Where, in the cases he reviews, one observes the courts declining to adjudicate
the merits, Weston can cite the presence of both elements of his test. That the latter
prong is sufficient, and the former therefore immaterial and of doubtful validity, simply
cannot be proved. Nevertheless, as Henkin has pointed out, the Court has many times
decided constitutional and other legal challenges to foreign policy decisions on their
merits without resort to the political question doctrine. L. HENKIN, FORIuGN AFrsAIs
AND THE CoNsTrrrmoN 213 (1972). This would seem a sufficient response to Professor
Weston, even granting that he was apparently prepared to make an exception for consti-
tutional challenges. See Weston, supra note 122, at 329-30.
Henkin, however, goes further and argues that there is "apparently no foreign af-
fairs case in which the Supreme Court ordained or approved judicial abstention from
Constitutional review or from deciding some other question that might have led to a dif-
ferent result." L. HENmN, supra, at 213. This observation as applied to constitutional
[Vol. 1976:807
ACT OF STATE
can rarely avoid an interpretive question: does a specific grant to the
President or Congress of the power to decide carry with it an implied ban
upon the power of the judiciary to review exercises of that power?
If the theory would confine the whole of this interpretive task to the
narrow modes of conventional textual exegesis-the parsing of words
and the search for meaning from context and framers' intent-then, as
others have fully demonstrated, the theory simply does not explain the
cases.
1 24
To add to the test the imperative of national unity only serves to
shift the whole explanation away from a textual commitment and
toward the functional attributes of the doctrine. This, in turn, only in-
vites further inquiry into when that imperative is deemed to exist. Un-
doubtedly it has something to do with the "unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made" or with the
"potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question."' 25  But these Baker v. Carr for-
mulations likewise are not criteria for application of the doctrine.
They are only statements of function that steer inquiry along relevant
lines but do not provide a measure of when the need is "unusual" or
when the potential "embarrassment" is to be avoided. And it is not
function but standards that are of concern here.
Nevertheless, the textual commitments theory does seem to reflect
a search for standards. If it would permit what one obviously exasper-
review is arguably subject to qualification in light of United States V. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942), and cases involving the expulsion of aliens, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952) and Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). See Scharpf, Judicial Re-
view and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE LJ. 517, 542 (1966).
But see McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agree-
ment; Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy in McDouGAL & AssocIATEs,
STUDIFS IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 404 (1945). Certainly the lower courts have not re-
fused to apply the political question doctrine to constitutional challenges. See United
States v. New York Trust Co., 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Steingut v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 58 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 161 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1947). For
a discussion of this point as it relates to non-constitutional cases, see note 146 infra.
124. Scharpf, supra note 123, at 543-48.
125. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). In full, Baker v. Carr laid down the
following tests for a "political question": "a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious 'Pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id.
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ated judge intimated-a "license to construe the sense of the Constitu-
tional framework"'126 -then perhaps it should be read more as a means
of securing adherence to a certain decisional modality than a command
to search for precise textual guidance. Perhaps it should be read only
as proscribing resort to broadscale notions of judicial prudence and dis-
cretion, not as ignoring the central question: namely, how far may
courts go without violating that tradition in which the consensual nature
of law is not merely recognized but celebrated as the bulwark of a free
society? If there is something of prudence in this, it is not the pru-
dence of a wise discretion but of a more compelling concern for
judicial legitimacy derived largely from the experience of history. It
is submitted that, by this reading, what ensues conforms to the
theory.12 7  And by this reading, Citibank and Sabbatino did indeed
present the Court with a political question. 18
3. Of Subject Matter
The first element apparent in the cases is the nature of the subject
matter. Time and time again the Court has shown a concern for the
enormity of the consequences that might attend its decision, a sense
of the inherent largeness of the issue. Factual context, the explana-
tions proffered, even the tenor of the rhetoric make sheer folly of any
effort to exclude this animating sensitivity from the decisions.
126. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1971) (Coffin, J).
127. With some trepidation in view of the late Professor Bickel's celebrated dissent
from his views, Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 H~Av. L. REv. 40, 43 et seq.
(1961), and my own obvious employment of the elements in the Bickelian formulation,
I nevertheless suggest that the mode offered here is in keeping with Professor Wechsler's
response to other patently more prudential views of the doctrine:
Difficult as it may be to make that judgment wisely, whatever factors may be
rightly weighed in situations where the answer is not clear, what is involved
is in itself an act of constitutional interpretation, to be made and judged by
standards that should govern the interpretive process generally. That, I
submit, is toto caelo different from a broad discretion to abstain or intervene.
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HA.v. L. REv.
1, 9 (1959).
128. A certain operational distinction between act of state and political question
should be noted. In the political question cases the courts abstained from judging par-
ticular acts of the American government in order to protect the integrity of those acts.
Having abstained on the merits they then either abstained from all use of the judicial
power or proceeded to use their power affirmatively, adopting the political department's
actions as the controlling rule for their decision. In the act of state cases, however,
it is the acts of a foreign government that are being judged even though it may be the
policies of the American government that are being protected. It is these latter that
may lend to the case the character of a political question, but not being in issue between
the parties they cannot supply the controlling rule of decision. Thus, like the political
question doctrine, the act of state doctrine may mandate abstention from judgment on
the merits, but unlike political question it does not mandate adoption of the policies of
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In the most influential of the early cases, Foster & Elam v. Neil-
son, 1 9 Chief Justice Marshall declined to determine whether, under
the controlling treaties, West Florida was included in the 1803 Louisi-
ana Purchase. The area had long been claimed by the United States.
The President and Congress had authorized its occupation. It had
been used to form the Alabama Territory in 1817. Alabama had been
admitted to the Union in 1819. The Chief Justice's recitation of all this
makes plain how far he was moved to his decision by the enormous
consequences that a contrary judicial decision in 1829 would have had
upon the internal order of the nation. It was unthinkable that the
courts of the United States, under the guise of a superior interpretation
of a treaty, would risk effectively invalidating all of the political depart-
ments' acts of governance in the period 1803-1819.11s
A decade later, in Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co.,' the Court
extended Neilson to a claim by a foreign sovereign to foreign territory.
The judiciary, it said, was bound by the Executive's determination that
"Buenos Ayres" did not have a valid international claim to sovereignty
over the Falkland Islands. Neilson and Suffolk were then followed in
a case involving a United States claim to foreign territory. In Jones
v. United States, the question was whether one of the Guano Islands
was territory "appertaining to the United States" for purposes of
criminal jurisdiction.'18 2
Arguably, of course, any judicial action that could impair the long-
accepted territorial definition of the United States (Neilson), or the
claim of the United States to control foreign territory (Jones), is an
action the inherent momentousness of which exceeds anything that
might be entailed in a conflict with a foreign government short of war.
And while in Suffolk the United States was not claiming sovereign
rights over the Falkland Islands, the Executive denial of the foreign
claim was issued in the context of a quarrel over seal hunting rights
which culminated in the Navy's expulsion of Argentinian officials from
the islands. The Court was plainly sensitive to this context.1 33
the American government as the controlling rule of decision. Act of state is operation-
ally distinct, even though its use may be gaided by the criteria of a political question.
The implications of this distinction are elaborated at note 251 infra.
129. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 108 (1829).
130. Id. at 114, 123. For a contrary view of Neilson, see Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 451, 454 (1956).
131. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
132. 137 U.S. 202, 209 (1890).
133. The Executive's denial of Buenos Ayres' claim was conclusive, for otherwise, the
Court said, one department might consider a "foreign island or country ...at peace
with the United States; whilst the other would consider it in a state of war." No "well
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Nevertheless, the Court has not read these precedents so narrowly.
On the contrary, as the recognition cases show, they have been read as
establishing that all questions of sovereignty over territory, whether
involving an American claim or not, are political questions. Thus, in
the early decisions such as Rose v. Himely,134 and Gelston v. Hoyt,135
principles of international law were held to govern when a party was to
be recognized as de facto or de jure the government of a foreign coun-
try. These principles were, however, "addressed to sovereigns, not to
courts," as Chief Justice Marshall put it."3 6 Then in Oetien v. Central
Leather Co.'37 and Pearcy v. Stranahan,38 the Court separated the
issue from international law, treating it as a question of policy 3 ' be-
longing exclusively to the Executive, and relying explicitly for this upon
the Neilson, Suffolk and Jones line of decisions.
The leading case in another instructive line of decisions is Doe
v. Braden,140 which established that the courts lacked authority to
inquire into a foreign official's treaty-making power.' 41  Such inquiries,
regulated government" would, according to the Court, sanction a "principle so unwise,
and so destructive of national character." 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 420. This, of course,
is an example of the Court relying upon the need for unity in national expressions. But
the need arises out of a special limiting context, rife with possibilities for armed conflict.
134. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
135. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818).
136. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 272.
137. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
138. 205 U.S. 257 (1907).
139. See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302; Pearcy, 205 U.S. at 265. This position accords
with that taken by at least one Legal Adviser to the State Department, see "Russia v.
Poland," Memorandum from Green Hackworth, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull, Jan. 29, 1944, reproduced in 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note
47, at 5-6, and on one occasion by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Memo-
randum by Trygve Lie, Secretary General, United Nations, Mar. 8, 1950, U.N. Doc.
S/1466.
140. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
141. Application of the rule in Doe v. Braden is found in a much earlier incident
in which the authority of the foreign official being challenged was not his treaty-making
authority, but his authority to confiscate American-owned property. In 1794 the French
government requested Secretary of State Edmund Randolph to stop an action in which
the Governor of Guadeloupe was arrested for his allegedly wrongful seizure of plain-
tiff's vessel while Governor. The Governor was in Philadelphia at the time of arrest
awaiting ship to France, having been captured by the British and released on parole.
In advising the Secretary, Attorney General William Bradford concluded that the defend-
ant had no "legal claim to be privileged from arrest." As to "his suability," the Gov-
ernor was, the Attorney General continued, "on a footing with any other foreigner (not
a public minister) who comes within the jurisdiction of our courts." But, Bradford went
on to note, if the act of which plaintiff complains
... is admitted to have been an official act, done by the defendant by
virtue, or under color, of the powers vested in him as governor, that it will
of itself be a sufficient answer to the plaintiff's action; that the defendant
Vol. 1976:807] ACT OF STATE
Chief Justice Taney thought, would make it "impossible for the
executive department . . . to conduct our foreign relations with any
advantage." 14 2 The rule of Doe v. Braden has been given a more con-
temporary application in such cases as Terlinden v. Ames,143 involving
the authority of the German Empire to carry out a treaty made with
Prussia, and Clark v. Allen, 44 which dealt with the capacity of
Germany to carry out a treaty on inheritance rights during the allied
occupation. 4
5
ought not to answer in our courts for any mere irregularity in the exercise
of his powers; and that the extent of his authority can, with propriety or
convenience, be determined only by the constituted authorities of his own
nation. 1 Op. Arr'y GEN. 45, 46 (1794).
Not being a case for a grant of sovereign immunity, it was not a case, so the Attorney
General advised, for ". . . the interposition of the government." Nevertheless, he was
of the view that if the quoted "principle [were] . . . made evident to the judge, he
[would] discharge the defendant from his bail, and the plaintiff probably [would] prose-
cute his suit no further."
Plainly, the Attorney General understood the difference between act of state and
sovereign immunity, and was sensitive to a difference in the role of the Executive under
each. See discussion at note 200 infra. Moreover, the close parallel between this action
and the constitutionally footed rule in Doe v. Braden, together with Justice White's ad-
mission in Sabbatino that any inquiry into the legality of a foreign act under the organic
law of the foreign state may be proscribed by the act of state doctrine, 376 U.S. at 470-
71 (White, J., dissenting), casts an intriguing historical cloud over his reluctance to
admit a constitutional footing for act of state.
142. 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 657.
143. 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
144. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
145. In Terlinden the Court, citing Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Doe v. Braden,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853), held that the question of whether an 1852 extradition
treaty with Prussia had been terminated by Prussia's subsequent absorption into the Ger-
man Empire, being a "question of whether power remains in a foreign State to carry
out its treaty obligations . . ., was, in its nature political and not judicial." 184 U.S.
at 288. Notably, however, the Court offered this conclusion only after a considerable
discussion apparently intended to satisfy itself that the State Department's assertion of
organic authority in the new imperial government to carry out Prussia's obligations was
at least a supportable conclusion. This approach is not without its theoretical signif-
icance, as we shall observe. In Clark, a 1923 treaty with Germany relating to inher-
itance rights was upheld against a claim that it was terminated by Germany's defeat and
the subsequent allied occupation. Relying inter alia upon Terlinden, the contention was
seen by Justice Douglas as posing a political question, answered, in turn, by the absence
of any showing that the political departments considered Germany's collapse inconsistent
with the maintenance and enforcement of the Treaty. 331 U.S. at 514. Justice Douglas
was quite prepared to treat the problem as one involving the termination of a treaty by
reason of supervening war; to this end he quoted at length from Judge Cardozo in Techt
v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1924), and also cited Society for the Propaga-
tion of the Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823). But unlike these lat-
ter cases, Justices Douglas' opinion undertook no independent inquiry into the comratibil-
ity of the treaty provisions with the interests of the nation either at war or under the suc-
ceeding occupational regime. He declared himself prepared to consider the treaty termi-
nated only if the Executive or Congress had "formulated a national policy quite incon-
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All of these decisions exhibit a common thread: whom was the
United States to consider sovereign in a community of sovereign states,
or to what people or territory were the attributes of sovereignty to be
accorded, or what credence was the United States to give those who
asserted a right to exercise sovereign authority? By its decisions on
these issues the Government establishes the framework and sets the
controlling climate for all the discrete acts of policy which it may later
pursue. They are questions central to the very existence of policy and
the ability of the political departments to give expression to the national
interest. They are questions foreclosed to the judiciary because they
are central to the fixing of a basic relationship between the United
States and a foreign government, and not because the Court has found
itself without a basis in international precept for gain-saying the political
departments. The Court's decisions thus represent a clear-cut exercise
in extraordinary judicial abstention.146
sistent with the enforcement of a treaty in whole or in part." Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503, 509-10 (1947). In light of this, it would seem preferable to read the case as deal-
ing more with the capacity or status of the treaty partner to carry out its obligations,
along the lines of Doe v. Braden and Terlinden, than as strictly a termination by war
case.
146. Professor Henkin in his recent book has rendered a singular service in coming
to grips with a problem in the interpretation of these cases which has too long been ig-
nored. See L. HENKIN, supra note 123, at 213. He offered a distinction. On one hand,
Henkin suggested, there is the "constitutionally significant" use of political question as
an "ordinance of extraordinary judicial abstention", a use for which he professed to find
no example among the foreign relations decisions of the Supreme Court. On the other
hand, there are cases where a political department decision is challenged and the Court
uses political question to mean that the question is "within the powers granted by the
Constitution to the political branches to decide." Id. If in the latter type case, Henkin
observed, the political department's actions do not violate or are not subject to any rel-
evant constitutional limitations, the Court proceeds "to give effect to what the political
branches have done." Id. at 213-14. In this latter category he included Suffolk and
Jones, and, by negative implication, Neilson as well as Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 38 (1852). See L. HENKiN, supra note 123, at 450-51 n.27. The use of
the political question label in these cases is, if I understand Professor Henkin correctly,
at best confusing. At worst, Henkin appeared to suggest, it mistakenly implies a consti-
tutionally mandated act of judicial abstention when actually all that the court did was
enforce what the political departments had "done because they had political authority
under the Constitution to do it." Id. at 213. The case is no different than when a
court refuses to examine the wisdom of any political act so long as that act is within
the constitutional powers of the political departments.
Obviously, a distinction exists between abstention under the political question doc-
trine and a judicial refusal to judge the wisdom of political department actions found
to be within the latter's constitutional purview. I only question the effort to place the
leading foreign affairs decisions into this latter category.
Initially, I suggest, the effort rests upon a failure to recognize that a refusal to judge
the "wisdom" of a political department decision and a refusal to judge a "political ques-
tion" are both derived from a constitutional definition of the scope of the judicial
[Vol. 1976:807
ACT OF STATE
In light of the events of 1959-1963 it is not difficult to fit the
policy consequences of a judgment regarding Cuba's actions within the
power. The relevant question in ascertaining the scope of that power as defined by
the political question doctrine is, therefore, whether the elements of a political ques-
tion exist, not whether a court characterizes its decision in that fashion. Nowhere
does Professor Henkin offer his own benchmarks by which to test whether the
leading foreign affairs cases contain the requisite elements of a political question.
Conversely, he appears to ignore the fact that neither a court's affirmation of the
power of the political departments to act nor its refusal to judge the wisdom of
that act eliminates the possibility that it was responding to the constitutional defi-
nition of its power implicit in the political question doctrine. Such a decision may
indeed represent an act of extraordinary judicial abstention, depending upon the elements
that prompted the decision. See, for example, the discussion of The Paquete Habana,
notes 115-20 supra and accompanying text.
Beyond this, the fact that a court which employs the political question label may
then turn around to use its power affirmatively to enforce a political decision on the point
is not in the least inconsistent with the use of the political question doctrine as an or-
dinance of extraordinary judicial abstention. The abstention mandated by the political
question doctrine is not necessarily an abstention from all use of the judicial power, but
only from an independent judgment on the merits. Given the functional attributes of
that doctrine (e.g., Weston's unity of expression; see note 123 supra), the observed en-
forcement of the political department's decision may represent only what is required to
carry out the function which necessitated abstention from a judgment on the merits in
the first place.
The international law cases cited by Henkin illustrate the point. In none of these
instances was there a dearth of rules that might have been employed by the Court to
decide the merits of the case in the fashion that courts usually decide such questions.
Apart from the decision to abstain, in other words, the substantive issue to be decided
was for the courts. It was not one given exclusively to the wisdom of the political
departments. Yet one may, of course, choose to characterize what the Court did in
positive terms: it affirmed the power of the political departments to decide. One can
also take the Court at face value and characterize what it did in negative terms: it
declared the courts powerless to decide. Choosing one characterization rather than
the other does not aid understanding.
What cannot be doubted is that the Court did not judge the merits of a question
it might have judged-in any sense of the word, it abstained. If that abstention was
predicated upon elements definitive of the constitutional proscription called political
question, then that abstention was, in any sense that is useful, the response to a consti-
tutional ordinance. This is wholly different from a case in which the substantive issue,
quite apart from the elements of a political question, could not be decided by a court
in any event, i.e., a case involving questions which were political without regard to the
special context out of which they reached the court. In those instances the court simply
proceeds to the one question within its competence to answer: did the political depart-
ments have the constitutional authority to do what they did?
A contrary view is predicated upon some extraordinary conclusions. To say that
in neither Neilson nor Suffolk was the Court engaged in an act of extraordinary judicial
abstention is to imply that neither the language of a treaty nor customary international
law can ever supply a rule of decision for an American court. If the point is that the
Court should not have abstained, that is merely a quarrel over the requisite elements
of a political question as a constitutional ordinance; the only responsive line of argument
would be to tender an alternative definition of what those elements might properly be,
recognizing that these seminal cases hold to the contrary.
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controlling sense of these cases. Having earlier welcomed the Castro
revolution and recognized the Castro government, the United States,
for the reasons enumerated by Judge Friendly, was engaged during this
period in a rather fundamental realignment of its basic relationship with
Cuba. The cessation of diplomatic relations, the quota reduction, aid
to Cuban refugees, initiatives in the OAS, the Bay of Pigs adventure and
ultimately the blocking of Cuban-owned assets in this country were all
part of the change. One could scarcely conceive of a sequence of acts,
short of war, having a more encompassing impact on the structure of the
political relationship between the two countries. And this was their
purpose. Without much doubt, since any objective inquiry under the
Sardino formula raised the possibility of validating Cuba's decrees and
thereby opening the entire course of American policy to a charge of
international aggression, that inquiry entailed a subject whose momen-
tousness signalled a potential political question. Even if the courts
were certain of invalidating those decrees, it would- appear that the
implications of the decision for the American blocking of Cuban assets
would also have come within their ambit.147
147. Judge Friendly's characterization of the Cuban-American relationship as q state
of near war evokes certain of the war powers cases in support of abstention in these
circumstances. When asked to decide whether a condition of war exists between this
nation and any foreign power in the international legal sense, as in the case of prize,
the Court has uniformly followed the latest utterance of the political departments,
whether in the form of declarations, treaties, joint resolutions or other competent acts.
Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558 (1912); Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S.
315 (1904); The Buena Ventura, 175 U.S. 384 (1899); The Brig Amy Warwick (Prize
Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 688-90 (1862). In deciding upon the constitutionality
of a purported exercise of the war powers in the uncertain period between the end of
fighting and the formal peace, however, the Court appears to have drawn something of
a distinction. For certain purposes such as the continuance of wartime prohibition,
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919), immediate
post-war rent controls, Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948), and the
post-war reorganization of the wartime price control agencies, Fleming v. Mohawk
Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947), the question of the constitutional power
to act was not answerable solely by reference to the existence of a formal state of war
in the international legal sense; hence, it was answerable by the courts. Yet for pur-
poses of seizing "enemy alien" property, Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51,
57 (1923), or deporting an enemy alien, Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948), dur-
ing this interim period, the judicial power seems to have been treated differently. In
the latter case Justice Frankfurter appears to have held that the Court was bound to
concede to Congress the power to grant (and to the President, the power to exercise)
a deportation authority until the state of war had been terminated, and that "whatever
the mode" that "termination [was] a political act." Id. at 168-69. This, the Jus-
tice said, was because a contrary holding would suggest that "the unconditional sur-
render" and disintegration of the Nazi regime "have left Germany without a government
capable of negotiating a treaty of peace"-a clear echo of the Doe v. Braden principle
as elaborated in Terlinden v. Ames and Clark v. Allen. Nor did the courts have, accord-
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Buttressing all of this are the cases dealing with the effect of legis-
lation upon a subsisting treaty as a source of domestic law. In spite
of the suggestion by John Jay in the Federalist Papers that treaties were
immune under the supremacy clause from unilateral legislative nullifi-
cation, 148 the contrary is by now axiomatic. Inconsistency being
unavoidable, a later-enacted statute supersedes a treaty as the con-
trolling rule of decision for the courts even when the result is a breach
by the United States of its solemn international obligations. It is true
that at times the Court seems to have relied upon the supremacy clause
for this conclusion; the mention of both treaties and statutes in the
clause created, it was said, an hierarchical equality compelling resort to
the later in time.149 But the rule is now firmly, and properly, 150 rooted in
the broader constitutional relationship between the judiciary and the oth-
er departments of the government. The Chinese Exclusion Case'"sup-
plies the controlling expression. The Court characterized the power
ing to the Justice, the "technical competence" or "official responsibility" to question the
President's "political judgment" that enemy aliens still retain their "potency for mischief
during the period of confusion and conflict" which follows active hostilities. Id. at 170.
Whether these war powers cases can be persuasively reconciled or not, they do suggest
a measurably greater judicial sensitivity to the political character of the question if a
decision appears to have a wider significance for foreign relations or for the Govern-
ment's ability to meet the special demands that the aftermath of war imposes upon the
nation. In this view, Ludecke marks a line, however uncertain, between decisions con-
fined to matters largely domestic and peripheral to the demands of war and its aftermath
and decisions that tend to affect the nation's immediate post-war international legal rela-
tionships or have a discernible impact on the conduct of external affairs in that uncer-
tain time. If this is so, then it would be incongruous for the Court to invoke a rule
of customary international law against a foreign government which, if applied even-
handedly against the American government, would bar any exercise of similar powers
in situations of near-war.
148. Speaking specifically about the supremacy clause, John Jay had the following
to say in The Federalist:
They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will
not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but
still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the con-
tracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of both
was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter
or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least
extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far
beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at any future
period, or under any form of government. THE Fr.ERALtsr No. 64, at 405
(H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Jay).
149. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Edye v. Robertson (The Head
Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
150. The supremacy clause refers to the Constitution along with federal laws and
treaties as the "Law of the land," so that if constitutional supremacy and an equality
of treaties and statutes is the proper order of authoritativeness, it is an order to be at-
tributed not to the bare listings of the supremacy clause, but to basic principles. See U.S.
CONST. Art. VI.
151. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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to refuse "to execute a treaty" as a "prerogative" power involving a
matter of the "utmost gravity and delicacy," but a power of which "no
nation could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence. 15 2
As such, it was a power which belonged to the Executive and Congress,
to "diplomacy and legislation and not to the administration of existing
laws." 15 3 And while it was "not [to] be presumed that the legislative
department [would] lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the
treaties of the country," circumstances could arise "which would not
only justify. but demand in the interest of the country that it...
do sO." ''14
An important point is implicit in all of this. The thought that
treaty repudiation is a grave and delicate matter testifies to the central
role that treaties play, however inconsequential their immediate sub-
ject, in defining relationships between states. To say, however, that
repudiation is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty such that no court
may invoke the customary principle of respect for treaties to nullify a
decision to repudiate, suggests even less authority in the courts to set
up a less certain norm of customary international law as a bar to other
political decisions of comparable import. The Paquete Habana con-
firms the point.1 55
4. Of Principle
Largeness of subject matter is not the only element to be consid-
ered in ascertaining the presence of a political question. While it is
generally a necessary condition, it is rarely a sufficient one. A second
element, the force to be ascribed to the values and principles seeking
judicial vindication, must enter in. In none of the decisions reviewed,
except perhaps the treaty repudiation cases, was the point of law
advanced by those seeking an adjudication reflective of a clear and
compelling principle. In cases like Neilson and Suffolk, the proffered
conclusions of law had long and consistently been denied by the politi-
cal departments and were, at best, debatable. Decisions regarding the
constitutional authority of a foreign official (Doe v. Braden) or a
successor government (Terlinden) presented questions of foreign law
laced with difficulties for an American court.
In this regard the cases are to be contrasted with the recent spate
of circuit court decisions dealing with the war in Southeast Asia. In
152. Id. at 602.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 600-01.
155. See notes 115-120 supra and accompanying text.
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spite of uncertainties in the fuller interpretation of their results, all
three circuits that reviewed the question uniformly purported to affirm
the judicial power to choose between peace and war, if that choice was
ancillary to deciding whether the Executive had the constitutional com-
petence to prosecute a war.15 This possibility, this thought that the
156. The focal point of all the challenges to the war was the absence of a formal
declaration or other effective congressional authorization. The practical import in each
instance was to embarrass, if not actually to terminate altogether, the Executive's abil-
ity to carry on military operations. In the earliest decisions, the District of Columbia
Circuit and a three-judge district court dismissed as political questions all issues bearing
upon the departmental allocation of the power to wage war. Mora v. McNamara, 387
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d
664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689
(E.D. Pa. 1972), affd without opinion, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). By 1973, however, all the
circuits having occasion to review the issue (First, Second and the District of Columbia)
had asserted their authority to decide, on the basis of the nature and extent of the hos-
tilities, whether some form of congressional authorization was constitutionally required,
answering the question as applied to Vietnam affirmatively. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d
611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Berk v.
Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970). All the circuits, however, refused to take any ac-
tion which might embarrass the Executive's conduct of the war, dismissing all of the
complaints under one or the other of the Baker v. Carr political question criteria. The
First and Second Circuits found sufficient authorization in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,
Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (repealed 1971), and other congressional acts, saying
that the form of the authorization and any further question as to the actual intent of
those measures posed political questions. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d at 33-34; Or-
lando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
After the Resolution was repealed, the Second Circuit found that the President and Con-
gress were winding down the war and declared that the method and means chosen for
doing so were political questions. Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972). The charges that additional congressional authoriza-
tions were necessary before the President could mine the harbors of North Vietnam, Da
Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973), or mount the Cambodian incursion,
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974), were characterized as challenges to tactical decisions, the judging of which was
not susceptible to any judicially manageable standard. Even the District of Columbia
Circuit, while asserting its power to decide that none of the proffered congressional au-
thorizations showed an intent to sanction the continued level of hostilities, made its es-
cape. The defendants were all Nixon Administration officials committed by policy, the
court found, to ending the war. This the President could do as Commander in Chief
without congressional warrant. How and at what speed it was accomplished was a po-
litical question, upon which a court would not substitute its judgment for that of the
President absent a clear showing of "bad faith." Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d at 616.
These decisions can, of course, be read as affirming the power of the judiciary to
decide the question of war or peace, if that decision is for peace and is merely conse-
quent upon deciding the issue of the Executive's constitutional competence to prosecute
a war. Read thus, they may be thought to find support in the Prize Cases. See note
147 supra. On the other hand, apart from uniformly refusing to embarrass the conduct
of the war, the courts affirmed their power to decide on the necessity of a congressional
authorization only insofar as they were assured of finding just such an authorization,
or finding that the decision for peace had been made, and the President was merely car-
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courts might properly decide so momentous an issue, shows that few
if any instances potentially engaging the political question doctrine
can be judged without regard for the countervailing importance of the
principles for which judicial vindication is sought. Concern for judicial
legitimacy demands it. No less than action upon too "large" a question,
a refusal to act upon a "large" principle can undermine the continuing
effectiveness of the courts as instruments of governance.
In Sabbatino and Citibank, however, it seems rather plain that the
principles at stake bore no resemblance whatsoever to the fundamental
constitutional ideas advocated in the Vietnam War cases. If Cuba vio-
lated international law, Sardino stands as rather persuasive evidence
that far from reflecting a compelling principle, that law would require
the American government to behave contrary to what the Constitution
expressly permits if not impliedly endorses. Certainly an international
norm that is contrary to basic constitutional standards must be appraised
by the courts as embodying something short of a compelling social
value. If the importance of the acts of the American government that
would run afoul of that norm are weighed against its dubious credentials
and the result matched against the historical uses of the political ques-
tion doctrine, the invitation to judge Cuba's decree according to that
norm was rather clearly an invitation to decide a political question. On
the other hand, if international law conforms to the Sardino calculus,
then Sabbatino and Citibank engaged yet a third and final element of
a political question.
5. Of Judicial Competence
Far from originating in forces exogenous to the social order, legal
principles and the values they reflect emerge from the complex politi-
cal, economic, cultural and historical forces at work on every individual
in the definition of his needs and aspirations. As these forces are com-
plex and work at cross-purposes, so the principles they produce will
rying out that decision. Certainly they used the political question doctrine to avoid any
inquiry that might show that there was no authorization or that the President was not
ending the war. In view of this they can also be interpreted as asserting a judicial power
to act only where there is evidence that the authority for war has been explicitly with-
held from the executive, i.e., where there is a direct conflict between the political depart-
ments. This is precisely the position taken by the three district judges in the only de-
cision reviewed by the Supreme Court. Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 694 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), a 'd without opinion, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). And it might be thought to
find support in the significance attributed by the Court in the Steel Seizure decision,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), to the express refusal




often be confused and contradictory. Hence, the task of principled
decision can and often does entail a difficult choice between competing,
even contradictory principles, or between competing applications of a
principle that is clear only at the highest levels of generalization.
In performing this difficult task the courts cannot ignore the com-
plex forces that yielded up the difficulties in the first place. To do
so can only produce exercises in judicial futility: results which at best
are ignored, at worst flouted. Yet, precisely as the courts cannot ignore
the complex realities that may intrude to render simple deductions
futile, they cannot ignore the possibility that in attempting to draw out
of those realities principles which will advance the national welfare, the
realities may either defy anything they can describe with reasonable
confidence, or will not yield to any fairly stable or tested body of predic-
tive theory or judicial experience. 15 7  Decision there must be, however
untidy the social forces with which decision must grapple. But as the
complexity and uncertainty inherent in the analysis of these forces in-
creases, the responsibility for choosing among contending values or
determining the application of a general principle moves toward the ex-
clusive province of the more representative institutions. Even if the per-
ceptive capabilities of legislators and administrators are no better than
those of judges, as uncertainty increases those departments stand in
their more rigorous accountability to the electorate as the surer exponents
of what is perceived by the latter to be the national interest. And the
cases illustrate the point.
Justice Frankfurter gave some expression to this view in Ludecke
v. Watkins.158 It is also present in the commitment of the question of
the recognition of foreign governments to the Executive. Although as
a result of the commitment, decisions have been permeated with con-
siderations of expediency, this does not explain the commitment in the
first place. 159 What is to be observed, it is submitted, is an intractable
problem of choice between contending sets of principles. For the fact
is that principles abound, and are no less discernible by the courts than
by the Executive. 60 Nor is there reason to believe that courts could
157. See the discussion of this problem in Bickel, supra note 127.
158. 335 U.S. 160 (1948). See note 147 supra.
159. On this point we deal with what was described in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1964), as "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Id. at 217. Again we have an observed func-
tion, not a standard for determining when the function must be carried out-what ques-
tions are "clearly for nonjudicial discretion"?
160. There has been, on one hand, what Hackworth describes as the dominant United
States practice since Jefferson's time. The decision to recognize a government (de jure
or de facto) has been predicated upon a factual test of actual control, general popular
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not at least attempt to articulate criteria for reasoned selection from
among those contending precepts. Rather, since no principle is free
from the ultimate utilitarian (i.e., national welfare) test, the commit-
ment of the issue to the Executive reflects two basic considerations.
There is first the centrality of the question to all policy in the sense
already explained. Combined with this is a realization that, because
the considerations (geopolitical, economic and ideological) which must
ultimately determine whether any principle serves the national welfare
lie so far beyond the competence of the courts to assay, the latter have
no adequate basis for assuming that any judicially constructed criteria
of choice would, on the whole and over time, meet the test of utility.
If there is an absence of a "judicially discoverable and manageable
standard,"'' it stems not from any lack of standards from which to
select, but from a sense that the limits of judicial competence render
other departments the proper organs to make the selection.
In like fashion, the effect to be given legislation that is inconsistent
with a subsisting treaty is not a subject lacking discernible principles. 1 2
It is rather the largeness of the question (probably the more decisive
acquiescence and the ability (and willingness) to discharge international obligations. 1
G. HACKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 174-76 (1940). Under this practice
the line between de facto and de jure recognition seems to be essentially a matter of
degree---"how firmly established" is the new regime, as one British Foreign Secretary
characterized the comparable British practice. Statement by Foreign Secretary Morrison
Before the House of Commons, Mar. 21, 1951; 485 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 2414
(1951). It ignores entirely considerations drawn from the character of that regime or
the mode of its accession to power. Certainly this practice could be employed as a prin-
ciple for judicial decision and, as such, could be justified as serving important national
objectives. And the courts could readily make the factual determinations necessary to im-
plement such a principle. On the other hand, the same history is one of recurrent re-
sort to other principles, in the matter of de facto as well as de jure recognition. There
was, for example, President Wilson's effort to make "Constitutionalism" a prerequisite
to recognition, see [1913] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 7, an effort reflected in the, Central
American Treaty of 1907, 1 G. HACKWORTH, supra, at 185, and the U.S. acceptance of
the provisions of the 1923 Treaty of Peace and Amity among five Central American na-
tions, see id. at 188. There was also the refusal to recognize (i) Manchukuo as a
matter of conforming to certain League of Nations resolutions, id. at 333-38, (ii) Al-
bania, inter alia, because that government was not established in conformity with the
principles of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, 17 DEP'T OF STATE BULL.
409 (1947); 15 id. 913 (1946); 13 id. 767 (1945), and (iii) Communist China because
of "that country's efforts to destroy the band of free nations," 38 id. 164-65 (1958).
161. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
162. John Jay's confident assertion that the courts should simply enforce the nation's
international obligations even in the face of a legislative dereliction (although the non-
self-executing treaty might pose a problem) is certainly one principled solution to the
problem. See note 148 supra. If this is too harsh, there is no lack of traditional ameli-
oriative doctrines from which a better balanced body of judicially enforceable standards
of national conduct might be fashioned.
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factor) combined with the complexity and subtlety of the political and
other considerations ultimately determining which principle would best
serve the national interest, that places the matter beyond the judicial
purview.
Turning then to Sabbatino and Citibank, the focus of interest is
the Sardino formula. 163 It may be assumed arguendo that that formula
is fully reflective of international law, and that by sanctioning certain
deprivations it can serve as an important constraint upon some of the
more excessive forms of confiscatory action to which governments are
prone. Yet, when one considers the extraordinary difficulties of arriv-
ing at the impartial characterization of Cuba's actions upon which that
formula depends, a concern for judicial competence comes to occupy
an important place in the case. Cuba's historical relationship with the
United States, the swift and dramatic changes in that relationship
wrought by the Castro Revolution, the ideological and military implica-
tions of that revolution, and the nature of the American response all
warn against viewing any particular judgment as the vindication of an
important principle. If the principle is important in the abstract, its
application to the particular case is far too complex and attended by
too many uncertainties to warrant viewing any decision as the expres-
sion of some overriding social imperative. When this realization is
matched against the foreign policy implications of a judgment validat-
ing Cuba's decree (i.e., largeness of the question) and those implica-
tions are in turn matched against the historical uses of the political
question doctrine, it becomes clear beyond peradventure that the invi-
tation to judge in Sabbatino and Citibank was an invitation to decide
a political question.
6. Summary
The larger lesson is again clear. With a frequency not encoun-
tered in domestic disputes, two questions are likely to arise in any trans-
163. Obviously relevant here is Justice Harlan's observation of the disparity of views
regarding international law and his sense that this disparity indicated a dearth of "agreed
principles" from which the courts could work. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-30. Possibly
issues can arise where the lack of agreed principles suffices to signal a void into which
no court, under any circumstances, can intrude. But such is not our case. There is
more than enough in the traditional international law of expropriations and in the Sar-
dino case, to mention only a few sources of potential enlightenment, from which the
courts could work in accordance with some of the best and most creative traditions of ju-
dicial reasoning. In our setting, the disparity of views and the absence of agreed princi-
ples must be juxtaposed with the other elements in the political question formula. The
difficulty, in other words, of ascertaining the controlling rule of decision in our case-the
degree to which that task may challenge the competence of the jtdiciary-is basically
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national dispute before a domestic court when international norms are
at issue. First, given the sources of its authority and its ultimate allegi-
ance to that authority, can a domestic court be counted upon to apply
international norms in keeping with their postulated universality? Are
there not limits to the power of the court to apply those norms even-
handedly against its own government as well as against others, especi-
ally if those norms differ from domestic law? And second, are there
not other institutions and other techniques better fit for the task of con-
flict resolution and the protection of individual rights? To accept the
challengers' formulation of the act of state doctrine--of deference and
comity-and thus to ignore these two questions is to invite the distortions
evident in the Citibank decision. On the other hand, an acknowledg-
ment of the centrality of these questions in any decision regarding act
of state will result in the recasting of the theoretical underpinnings of
the doctrine.
Act of state is a rule concerned with keeping the courts within
their proper sphere under the American constitutional system. No less
than political question, it is rooted in a respect for the consensual nature
of all law. Yet because of its explicit transnational component-the
act of a foreign state-it also reflects a concern for the international
order and the perfection of international norms as instruments for con-
trolling the behavior of nations. It thus seeks to secure against that
degradation of international norms which is inevitable unless an honest
answer is given to the first question. And because it rests upon a
broader, functional view of law, the abstention necessary to protect
against such degradation becomes a positive force in the search for the
rule of law among nations. Its underpinnings, in short, are found in
that demand for judicial legitimacy which is ultimately constitutional.
But the boundaries of legitimate action reflect the unique transnational
setting in which the doctrine operates. And while those boundaries
may certainly encompass a classic political question, they need not do
so. Dunhill illustrates that point.
D. The Dunhill Decision
Once the Supreme Court in Dunhill determined to let stand the
lower courts' denial of Cuba's claim to the pre-intervention accounts
receivable, and to treat only the failure to return the importers' pay-
ments on those accounts, it was able to proceed as though no interna-
relevant only because it points to the absence of a compelling principle or to a high
potential for disrupting foreign policy. Mere difficulty in finding the controlling inter-
national consensus is not sufficient to warrant withdrawal from the attempt.
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tional law questions were directly raised in the case. The issue was
simply whether act of state should bar enforcement of the obligation
to return the payments-an obligation imposed upon the interventors,
in the district court's view, by the law of New York, 64 but one which
the Second Circuit saw as having its "situs" for act of state purposes
in Cuba. 65
Notably, in approaching this question all of the judges exhibited
a propensity to search for answers in some general, abstract and self-
limiting definition of what constitutes an act of state. To the extent
the doctrine's purposes entered into this search there was an equally
notable preoccupation with a single factor: that of avoiding judicial
embarrassments to foreign policy. Even Justice Marshall, while allud-
ing to the existence of other purposes, nowhere explored what they
might be. The Second Circuit contented itself with the observation
that the courts could embarrass foreign policy by judging the contractual
acts of foreign governments as readily as by judging their expropriatory
acts.' 6
6
If any of the judges had kept an eye on the broader range of
purposes catalogued by Justice Harlan, they might have noted that had
a Cuban debtor mistakenly paid money to an American citizen and
recovered judgment in the courts of the United States on a theory of
unjust enrichment, all payments under that judgment would have been
blocked under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. 167 While the
law of New York might have conferred a cause of action upon the
Cuban plaintiff, federal law would have intervened to deny him recov-
ery on that cause of action temporarily and, more likely than not, per-
manently. Had any of the judges, in other words, consulted the
doctrine's broader purposes, they might have reshaped the central act
of state question altogether: were the American courts to hold that,
while under American law a Cuban citizen with a claim for unjust
enrichment might rightfully be barred by the American government
from recovering upon that claim, it was nevertheless wrongful, again
under American law, for a foreign government to deny an American
recovery upon an identical claim? And this was indeed the issue.
164. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 543-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
165. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 488 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit
nowhere expressly considers the district court's resort to the law of New York as estab-
lishing the interventors' obligation. It simply holds that for act of state purposes, that
vbligation had a Cuban "situs."
166. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1370 (2d Cir. 1973).
167. Cf. the Treasury Department letter, discussed in note 44 supra.
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All the Justices agreed that the Cuban government had in fact barred
return of the mistaken payments-that it was not just a default by the
interventors acting without governmental authority.06
Perhaps to pose the question is to invite the answer. Neverthe-
less, it may be argued that, in appropriate circumstances, the responsi-
bility of the American courts to protect domestic interests can warrant
condemning foreign deprivations-to use Judge Friendly's phrase'6s -
against American citizens while approving comparable American dep-
rivations against aliens. 17 0  To invoke such a rationale in Dunhill,
however, is to take the case out of context. Such protective purposes
as might have justified the double standard were already being pursued
through the very political department actions-the blocking of Cuban
assets-that raised the problem in the first instance. Since the Court
could have used act of state and thereby avoided compromising the
importers' position,' 7 ' its implicit sanction of a double standard-assum-
168. Justice White supplied the definitive characterization by calling the interventors'
refusal to repay nothing more than an assertion "that the preintervention accounts re-
ceivable were theirs and that they had no obligation to return payments on those ac-
counts." Dunhill, 96 S. Ct. at 1860. From this the Justice concluded that since the
initial claim to the accounts was not entitled to act of state protection, the failure to
return the payments on those accounts was not an act of state. For immediate purposes,
however, the conclusion is beside the point. The fact was, as Justice White acknowl-
edged, that Cuba claimed the accounts receivable; it made that claim by its decree of
September 15, 1960, and the effect of that decree was to bar return of the mistaken pay-
ments. Quite apart from whether an American court should recognize that claim, the
fact of the claim sufficed to establish an act of the Cuban government indistinguishable
from the regulations of the United States government which would have barred payment
to a Cuban citizen on an identical cause of action. Also notable is Justice White's point
that an American court should not, absent proof, attribute to the Cuban government
any act subsequent to September 15, 1960 confiscating the importers' payments when they
arrived in Cuba, and should not, absent proof, charge that government with repudiating
its obligations. Id. at 1860 n.8. These conclusions may be correct, but they are im-
material.
169. See Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 898 (1966).
170. Such a possibility, of course, did not exist in either Sabbatino or Citibank where
the claims of C.A.V. and the Bank rested upon international law. Presumably, even in
the hands of national courts, what international law permits one nation to do, it permits
another.
171. Under § 503 of the International Claims Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a)
(1970), the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission is empowered to "receive and deter-
mine in accordance with applicable substantive law, including international law, the
amount and validity of claims by nationals of the United States against the Government
of Cuba." The claims the Commission is authorized to determine include claims for
debts "owed by the Government of Cuba or . . . by enterprises . . . intervened" by
that Government, 22 U.S.C. § 1643a(3) (1970). Under these provisions the Commis-
sion, in addition to determining claims under international law, justice and equity, see
Claim of Isabella Shamma, 1972 FCSC Ann. Rep. 228; Claim of American Cast Iron
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ing that the Cuban Assets Control Regulations are valid-represented
only a somewhat less egregious compromise of judicial integrity than
the decision in Citibank.
First, if Dunhill, Inc., even though an American company, would
have been denied access under current laws and Executive practice to
any political settlement of American claims because of its foreign
ownership, 171 the argument for a double standard in its case would have
had to be dismissed out of hand. It would hardly do for the American
courts to compromise the basic integrity of their own law in order to
vindicate a claim which not even the political departments were pre-
pared to support in furtherance of the larger interests of the nation.
But even as applied to the other importers, and arguendo to Dunhill
because current practice might change, the argument for a double
standard cannot stand.
Counsel for Dunhill argued that their client's claim was not
mooted merely because the corporation would have been barred by the
Treasury Department from executing its judgment against the sums
owed to Cuba by the other importers. 73 As a judgment creditor, coun-
sel suggested, Dunhill might still have had access to a future settlement
of American claims, presumably including a settlement through the use
of blocked funds. Leaving aside the special problems of Dunhill's
ownership, and applying the argument to all the importers, it is well
to note that access to such a settlement is not dependent upon the reduc-
tion of a claim to judgment. The argument, in other words, also estab-
lishes that the importers' access would have remained unimpaired even
had their claims been dismissed by the Court, provided the dismissal
was without prejudice to the legal sufficiency of the claims. And
Pipe Co., 25 FCSC Semiann. Rep. 49 [July-Dec. 1966], has recognized claims arising
under the law of Pennsylvania, Claim of James Keyes, 1968 FCSC Ann. Rep. 75, and
under the laws of Cuba, Claim of Robert L Cheaney, 1972 FCSC Ann. Rep. 154. See
generally Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and the Cuban Claims Pro-
gram, 1 INT'L LAw. 81 (1966).
172. Section 502(1) of the International Claims Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643a
(1) (1970), defines a United States national as, inter alia, a U.S. corporation 50% or
more beneficially owned by United States citizens. Also, in determining participation
in all the post-World War 11 lump-sum settlements, the State Department required
substantial U.S. ownership of American corporations (generally 50%), although earlier
examples exist where the Department ignored the ownership of such companies alto-
gether. R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION
15-17 (1962). Certainly international law does not establish such a prerequisite to the
diplomatic espousal of the claims of a corporation organized under United States law.
Cf. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain) [1970] I.C.J. 3.
173. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner, at 2, Dunhill, 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976). See
the discussion of the mootness question at note 44 supra.
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plainly, since act of state is a rule of judicial abstention from judgment
on the merits, the Court could have invoked that doctrine to dismiss the
importers' counterclaims without formally impugning their sufficiency
under those alternative devices. It could have avoided announcing a
double standard (i.e., that Cuba's act was wrongful) while preserving
the political department's ability to assert or otherwise recognize that
allegation.1 7 4
Equally important, the Court in pursuing such a course would not
have had to note the possible similarity between Cuba's actions and the
American blocking of Cuban assets, thereby risking the implication that
because the latter was constitutional, Cuba's actions were likewise
proper. One of the purposes, and in it the wisdom, of Justice Harlan's
broad interdiction is the avoidance of all judicial pronouncements, not
merely those invalidating foreign state acts. One may even read his
opinion as an elliptical forewarning of just such difficulties, skillfully
crafted to secure against the very dangers with which it was concerned.
In summary, once the political mechanism was in place and the possi-
bility existed for using act of state to relegate the importers' claims to
that mechanism, a decision by the Court to protect its own integrity by
invalidating those claims was unnecessary, while the decision to compro-
mise that integrity by affirmatively validating the claims (i.e., permit-
ting the offsets) was wholly unwarranted.
More specifically, when the Court refused to recognize Cuba's
claim to the pre-intervention accounts receivable, it effectively decided
that American citizens, not the original Cuban owners, were to bear
the loss from Cuba's taking of those accounts. The blocking of Cuban
assets further compounded the problem, leaving the Court essentially
three choices. It could, in the name of its own integrity, have declared
that because Cuba had not acted wrongfully the importers had no cause
174. It is to be kept in mind that the problem of a double standard which a court
would have to consider is not a matter germane to the validation of the importers' claims
by the Executive or to their espousal in any negotiated settlement. The importers' injury
was a fact, so long as they had to pay twice. Assuming, therefore, that the claims could
be sustained upon grounds of either international law or justice and equity, they would
still be cognizable by the Executive in spite of the United States' blocking of Cuban as-
sets, since the basic purpose of Executive espousal is to redress the real grievances aris-
ing out of past hostilities and their attendant deprivations. The Executive properly as-
serts the American claims without regard to whether it may have acted in kind, Cuba
does the same, and settlement proceeds from that point. While the Foreign Claims Set-
tlement Commission appears to have thought that it might be required to apply the act
of state doctrine, Claim of James Keys, 1972 FCSC Ann. Rep. 154; see Claim of
Brower, 19 FCSC Semiann. Rep. 18 [July-Dec. 1963], this is a highly dubious proposi-
tion generally, and certainly inapplicable in this setting, a point upon which the Court
might well have instructed the Commission.
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of action, and should therefore bear the whole loss. Or, the Court
could have compromised its own integrity, declared the Cuban actions
wrongful, granted the importers a set-off (i.e., a preference) and
thereby visited the whole loss upon other Americans with claims against
Cuba. This is, of course, what it chose to do. Lastly, it could have
abstained under act of state, avoided sanctioning a double standard, and
compelled the importers and the other American claimants to share the
loss equally. A denial of the set-off would have increased the poten-
tial aggregate recovery of all American claimants, which, if less than
the amount of those claims, would have meant that the importers shared
some of the loss. At the same time the importers' claims would, by
diluting the amount of the individual shares recovered, have required
the other claimants to share in the loss.175
Possibly, absent other considerations, a preference for the impor-
ters could be justified. 17 6  But once that preference also required the
Supreme Court of the United States to approve a double standard under
American law, there would appear to be no justification whatsoever for
the decision. This is all the more so because a decision of the Supreme
Court carries far greater weight in defining that state practice from
which an' international norm may evolve than does any pronouncement by
the political departments on a point of immediate national interest.
Dunhill stands, in short, as an invitation for other nations to practice
a discrimination which, in the broader view, can hardly serve either the
interests of American investors or the larger cause of good order in the
international community.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that notwithstanding the existing
authority of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to validate the
175. Consult the careful explanation of this point by Judge Lumbard in his Citibank
opinion, 431 F.2d at 404 n.18. The point is one of elementary alternative cost analy-
sis. The question of who bears the loss of the pre-intervention accounts is to be deter-
mined by comparing the gains or losses of each group (importers versus other claimants)
under the several alternatives available to the court. Since the Court could have denied
the importers' claims altogether, thereby increasing the other claimants' potential recovery
by the full amount of the pre-intervention payments, any alternative decision which re-
duces the other claimants' potential recovery represents a decision to impose upon those
claimants all or part of the loss of the pre-intervention accounts. Because the allowance
of the set-off reduced the other claimants' recovery up to the full amount of the pre-
intervention accounts, they actually bore the full impact of the loss-a loss occasioned
not by their own actions, but by those of the importers. To have remanded the import-
ers to the political mechanism would have meant a sharing of the loss, since the other
claimants would recover less than under the first alternative (i.e., they would bear some
loss) and the importers would recover less than under the latter alternative (i.e.,they
would bear some loss). The sharing is pro rata.
176. See Part II supra.
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importers' claims,1 77 recovery on those claims is likely to depend largely
upon the outcome of some future negotiation with the government of
Cuba for a lump-sum or other settlement. There is also some possibil-
ity that the State Department might decline to espouse those claims as
part of such a settlement on the grounds that they were not cognizable
under international law. Were the Court, however, to have cited this
possibility as a basis for refusing to remand the importers' claims,
especially if advised of the possibility by the State Department, it plainly
would have had no recourse but to invalidate the claims altogether.
If the possibility were sufficient to bar remand, it would certainly
have sufficed to suggest the compelling danger that any judgment
granting the importers a set-off against funds legally belonging to Cuba
was an offense against the very rights of Cuba as a sovereign state
which the United States had claimed for itself. At this point the issue
would have been not whether there should be a double standard under
American law, but whether the United States should, by applying that
standard, violate its obligation to respect the very rights of a foreign
sovereign which it had demanded for itself. In the context of claims
for approximately $477,000 which not even the State Department
would espouse, the obligation of the Court to uphold international law
was plain.
Thus act of state again emerges rooted in considerations which no
theory of mere deference to the Executive can possibly capture. And
since, in the Dunhill context, it may be doubted that the problem for
the Court rose to the status of a classic political question under the his-
torical standards already discussed, act of state, if not commanded by
the Constitution, may nevertheless be seen as firmly footed upon
constitutional underpinnings.
IV. SUMMARY AND FORWARD LOOK
A. The Further Inquiry
It should be obvious that the foregoing critique of the Cuban cases
is based upon their very special and limiting context-a hostile political
climate capable of precipitating mutual acts of deprivation. It is by no
means self-evident that judicial actions removed from this setting will
have a comparable impact upon policy, upon private rights, upon the
integrity of the courts or upon international law. It cannot be assumed
that one will find in the particular circumstances that may have necessi-




tated the results in Sabbatino a warrant for Justice Harlan's broad inter-
diction. Whether such an extension can be justified is the question for
the remainder of this Article. As preface to that inquiry, a few general
observations will emphasize the pertinence of the question and aid in
pursuit of the answer.
Without much doubt the classic statement of the doctrine-that
"the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of govern-
ment of another done within its own territory"174-begs the question.
The courts of the United States do sit in judgment upon the acts of a
foreign government, except where they do not do so because of the
act of state doctrine. They judge whether those acts are offensive to
their own public policy or to international law.1" 9 In the case of foreign
judgments, they pass on the adequacy of the rendering court's claim
of jurisdiction, the essential fairness of the procedures employed, and
the conformity of the decision to the fundamentals of American public
policy. 180
Nor can the doctrine's ambit be defined by automatically limiting
its application to executive acts and excluding all legislative or judicial
acts. If in nineteenth century usage "acts of government" meant
only executive actions, contemporary experience compels a total rejec-
tion of any such limitation. The courts have in fact applied act of state
to a wholly private dispute where only a foreign legislative enactment,
divorced from any executive act, was involved.18 1  In both Sabbatino
and Citibank, while the seizures at issue were carried out by the Cuban
executive, it was Law 851 itself and the circumstances of its issuance
that were the exclusive subject of judicial scrutiny.
The fact that a foreign government is willing to submit its acts to
the scrutiny of its own courts may weigh in assaying the consequences
of submitting that act to American judicial scrutiny. But given the pro-
pensity of contemporary governments to protest their adherence to legal
forms, and the advantages to be gained from appearing to follow those
forms, there is scarcely a governmental purpose that might in an earlier
day have been accomplished wholly by executive decree that today will
not be the subject of subsequent judicial enforcement. The judiciary
may be wholly subservient to the will of the executive, but the form
persists.
178. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
179. See Henkin, supra note 72.
180. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), is the leading case.




In like fashion, Dunhill warns against any limitation based upon
general and somewhat abstract subject-matter categories. An excep-
tion for all commercial obligations, or all acts by agents with commer-
cial (as distinct from sovereign) powers or for regulatory or contractual
actions, as distinct from expropriatory acts, is folly. Attempted com-
parisons to sovereign immunity are fragile at best. Act of state is
rooted in the perceived threats to judicial legitimacy which may attend
efforts to judge a foreign state act on its merits. Only in their common
concern to avoid direct embarrassments to foreign policy may a some-
what fortuitous convergence of the two doctrines occur. And careless
statements calling act of state a "claim of immunity in disguise" -are
wholly misplaced.'8 2
There is, in short, no ready definition. The touchstone is purpose.
Any exercise or refusal to exercise power by any agency of a foreign
government, by whatever mode and with whatever object in mind, is
an act of state, if an American court, consulting the sources of its own
legitimacy and the requirements of justice, determines that it must be
SO.
But this definition also begs the question unless one can replicate,
in the wider setting of Justice Harlan's interdiction, those particular
threats to judicial legitimacy that were present either in the Cuban cases
or their precursors. And the fact is that the boundaries of the doctrine
laid down by the pre-Sabbatino decisions of the Supreme Court can be
read in a very limited fashion indeed-a fashion warranting application
of the doctrine in Sabbatino and Citibank, but no more. It is not that
the leading cases must be read in this restricted way. The lower courts
have not done so. But since the latter provide little by way of explana-
tion-the classic statement usually suffices-any rigorous test of the
Sabbatino rule must commence by acknowledging that it was not com-
pelled by any existing Supreme Court authority.
In rejecting a claim for damages arising out of an armed insurrec-
tion in Venezuela, the Court in Underhill v. Hernandez'8 3 clearly
recognized the distinctiveness of that case.'84 Insurrection as a means
182. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 26, Dunhill, 96 S. Ct. 1854
(1976).
183. 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (suit by American citizen held captive and otherwise
injured by Venezuelan revolutionaries later recognized as legitimate government by
United States).
184. Id. at 254. It is nowhere clear from the case upon which law plaintiff based
his cause of action. If, as normal choice of law rules would indicate, Venezuelan law
was controlling, the Court might well have found a total lack of basis for the claim. The
case might also have been disposed of on sovereign immunity grounds.
[V"ol. 1976:807
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of governmental change was a growing phenomenon. Claims for dam-
ages from such events were certain to increase. The problem was to
fashion a general judicial response to such claims in cases where the
Executive had later recognized the party perpetrating the injury as the
legitimate government of the foreign country. Seen from this perspec-
tive, the entire opinion shows how thoroughly the Court desired to
avoid imperiling the whole relationship between the United States and
a foreign government that was implicit in the act of recognizing the
latter.18 5 It was responding in terms not unlike those undergirding the
classic political question decisions already reviewed.
In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.18 6 and Ricaud v. American Metal
Co.,1 87 the link to the recognition power appears much more explicit.
Act of state, as one of a triumvirate of principles, was necessary to give
full operative effect to the other two precepts: the principle that the
recognition power was altogether political and the principle that recog-
nition retroactively validated all actions of the newly recognized govern-
ment.18 8 In the Litvinov Assignment cases, it was the inextricable rela-
tionship between those Assignments and the recognition of the Soviet
government that led the Court, using act of state, to recognize the
underlying Soviet expropriatory decrees. 8 9 United States v. Bel-
185. It was dealing, the Court said, with an act of "legitimate warfare [which] can-
not be made the basis of individual liability." Id. at 253. It was a civil war, the merits
of which "generally speaking foreign nations do not assume to judge." This being so,
once the victors had been recognized by the Executive, it would be "idle to argue" that
they were "banditti or mere mobs." The case was entirely distinguishable from decisions
dealing with piracy, with contracts in aid of insurrection and with military arrests re-
moved from the context of war. Hence, the "redress of grievances by reason of such
acts" was the province of diplomacy. Id.
186. 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (seizure of animal hides by Mexican insurgents who pre-
vailed and were recognized as de jure government of Mexico).
187. 246 U.S. 304 (1918) (seizure of lead bullion shipment under same circum-
stances as in Oetijen).
188. In Oetjen, plaintiff alleged that the seizure violated international law. Although
disposed to find no such violation, the Court, noting that similar "claims . . . [were]
being made in many cases in this and in other courts," preferred to rest its decision on
the "three clearly settled principles of law" noted above. Id. at 302.
189. Although in M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E.
679 (1933), the impact of the de facto recognition of the Soviet government is apparent,
it must be conceded that lower court decisions dealing with the Soviet decrees cannot
be explained in terms of the existence or not of a comparable linkage to the recognition
power. This is underscored by the fact that even when confronted by the linkage of
the Litvinov Assignments, the New York Court of Appeals refused to apply act of state
in Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York, 280 N.Y. 286, 20 N.E.2d 758 (1939).
If the Soviet decrees were intended to apply to assets in the United States they were,
the court held, unenforceable as contrary to public policy. While the decision was af-
firmed by an evenly divided Supreme Court, 309 U.S. 624 (1940), its continued force
874 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1976:807
mont' 90 is the definitive illustration.' 9' There, Justice Sutherland, after
noting the Oetfen linkage, forged such a close inderdependence
between the two that, on the facts before him, he found the rationale
for applying the act of state doctrine in the political act of recogni-
tion.192
has, I suggest, been substantially undermined if not overruled by United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942). Also, in Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263
N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934), while the circumstances of de facto recognition were
the same as in Salimoff, the doctrine was not applied since the situs of the property
in question was said to be New York. In cases where the foreign act was not considered
extraterritorial, such as Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71, 193
N.E. 897 (1934), Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d
798 (1938), and the first Bernstein case, Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frares S.A., 163
F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947), involving Nazi racial decrees,
much less was made of the recognition point, although, of course, recognition was con-
sidered necessary to the application of the doctrine. Compare pre-recognition cases such
as Petrogradsky Meijdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y.
23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930), and Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 147
N.E. 703 (1925), where non-recognition was obviously important, although no less than
the fact that the assets were thought to have a situs in New York. In Wulfsohn v. Rus-
sian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923), writ of
error dismissed, 266 U.S. 580 (1924), dismissal of plaintiffs tort claim for seizure of
assets located in Russia was predicated more upon sovereign immunity than act of state.
As discussed in Part V of this Article, such non-extraterritorial cases as Salimoff,
Dougherty, Bernstein and Holzer fall within a distinct category of situations to which
act of state was properly applied. This application represents, nevertheless, an extension
of the precise constitutional underpinnings which undergird the Supreme Court decisions
reviewed to this point.
Of the more recent non-Cuban decisions, Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas
& Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972), rests upon a classic constitutional footing.
There, one of the Trucial States in the Persian Gulf, allegedly as part of a conspiracy
in violation of the United States antitrust laws, laid claim to the territory of another
such state within which territory the latter had granted plaintiff an oil concession. As
a result plaintiff lost his concession. The validity of the first state's claim to territory
was plainly a political question under the authority of such cases as Suffolk and Jones,
discussed in notes 131-33 supra and accompanying text.
190. 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (action to recover money formerly belonging to Russian
corporation and assigned by Soviet government, after expropriation, to United States).
191. The other major Litvinov Assignment cases were United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942); Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 309 U.S. 624 (1940); Guaranty
Trust v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938). In Moscow, an evenly divided Court up-
held the New York Court of Appeals' judgment that the Soviet decrees were either not
intended to have extraterritorial effect or, if so intended, were unenforceable as contrary
to public policy. In Pink, however, the Court held that the Moscow Court's decision
was not an "authoritative precedent," and proceeded to uphold the Government's claim
based upon the Soviet decrees. In doing so, Pink purported to adopt the Belmont rule,
but Belmont was clearly used in a subsidiary role, the main point being the constitu-
tionality of the Assignments, See note 100 supra.
192. For this position, Justice Sutherland relied principally upon Lord Scrutton's deci-
sion in Luther v. James Sagor & Co. [1921] 3 K.B. 532, especially that passage where
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Starting with the boundaries suggested by these cases, several
conclusions seem to follow. The constitutional underpinnings of the
doctrine can scarcely be denied. And while in Sabbatino the Court
could not have relied upon a comparable linkage between Cuba's acts
and the recognition power per se, the linkage to those elements under-
girding the characterization of that power as political-the largeness of
subject and the matter of judicial competence-was, as already sug-
gested, quite plain. Sabbatino represented only a modest extension of
the earlier decisions, if any extension at all. Citibank and Dunhill, in
turn, demonstrate the wisdom of that extension.
This conclusion, however, underscores the breadth of the potential
gap between the particular circumstances which justified the results in
Sabbatino and the broad ruling which emerged from the case, a gap
Dunhill fails to close. In the absence of guidance from the Court, our
only course is to postulate a rough catalogue of situations where the
act of state doctrine might appear to serve purposes analogous to its
role in the leading cases (Section B of this Part) and then to examine
the Lord Justice insisted that "the responsibility for recognition or non-recognition...
rests on the political advisers of the Sovereign and not on the judges." Id. at 559.
Lord Scrutton plainly was not suggesting that every legislative act of a recognized
foreign government had to be recognized by the courts of England. It was only that
judicial non-recognition of the Soviet legislation in that case would have undermined,
if not actually repudiated, the political decision to extend de facto recognition to the
Soviet government. A glance at the context underscores the point. The British grant
of de facto recognition to the Soviets had just occurred; the two governments had, a
month before, signed a trade agreement which anticipated the equitable settlement of
precisely the kind of claim that was before the court. The year was 1921. Western
intervention against the Soviet revolution had just come to an end. The Soviets were
attempting to re-establish commercial and financial relationships with the Western pow-
ers, and the latter were reciprocating. Against this background, Lord Scrutton, in speak-
ing of the question of "recognition," was referring unambiguously to both the political
question of de facto recognition of the Soviet government and the question of judicial
recognition of Soviet decrees. They were inextricably connected. Preservation of the
integrity of the political decision was a bar to any course other than judicial recognition.
Of the American cases, only Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937), and Ameri-
can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), do not readily fit this partic-
ular linkage of act of state to the recognition power. Both involved the seizure of Amer-
ican property by a foreign government, but neither occurred in the narrow context of
an insurrection by a party later recognized by the United States, and in neither did the
Court evince any particular sensitivity to the impingement of the case upon the recogni-
tion power or upon the larger relationship between the United States and the foreign
power. In both, nevertheless, the Court's treatment of the doctrine was perfunctory at
best. In Shapleigh the party complaining of the expropriation conceded the validity of
the doctrine and offered no serious test of its limits; the Court noted that a claim had
already been filed with a commission jointly established by the United States and Mex-
ico. In American Banana, the doctrine's use was closely related to Justice Holmes' more
famous dictum constraining the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws, a holding ef-
fort long since abandoned by the Court.
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how and to what extent this may be so (Part V). In this effort lower
court decisions are suggestive, but by no means definitive, and the cata-
logue is far from exhaustive.
B. A Catalogue of Wider Uses
1. Of Scope
Since our purpose is to discern the potential effects of judicial
action in the wider circumstances envisioned by Justice Harlan, several
considerations militate against confining the inquiry solely to disputes
over foreign expropriatory acts (the direct taking of title to property),
even though these were obviously the focus of the Justice's concern.
The courts have not drawn any arbitrary, formalistic lines around the
act of state doctrine. 19 3  There is certainly no a priori reason why judg-
ments regarding foreign regulatory acts or contract repudiations cannot
have effects as great as those feared by the Court in the expropriation
context. 19 4
193. Cuba's action in Dunhill can be viewed as the repudiation of an equitable obli-
gation, although it can also be characterized as a seizure of the pre-intervention accounts
receivable. In French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968), act of state was applied to Cuba's exchange control regulations
where those regulations effectively repudiated an agreement guaranteeing to plaintiff the
right to repatriate the earnings from certain investments. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-
Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938), involved the repudiation of a private
contract by reason of the Nazi racial laws, while Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 226 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934), involved a Soviet decree terminating all bene-
fits under private insurance contracts.
194. The related question of the doctrine's applicability to foreign revenue measures
raises its own distinctive problems. Traditionally, American courts have refused to en-
force foreign revenue laws. See, e.g., Banco de Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity
Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963); Philadelphia v. Cohen,
11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.Y. 167, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1962); Colorado v Harbeck, 232 N.Y.
71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921); In re Estate of Jandorf, 41 Misc. 2d 712, 246 N.Y.S.2d 378
(Sur. Ct. 1964); In re Robinson's Estate, 206 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sur. Ct. 1960). State
courts are slowly abandoning the rule as applied to the revenue laws of sister states. See,
e.g., Buckley v. Huston, 60 N.J. 472, 291 A.2d 129 (1972); Nelson v. Minnesota Income
Tax Div., 429 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1967). A number of states have enacted reciprocity stat-
utes applicable to such laws. E.g., ARK. STAT. § 84-4018 (1947); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
79-2910a (1969). Nonetheless, the rule as applied to foreign countries' revenue laws
is arguably more essential today than in the past. Cf. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600
(2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J., concurring). The argument for the traditional rule rests
upon considerations very similar to those underlying the act of state doctrine. Yet the
rule is genuinely one of non-enforcement. It requires a court to do no more than grant
the taxpayer's motion to dismiss a foreign government's claim. This is not necessarily
the case with act of state. See note 251 infra. The appropriate relationship be-
tween the traditional rule and the act of state doctrine poses an interesting and intricate
question lying beyond the purview of this Article. On the enforcement of foreign reve-
nue laws see Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46
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At the same time this disavowal of a formalistic limitation does
require that some other, perhaps arbitrary, limit be imposed upon
the inquiry. Accordingly, the analysis is confined to foreign state acts
involving some form of deprivation of property rights that gives rise to
a claim of right to property itself (e.g., Sabbatino), or to a claim for
damages (e.g., Citibank). Furthermore, our chief concern is with
claims predicated upon a violation of international law, although
municipal law (e.g., Dunhil) cannot be wholly ignored.
In working within these bounds, the analysis rejects any suggestion
that in contrast to expropriatory acts, the regulatory and contractual
actions of States are all automatically exempt from international legal
control. It rejects especially the notion that all such acts, or even broad
categories of such acts, are non-confiscatory. There is, of course,
authority for such ideas. But they are often so devoid of economic
rationality as to be nothing more than a means of avoiding embarrass-
ments to the strict non-discriminatory, full, prompt and adequate com-
pensation standard.195 If the rules differ according to the form of
deprivation, as they do, that is usually because national behavior differs,
not because one form is less a deprivation than the other. More
HARv. L. REv. 193 (1932); on the relationship of the revenue rule to act of state see
Cohen, Nonenforcement of Foreign Tax Laws and the Act of State Doctriner A Con-
flict in Judicial Foreign Policy, 11 HARv. INT' L.J. 1 (1970). With respect to the tra-
ditional rule denying enforcement to foreign penal laws, see notes 263-70 infra and ac-
companying text. While the traditional rule regarding foreign revenue laws has its or-
igins in the penal law rule, they may bear a quite different relationship to act of state.
See note 272 infra.
195. See M. WHrrEmAN, supra note 47, at 1143; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED STATES § 187 (1965). Compare Judge Keating's some-
what flawed but nevertheless realistic effort to come to grips with the Cuban exchange
control regulations involved in French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 76-
93, 242 N.E.2d 704, 723-34, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 450-61 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting),
with the following statement of Mann, quoted by Judge Fuld in the same case:
A legislator who reduces rates of interest or renders agreements invalid or
incapable of being performed or prohibits exports, or renders performance
more expensive by the imposition of taxes or tariffs does not take property.
Nor does he take property if he depreciates currency or prohibits payment in
foreign currency or abrogates gold clauses. Expectations relating to the
continuing intrinsic value of all currency or contractual terms such as the
gold clauses are, like favorable business conditions and good will, "transient
circumstances, subject to change," and suffer from [the] "congenital in-
firmity" that they may be changed by the competent legislator. They are not
property, their change is not deprivation. Mann, Money in Public Interna-
tional Law, 96 RECUEIL DES Couns 1, 90 (1959).
Stuff and nonsense! It only brings contempt upon international law and its scholarly
purveyors. Ask the man who has suffered. And if the expectation of a governmental
deprivation is the test of governmental regularity, then in light of the contemporary rec-
ord there can be no rule prohibiting expropriations. If the behavior of nations cannot
be reconciled with a particular norm, then the latter must be changed; it will not do
to distinguish the behavior by ignoring economic reality.
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importantly, if the American courts are to act in a way conducive
to the development of more adequate norms in this under-developed
area of international law, they cannot retreat behind formalities that
defy rational exposition, especially since their own law has at least
begun to see through such devices. 196
2. Of Encroachment on the Political Realm
Consider first the Cuban situation had the Castro government
issued the sweeping July, 1960 decree, but had the United States, for
its own reasons, not denied Cuban sugar access to the American
196. By an older tradition, an otherwise valid although confiscatory state police
power regulation--compelling a person to use or not use property in a specific fashion
at a financial sacrifice-was thought to be distinct from the eminent domain power (tak-
ing in the literal sense of title) and wholly immune from any compensation requirement.
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). In the case of federal regulations, while the degree of deprivation was undoubt-
edly relevant under a substantive due process inquiry, adherence to literal notions of a
taking for use foreclosed resort to the fifth amendment's takings clause.
Pennsylvania Coal Co., however, may be said to mark the end of any strict adher-
ence to the older tradition. There a state's otherwise valid "police power" prohibition
on certain mining operations was struck down. The due process clause, informed, as
Justice Holmes said, by the fifth amendment's takings clause, required that while
"property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking" and the state compelled to resort to the eminent domain power
and to make compensation. Id. at 415.
The older tradition has, nevertheless, died hard. United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958), is illustrative. There Justice Burton took comfort
in the fact it was a "war power regulation" he was dealing with in upholding the War
Production Board's closure of gold mines to save equipment and divert miners to more
essential work. Id. at 181. This evoked from Justice Harlan a vigorous dissent against
"permitting formalities to obscure actualities" merely because the government "proceeds
by indirection, and accomplishes by regulation what is the equivalent of outright physical
seizure of private property." Id. at 184 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
If Eureka can be said to stand with the older tradition, that is only a matter of de-
gree; the deprivation was virtually total. For it is clear that in spite of Pennsylvania
Coal Co., the law has not arrived at the point where an equivalence in the measure of
deprivation alone, if less than total, will secure for a regulation the same fate as an out-
right expropriation. Or conversely, it might be thought that if form were no guar-
anty against having to pay just compensation, form should offer no guaranty that
compensation will be required; that if the government might regulate without pay-
ing compensation, it would not be barred from achieving an identical purpose
through outright confiscation. But neither symmetry nor even rationality is always con-
trolling. This may be because in our ideas of what is just, there is much that breeds
ambivalence towards the rights of private property. Here we need only note that while
the government may do by uncompensated regulation what it may not do by a formal
taking without compensation, the line between the two is not a firm one. The regulatory
form is no longer unconstrained by the just compensation requirement, and the Court's




market. In this context, an adjudication invalidating that decree would
have been an open invitation to a series of attachments tantamount to
a judicial withdrawal of the sugar quota. Far from being a claim by
a handful of investors attaching an isolated piece of property, the case
would have taken on a wholly different aspect. Cuba's dependence
upon its sugar exports, the historical significance of the United States
as a Cuban market, the place of the expropriations in the nationalistic
and ideological aims of the Cuban government, all suggest an action
the impact of which could scarcely be more fundamental to the relation-
ship between the two nations. Certainly the sweeping confiscations with
which Cuba answered the quota withdrawal are a measure of the poten-
tial importance of such a step. Arguably, it would rank as no less cen-
tral to specifying the quality of the relationship between the two
countries and to conditioning all questions of policy which might follow,
than would a legislative refusal to execute a treaty or a denial of a
foreign claim to contested territory.
This sense of the largeness of the subject is complemented by a
concern for the competence of the courts to resolve the questions
inherent in the invitation to take such a step. The refusal of the politi-
cal departments to ban Cuban imports would have implied a certain
"disavowal," as Justice Douglas called it in United States v. Pink,19 7 of
concern with Castro's decrees-not a disavowal of all concern, but a
matter of proportion. It would have been a disavowal of the degree
of concern necessary to warrant the kind of unilateral action that the
court was being asked to take. As such it would, beyond doubt, have
constituted a statement of the national interest. Unless a court, there-
fore, were prepared to assert its superior competence to weigh the com-
plex and subtle considerations of economic advantage, political and
diplomatic influence and military power upon which such statements
hinge, it would have had further cause to question its authority to judge
the foreign government's actions.
The situations most likely to pose a danger of judicial encroach-
ment upon the political realm are major expropriations by the nation's
principal trading partners, particularly nations that are important
sources of petroleum and other raw materials vital in the American
economy today. It is not difficult to perceive why any political decision
to impose a trade ban in such cases is likely to be attended with con-
sequences sufficient to warn against a judicial decision which might
197. 315 U.S. 203, 232 (1942).
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have a comparable effect.' 93 The record of the difficulties encoun-
tered by the State Department in the Libyan Oil cases serves to
illustrate the point, 190 suggesting that the Legal Adviser's willingness
to see Sabbatino overruled was ill-advised at best.
Other situations may arise, however, where a judicially imposed
ban might be preferable to legislative and executive sanctions. And
so long as this can be accomplished consistently with the several pur-
poses of the act of state doctrine, the characterization of the case as
posing a political question will not, it is submitted, foreclose such use
of the judicial power.2 00  There may, indeed, be a place for the Bern-
198. The relationship between expropriations of this type and the question of when
the judicial power might properly be employed to deter or ameliorate foreign expropria-
tory excesses is worthy of note. It can be assumed that if their claims were vindicated
by the courts, expropriated investors as a group would not obtain significant redress di-
rectly through the attachment of imports as they arrived in this country. The imports
would simply stop arriving. As a group, their interest in judicial action is principally
a matter of exerting economic leverage upon the foreign government to modify its plans,
reverse itself entirely or negotiate a more adequate settlement. If one is dealing with
an expropriatory program with a high ideological content, the larger the taking the less
chance of judicial action having the desired effect. But generally, the larger the policy
implications of judicial action the greater the economic leverage and hence the greater
the chance of judicial action succeeding in these ameliorative or deterrent purposes. If,
however, the political departments are observed refusing to ban imports in spite of the
prospect that such action may aid the investors' cause, it must mean that there are other
interests of the nation at stake, and that such of the latter as would be sacrificed to
that success or hurt by failing in the attempt command the greater weight. The stronger
the case for a trade ban, in other words, the greater the countervailing national interest
implicit in the political departments' refusal to impose the ban. This means that the
clearer the prospect of the courts effectively assisting expropriated investors as a group,
the more clearly political department inaction stands as a warning against attempting
such assistance. Obviously, investors may not agree with the political departments. But
the judges must, unless they are prepared to assert their superior competence in the
premises.
199. See Department of State, Statement on "Hot" Libyan Oil, 13 INT'L LFGAL MA-
TERIALS 767 (1974).
200. In principle, whenever the elements of a political question are drawn into a de-
cision under the act of state doctrine, any assessment of the largeness of the subject is
a matter of assessing the impact of judicial action upon the nation's foreign and domestic
policies. Plainly, the courts can be aided in this perceptual task by the political depart-
ments. Even if, as Justice Brennan urged, the Executive could not by mere stipulation
change a non-justiciable controversy into a cognizable claim, an expression of its posi-
tion might well change the judicial perception of the controversy. What might without
guidance be thought political may, with guidance, be no longer viewed as such. And
if the political departments perceive no harm to policy, then possibly the courts are as
constitutionally bound to recognize that perception as they are constitutionally bound to
avoid disrupting policy when guidance is not forthcoming. As a corollary, when the
perceived largeness of the question changes, then the overall balance among the elements
of a political question would appear to change. The less momentous the issue, the freer
the court may be to invoke novel principles or to undertake the task of reconciling con-




3. Of Encroachments on the Settlement of Disputes
Cases will, of course, frequently arise where neither the magni-
tude of American claims nor the size of the foreign government's trade
and financial relationships with the United States poses a danger of
thrusting the courts into that high policy-making role that would have
occurred under our variant of the Cuban setting. Nevertheless, even
as the context moves away from this more obvious, constitutionally pro-
scribed area, the other variables remain. The foreign government's
action may still relate to American and other alien interests which
None of this, however, implies acceptance of Justice Rehnquist's deference theory.
National policy is not the only interest to be protected. Certainly, in the context of
Citibank and Dunhill, protection of the other affected claimants was not a matter upon
which the Executive could control the Court. Moreover, nothing that the political de-
partments say can control what the courts, in the name of their own integrity, determine
to be the applicable rule for their decision. See note 256 infra. What this means, of
course, is that if the political departments by their guidance can change a political ques-
tion into a cognizable controversy, it must be guidance issued with full knowledge of
all possible outcomes. Citibank is illustrative. One cannot read into either the Legal
Adviser's letter or the Hickenlooper/Sabbatino amendment acceptance of a judgment im-
pliedly invalidating all peacetime seizures under the Trading with the Enemy Act, in-
cluding the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. And certainly neither can be read as
accepting an international standard which, should it validate Cuba's decrees, would cast
doubt upon the whole course of American policy toward Cuba. Neither letter nor stat-
ute, in other words, was accompanied by the necessary evidence demonstrating a consid-
eration of the foreign policy interests at stake in the case. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
at 436. Until that evidence was supplied the Court was bound to ignore both. And
while there may be a place for a new cooperative regime between the political and judi-
cial branches, that regime bears no resemblance to Justice Rehnquist's notion of judicial
deference to the Executive.
Focusing more specifically on the question of a judicially imposed trade ban, it
would seem from this analysis that if the Executive stated that the consequences of an
adjudication upon the relationship of the two countries were not as adverse as our dis-
cussion of the Cuban variant suggests, see Part IV. B.2, then the court might well hear
the challenge to the foreign government's actions. Additionally, if, notwithstanding
those consequences, the Executive advised that a judicially rather than politically im-
posed trade ban would better serve the national interest (i.e., that the national interest
determination implicit in political inaction was not as the court must otherwise assume),
then it would again seem that the challenge should be heard. There are, however, two
limitations to be observed. First, the Executive advice, as trigger to the imposition of
a trade ban, would probably have to rest upon a grant of legislative authority. And,
in both situations, the courts could act upon such advice only if assured that the politi-
cal departments would accept the consequences of using the legal standards hereinafter
discussed. See Part V. B. inIra.
201. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The court held itself relieved of the act of state doctrine's
proscription when advised by the State Department that an adjudication would not be
contrary to the foreign policy interests of the U.S.
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occupy a highly visible place in its economic affairs. The political
power of those interests, real or imagined, may be significant. The act
may be associated with the government's larger international economic
objectives, or it may be undergirded by a strong ideological imperative.
In this setting the several elements in the Sabbatino formula have
a differential impact. An adjudication, even if not impinging upon
high policy, could have political and symbolic effects prejudicial to the
general redress of American grievances and embarrassing to the
nation's wider economic and political interests. Yet, because the possi-
bilities of frustrating the foreign government's purposes are limited,
such embarrassments are by no means certain to attend every contro-
versy and are arguably a matter to be judged on a case by case basis,
with Executive assistance. Indeed, if the foreign government has actu-
ally violated international norms, the responsibility of the American
courts to uphold those norms should not be set aside without a clear
showing of necessity in the particular case. It is a setting, in other
words, where Justice Harlan's broad interdiction may be seriously chal-
lenged so long as justice to the American investors immediately
involved and a concern for national policy are the only touchstones to
the act of state doctrine. Perhaps one can read some such sense into
Justice Powell's position, and it certainly accords with Justice White's
vigorous appeal for a more selective approach.2"2
There remains, however, a concern for the integrity of the judici-
ary itself. The controlling analogy is the Citibank analysis-an
analogy which also applies to our variant on the Cuban setting and
bolsters the constitutional predicates already observed in that instance.
While the argument is fully developed in Part V, suffice it to say here
that substantial questions exist as to whether, in a similar setting, the
courts of the United States would hold the United States government
to a constitutional standard comparable to the traditional non-discrim-
inatory, full, prompt and adequate compensation standard of inter-
national law. Yet that standard performs a critical facilitative function
in the settlement of international investment disputes. In cases, there-
fore, where the courts, in the name of their own integrity, could not
uphold that standard, their intervention would serve neither the cause
of justice nor the "rule of law" among nations. Few more pointed
examples can be found demonstrating that the progress of law among
nations cannot invariably be equated with the judicial enforcement of
international norms, and that act of state may indeed serve to secure the
efficacy of those norms in their proper role.
202. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 466 (White, J., dissenting). Note also the Justice's
proposal that the courts notify the State Department and then decline to exercise their
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4. Of What Remains
Lastly, it is possible to anticipate a potentially large number of
cases where there is no danger of intruding the courts into the political
realm and no risk of undermining judicial integrity, cases where the
courts can be assured of applying a single standard evenhandedly under
both constitutional and international precept. The problem lies in dis-
cerning the case. To determine whether or not to sit in judgment on
a foreign act-to decide whether act of state should apply-may
actually require judging that act. Any decision, in other words, even
one applying traditional norms, may result in pronouncements as
destructive of those norms as an outright disavowal of them would be.
The question is whether these dangers can be avoided. Can the courts,
if sensitive to the problem, clear in understanding the conflict to be
avoided, and careful in articulating their results, intrude themselves into
these cases as a positive force for justice and order in the international
sphere? An affirmative answer is devoutly to be desired. But on close
examination the risk, it would seem, is not worth the undertaking. Jus-
tice Harlan's broad interdiction was, indeed, a wise extension of prior
authority.
V. TIE WIDER USES OF THE DOCTUNE
Once the analysis leaves the more certain confines of the Cuban
cases where Sardino supplies the controlling constitutional analogy, the
task of comparing constitutional with international precept becomes a
hazardous task indeed. What is offered here can hardly be an exhaus-
tive review of American law. Nevertheless, there are two recurring
lines of authority sanctioning the deprivation of property in spite of the
fifth amendment's due process and takings clauses, neither of which can
be ignored in any serious discussion of the act of state doctrine. There
is more than enough to suggest that both may be rooted in concerns
not unlike those that underlie the political question doctrine.
A. Constitutional Practice
1. A Normative Dimension
The Court has many times reminded us that the fifth amendment's
takings clause is an ethical injunction.203 Beyond this there may be,
power only upon receipt of a request for withdrawal from the Department. Id. at 468-
70.
203. See, e.g., United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124
(1950); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947). As an ethical injunction
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as Justice Jackson seems to have suggested, a certain open-ended utili-
tarianism about it as well."0 4 Nevertheless, in searching for normative
specifications of somewhat greater rigor, the idea that compensation is
sometimes required may be usefully thought of as resting upon an
assumed relationship between collective action and individual welfare.
It assumes that a principal impulse and justification for organized
society is the promise that there are gains to individual welfare which
might not otherwise be secured without collective action. It also
assumes that any collectively compelled change in the distribution of
resources can meet its promise to private welfare only if the gains to
individuals from the compelled new use are great enough to permit
compensation for the losses imposed by a denial of the old, that is, only
if the "gainers" are willing and able to pay off the "losers." Social, psy-
chological and even aesthetic gains are no less a part of this welfare
calculus than material gains. Stated another way, if a violation of the
literal terms of the just compensation requirement is capable of evoking
outrage, this is only the outward manifestation of a conviction that collec-
tive action, having failed to pay for what it intended to achieve, has
failed in that promise to individual welfare which stands as the principal
justification for such action.
Added to this, there has been forged a critical instrumental link
between the just compensation requirement and private markets.
Where compensation is required in the name of justice, market value
is the measure of justice done. Using this basic normative benchmark,
we turn to two important lines of doctrine.
2. Of Magnitude and Comprehensiveness
It is axiomatic, as already noted,20 5 that a strong formalistic
tradition continues to persist in American law. The government can
deprive a person of property by regulation even though to take the
same value for the same purpose would require just compensation.
The taking of 10% of the value of property by regulating its use is
the provision may be an enigma: "The political ethics reflected in the Fifth Amendment
reject confiscation as a measure of justice . . . . But the Amendment does not contain
any definite standards of fairness .... " United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332
(1949) (Douglas, J.).
204. "The Fifth Amendment," Justice Jackson said, "undertakes to redistribute cer-
tain economic losses inflicted by public improvements so that they will fall upon the
public rather than wholly upon those who happen to lie in the path of the project. It
does not undertake, however, to socialize all losses . . . ." It does so only for those
"which have the law back of them." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324
U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
205. See note 196 supra.
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not invariably equated with taking 10% of the property itself. Never-
theless, the line between the two is not a firm one. The regulatory
form is no longer wholly unconstrained by the just compensation
requirement, and the Court's application of that requirement to regula-
tory action does have probative value for our subject.
Given the breakdown of these formalistic distinctions, it is instruc-
tive to look at the taxing power. Plainly, this power is an exception
to the ethical assumptions which we have ascribed to the fifth amend-
ment's compensation requirement. Formal taxation (i.e., excluding
taxation through inflation) is the method sanctioned by the Constitution
for having society as a whole pay for the gains to social welfare incident
to all other forms of governmentally compelled changes in the use of
resources. Yet, when so used, the tax law has a redistributive effect,
quite apart from its use as an instrument for the deliberate redistribu-
tion of wealth within society. What this then means is that if the gov-
ernment taxes to meet a social exigency, such as controlling inflation
or fighting a war or reforming the currency, these redistributive effects
are, and must be, basically ignored. Yet obviously there comes a point
where regulations, expropriations, and contract repudiations to the same
end (e.g., wage and price controls, war production controls, and gold
clause abrogations) can have, in magnitude and comprehensiveness, an
effect not very different from taxation. That such measures have re-
distributive effects (i.e., are confiscatory)2 08 is a matter that rationally
should be ignored so long as the comparable effects of the tax law are
ignored. To grant the government the power to regulate or take without
compensation in these instances stands as little more than a pragmatic
grant of permission to do by regulation essentially what it might do by
taxation, especially if it is thought that the regulatory form will accom-
plish the governmental purpose more effectively.
The point should be made plain. The author has found no
authority explicitly sanctioning such a rationale for a regulatory or
expropriatory deprivation of property. But the interest here is in the
strength of the underlying values. Thus, it should be recognized that
all uncompensated expropriations and many, if not most, regulations
redistribute wealth in society. Indeed, some regulations, such as wage
and price controls, could not otherwise achieve their purpose: namely,
controlling explicit money prices, not necessarily real prices. In these
instances, to say that the Constitution requires compensation is tanta-
mount to saying that the Constitution denies the power to regulate.
Hence, the point. In the usual case there may be important differences
"206. See note 96 supra regarding the use of the word "confiscation."
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in the redistributive effects (who gains and who loses, how much and
in what form) between general taxation and other forms of deprivation.
Generally, taxation may be a more objective and reliable way of distri-
buting the costs of securing the general welfare. But there would be
something profoundly irrational in a constitutional scheme that granted
the power to achieve a social purpose requiring the redistribution of
wealth so long as taxation was used but would deny a power to regulate
or expropriate without compensation for the same purpose, if, by some
general test of magnitude and comprehensiveness, the redistributive
effects were not likely to be very different. In such a context, the only
interesting constitutional question concerns the content of that general
test.
Here, cases such as United States v. Central Eureka Mining20 7 and
the "Gold Clause''208 cases are on point. Not only do they illustrate
the use of such a test, they also illustrate some of the difficulties attend-
ing its application to specific cases and the imprudence of maintaining
any formalistic distinction that would treat the expropriatory form of
deprivation more strictly than other forms.
In Eureka, Justice Burton, writing for the majority, upheld the
government's decision to close the nation's gold mines in order to divert
men and equipment to more essential wartime needs. Initially taking
comfort in the regulatory form of the government's action, he then
sought to equate that regulation with the wider wartime price and pro-
duction controls which the Court on several occasions had already vali-
dated.20 9 After objecting to the triumph of form over substance, 10
Justice Harlan responded in dissent not by denying that wartime regula-
tions may fall outside the constitutional demand of just compensation
in some instances, but by denying that the regulation of the gold mines
was such an instance. The wartime price and production control cases
were, he said, "wide of the mark," because, inter alia:
In all of them the Government was administering a nationwide regula-
tory system rather than a narrowly confined order directed to a small,
singled-out category of individual concerns . . . . In those cases the
Court was rightfully reluctant to sanction compensation for losses re-
sulting from wartime regulatory measures which, under conditions
207. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
208. Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), and Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), are the cases of principal interest.
209. 357 U.S. at 168, citing Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251
U.S. 146 (1919); Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1919); Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503 (1944); United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
210. See note 196 supra.
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of total mobilization, have ramifications touching everyone in one degree
or another.
211
Possibly war was an essential element in Justice Harlan's view of
the case, but plainly that was not enough. 1 2 Only if sufficiently gener-
alized in its impact upon society could even wartime confiscatory regu-
lation be sanctioned. That point had not, in the Justice's view, been
reached in Eureka. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the
Justice was adamant in equating the government's regulatory acts with
a taking for use. Does this suggest he would apply his tests of magnitude
and comprehensiveness to uphold an outright expropriation without com-
pensation which otherwise qualified as a taking? Perhaps not, but the
mere possibility is certainly illustrative of the difficulty in maintaining
the formalistic line.
If Justice Harlan's reasoning in Eureka owed something to the
wartime context of the case, the "Gold Clause" cases can in consider-
able part be read as a peacetime analog. When in 1933 and 1934 Con-
gress and the President demonetized gold and devalued the dollar
(reduced the gold parity) 1 3 they demanded surrender of all outstand-
ing gold coin and bullion, prohibited domestic trading and exportation
of gold2 14 and also abrogated all "gold clauses" in public and private
obligations215 (i.e., clauses calling for payment in gold coin of a speci-
fied weight and fineness or in other legal tender equivalent in value
to the specified coin).
In Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,21 6 the Court dealt
with the clauses in local governmental and private obligations. Those
clauses, Chief Justice Hughes held, called for payment in money, not
in a commodity. Since Congress was constitutionally authorized to
"coin money" and "regulate the value thereof, '217 the abrogation of the
clauses was a necessary incident of that power, and hence, not offensive
to the fifth amendment. To deny abrogation in the face of devalua-
tion would mean that while the income of debtors was "controlled by
211. 357 U.S. at 182-84.
212. Justice Harlan also suggested a distinction between regulations which destroy all
profitable use of property and regulations which leave the owner with something of value.
Id. at 182. Here is Justice Holmes' notion of regulation going "too far." See note 196
supra.
213. Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. §§ 411 et seq. (1970).
214. Emergency Banking Act, Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1; Executive Or-
ders Relating to the Hoarding, Export, and Earmarking of Gold Coin, Gold Bullion, and
Gold Certificates, 31 C.F.R. §§ 50.1 et seq. (1939).
215. Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, ch. 48, 48 Stat. 112.
216. 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
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law, their indebtedness" would have to be "met by an amount of cur-
rency determined by the former gold standard." Having noted the esti-
mate of $75 billion of such obligations outstanding with annual interest
costs of $3-4 billion, the Chief Justice stated,
It requires no acute analysis or profound economic inquiry to disclose
the dislocation of the domestic economy which would be caused by such
a disparity of conditions in which, it is insisted, those debtors under
gold clauses should be required to pay one dollar and sixty-nine cents
in currency while respectively receiving their taxes, rates, charges and
prices on the basis of one dollar of that currency.218
In Perry v. United States,219 the Court turned to the clauses in the
federal government's own obligations. There, the Chief Justice found
that while Congress had the power to regulate the value of money, it
had, in borrowing, promised that the lender should not suffer "through
a depreciation in the medium of payment" occasioned by the exercise
of that power. Abrogation in that case, the Chief Justice said, "would
be not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation. 220
Having so firmly aligned the Court on the side of contractual
integrity, it might have been expected that plaintiff would win his
cause. But not so, for the Court next turned to the measure of dam-
ages. Plaintiff's claim was for $16,931.25 on a $10,000 bond. At
this ratio, the Government brief had pointed out, enforcement of the
clauses would have increased the $20 billion Government debt to $34
billion and the annual interest expense from $700 million to $1.2
billion.22' In light of the policy of balancing the federal budget which
prevailed at the time, these increases would have been nothing short
of catastrophic. The President, according to the New York Times, was
218. 294 U.S. at 315-16. It has been suggested that the decision in Norman may
rest upon the uniqueness of the power to regulate the currency. See Dunham, Griggs
v. Allegheny County In Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation
Law, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 63, 77. If so, it is not immediately apparent why one may
not effectively contract with others to be protected against such regulation, except as
such contracts by their number and dollar magnitude might have the practical effect of
constraining the government in its use of the regulatory power. Moreover, it is unclear
why the power to regulate the currency is different from any other governmental regula-
tion issued in the effort to recover from a depression or in response to other large public
exigencies.
219. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
220. Id. at 352-53. This would appear to distinguish Perry from Nortz v. United
States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935), where the gold certificates involved were not thought to
have been issued or purchased with the broader purpose in mind of protecting the holder
against the subsequent depreciation of the currency.
221. See A. NUSSBAUM, MoNEY IN THE LAw 364 (1939).
[Vol. 1976:807
ACT OF STATE
prepared to tell the people that compliance was impossible.222  Against
this background the Court held that because Congress was fully
empowered to bar trading in gold, the failure to pay in gold coin gave
rise to no cognizable injury.223  Moreover, under a "gold-value" clause,
plaintiff's injury was not to be measured by the equivalent of the gold
coins promised. He was not to receive the difference in the official value
of the dollar before and after the devaluations evem though, as the
Court had held, it was against such changes that he had contracted to
be protected. Rather, his damages were to be measured by the loss
of purchasing power that would have resulted from a' failure to pay at
the contracted higher value. Not only was there no proof of such loss
in the case, but given the general decline in prices since the date of
purchase, such proof might have been very difficult to make. Plaintiff
was entitled, in short, to only the $10,000 face amount of the bond.224
As Nussbaum has observed, the Court, by its theory of the measure
of compensation, essentially nullified its holding on the right to
compensation. 25
Justice Stone's concurring opinion highlights the point, The
Justice agreed with the majority that the clause in question implied a
promise that the holder would not suffer from a later depreciation in
the currency. But he was unwilling to say that this obligation over-
rode the power to regulate the currency, that there was a distinction
between the federal government and other debtors. To hold otherwise
would have meant, he suggested, that the Government might so
manage the borrowing power (i.e., incur such large gold-value obliga-
222. New York Times, Feb. 21, 1935, at 1, col. 6.
223. 294 U.S. at 355-56.
224. Id. at 357-58.
225., It is to be emphasized with respect to Perry that, as Nussbaum points out, the
very purpose of a gold value clause was to protect the creditor against governmental dis-
turbances in gold trading like those involved in that case. In other words, the creditor
was to receive the equivalent in legal tender of what he would have received had he
been paid in gold coin and been free to trade gold on world markets. The thought that
plaintiff was claiming a windfall also is incorrect. It is true that had plaintiff been
awarded the full amount of damages sought, he would have obtained much more in the
way of purchasing power than he would have received had the gold value clause never
been abrogated and prices remained constant. But then if he had been certain that
prices would remain unchanged, he would not have been willing to pay as much for the
gold value clause. The possibility of price changes precipitating changes in the value
of the currency largely determined the price he was willing to pay for that clause. More-
over, it is notable that it was the competitive devaluations in the context of worldwide
depressions that had largely spawned such clauses. See A. NuSSBAuM, Supra note 221,
at 365. Nussbaum's nullification theory would seem, therefore, to be entirely correct.
The Government was allowed to take exactly what it had promised to give.
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tions) as to effectively impair its power to regulate the currency.226 In
other words, if the burden of such contracts would have effectively
defeated the attainment of a sufficiently large regulatory purpose, repu-
diation of the contracts was permissible. Although unwilling to adopt
this position explicitly, the majority arrived at the same point.
The larger lesson of these cases is not to be denied-magnitude and
comprehensiveness can play a role in determining the constitutionality
of confiscatory action. If the redistributive impact of such an action
is sufficiently broad and the costs of forestalling the deprivation large
enough to frustrate an important national purpose, the cases illustrate
how difficult it may be for a court to interpose the Constitution against
the Government. This is especially so when the latter can cite such
utilitarian concerns as the adverse effects of compensation upon the
management of the budget or even simple efficiency in the execution
of a governmental program.
Caution, however, must be exercised in drawing analogies from
all of this to particular foreign deprivations of American property, par-
ticularly in the expropriatory form. The cases did not involve a total
deprivation of all value, except in the case of Eureka. There still
remains the matter of form, however fragile may be the distinction
between regulation and contract repudiation on one hand and expropria-
tion on the other. In addition, there is the problem of a confisca-
tion that discriminates against aliens rather than falling more randomly
across the society.
On the other hand, because our interest is in the nature and
strength of underlying values, especially the extent to which a commu-
nity of values may be thought to exist between American constitutional
law and a strict view of the traditional international law, the decisions
are instructive. From the standpoint of our values, is there any differ-
ence, for example, between a total deprivation and a less than total loss
which nevertheless destroys all the value expectations upon which the
acquisition of property was predicated, as in the "Gold Clause" cases?
If not, what is the measure of deprivation that distinguishes the im-
permissible (confiscatory) from the permissible (non-confiscatory)
deprivation? Or rather, is not the very fact of resort to such
elusive phrases evidence of a fundamental ambivalence towards the
rights of private property? If in the practice of such ambivalence con-
siderations of magnitude, comprehensiveness and essentiality of pur-
226. 294 U.S. at 358 (Stone, J., concurring); see Dawson, The Gold Clause Deci-
sions, 33 Mica. L. REv. 647, 656 (1935).
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pose play a role, must we not entertain the possibility that a total depri-
vation might receive constitutional sanction? Moreover, again as a
reflection of American values, is it not immaterial that such a depriva-
tion might be permitted by the Court only if it took the form of a regu-
lation or the repudiation of a contract? Particularly in judging the acts
of less developed countries, it would seem necessary to recognize that
the use of the expropriatory form is often dictated more by considera-
tions of institutional competence than anything else. And surely the
non-discriminatory character of the actions in these cases is a wholly
irrelevant factor in viewing most foreign expropiatory programs through
a constitutional lens.2 2 7
Stating the point another way, there would seem to be more than
passing affinity between the reasoning in Eureka and Norman, the
results in Perry, and the views expressed by Mexico three years later,
in response to a demand by Secretary of State Cordell Hull that Ameri-
can landowners be accorded full, prompt and adequate compensation
for properties taken by the Mexican government under its land reform
programs. In international law, the Mexican Foreign Minister as-
serted, there was "no rule universally accepted in theory nor carried
out in practice" requiring either immediate or deferred compensation
for "expropriations of a general and impersonal character" such as those
carried out by Mexico.228 Otherwise, the Foreign Minister argued, "a
transformation of the country, that is to say, the future of the nation,
[would] be halted by the impossibility of paying immediately the value
of the properties" taken.2 29
3. Of "Evils To Be Eradicated"
The second doctrinal line of interest is the so-called "evils (or
harms) to be eradicated/causality" test originating in due process chal-
227. In the matter of discrimination, were the bondholders in Norman and Perry any
less discriminated against than aliens, including Americans, might be in the case of a
foreign expropriation? The use of a non-discrimination test to distinguish bondholders
from aliens-to protect aliens but not bondholders because the deprivation in the case
of bond repudiation falls indiscriminately upon both citizens and aliens-begs the ques-
tion. Discrimination against aliens goes to the purpose of the confiscation. To impose
a non-discriminatory qualification on the magnitudinal test is merely to say that a nation
may confiscate in order to conduct a war or devalue the currency, but not to forestall
the perceived threat to national economic and political independence posed by what is
thought to be a too-extensive foreign ownership of national resources. Apart from the
inherent improbability of such a rule, it is a quite inapposite qualification upon the mag-
nitudinal test. For a broader discussion of the non-discriminatory criterion in interna-
tidnal law see Dawson & Weston, supra note 108, at 87-91.
228. 3 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 99, at 657.
229. Id. at 658.
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lenges to state police power regulations. 2 0 Properly understood, the
test appears initially as a further and distinctive effort to limit what
Justice Holmes was prone to call the "petty larceny" of the police
power.23' Perhaps because the test of whether a regulation had gone
too far was so nebulous, calling for a case-by-case weighing of public
desire against private cost,232 the addition of a requirement that the
regulation also be directed, in both purpose and degree of deprivation,
at eradicating a public harm caused by the private owner of property
appeared to offer a welcome element of objectivity.
Professor Dunham has quite elegantly drawn the principle out of
a wide range of cases. 2 8  Here a few decisions will suffice to illustrate.
In Nashville, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Walters,23 4 Justice
Brandeis, acknowledging that the police power may appropriately be used
to secure gains to public welfare and convenience-in that case a grade
separation where a railroad crossed a public way-also insisted that the
cost of those gains (an assessment) not be imposed on a single individ-
ual unless the imposition bore "some reasonable relationship to the
...advantages to be secured" by that person or "to the evils to be
eradicated."235 Thus, the Supreme Court of Tennessee's refusal to
inquire into such matters as the relative responsiblity of railroad and
highway users for accidents was reversible error. In Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway v. Public Utilities Commission23 6 an assessment for
the construction of a grade separation was upheld because "the
presence of the tracks in the streets create[d] the burden [of the
construction] in the interest of public safety and convenience," while
in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. State Highway Commission3 7 the
absence of public danger from a gas transmission line to be crossed by
a new public highway invalidated the state's demand that the pipeline
owners relocate the line. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,2 8
Justice Clark, in spite of deficiencies in the record, inferred that further
excavations in a gravel pit might be "attractive and dangerous to
children." He then emphasized the absence of evidence regarding the
230. See, e.g., Nashville C. & St. L Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 (1935). See
notes 233-50 infra and accompanying text.
231. 1 HOLMEs-LAsKI LETrrEs 456-57 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
232. See note 196 supra.
233. Dunham, supra note 218.
234. 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
235. Id. at 429.
236. 346 U.S. 346, 353 (1953).
237. 294 U.S. 613 (1935).
238. 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962).
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losses that the owner would suffer if prohibited from further excava-
tions in order to uphold that prohibition under a general presumption
of constitutionality.
Had the use of this test been confined to state police power regu-
lations it might not be of much interest to our subject. But it occurs
elsewhere as well. Justice Harlan used it to bolster his attack on the
gold mine regulations in United States v. Central Eureka Mining; the
gold mines were not, to his mind, a "harm" to society.239  Justices
Douglas and Black invoked its aid in their dissent in United States v.
Caltex, Inc.,2 40 wherein Caltex was denied compensation for petroleum
storage facilities destroyed when the American army retreated from
Manila.
Set in this larger federal context, the doctrine is of considerable
significance. It no doubt evidences a judicial determination to exercise
greater control over regulatory deviations from the just compensation
requirement. But what is of immediate interest are the values thought
to be served by selecting this particular point for drawing the line and
implicitly lending a certain ethical license to deviations which meet its
terms.
First, it is to be observed that none of the above cases has adopted
a temporal test of causality. In Nashville, Atchison and Hempstead it
was the community action-the expansion of the highways and the
growth of the surrounding town-not the railroad or the gravel pit
owner that, in a temporal sense, caused the asserted harm. 241  This,
in turn, means that the test has no deterrent or punitive purpose but
serves only as a way of choosing between two incompatible claims to
property: the claim of the owner to treat as his property (that bundle
of benefits from which he can exclude others) the benefits derived
from one set of activity (harms), and the claim of others to treat as
their property the benefit of having those activities cease. Clearly,
recognition of one claim excludes the other.
In this respect, the "evils to be eradicated" cases are one with
Miller v. Schoene.242  There the Supreme Court sustained a Virginia
239. 357 U.S. 155, 182-83 (1958) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
240. 344 U.S. 149, 156' (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
241. In Nashville, Justice Brandeis, citing a long line of authorities, was quite clear
that an owner may be thought to have caused the harm to be eradicated even though
the "railroad was built before the crossing was made." 294 U.S. at 430. But this then
means that the test was not thought of as serving a deterrent purpose, nor does it appear
to have been a means of securing from property owners some higher order of socially
responsible behavior. If supported only by a punitive purpose, it is an outrage.
242. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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statute requiring plaintiff to destroy, without compensation, ornamental
red cedar trees infected with a cedar rust that was fatal to neighboring
apple orchards but harmless to the cedar host.243 The onset of the rust
compelled the state, or so the Court thought, to choose either cedar
trees or apple trees-the two could not coexist. The Court concluded
that when
forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional pow-
ers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order
to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater
value to the public.2 44
Plainly, cedar rust was an evil to be eradicated, but only if one wanted
to grow apples. Likewise, a railroad on a public way or a gravel pit in
a town were evils to be eradicated, but only if one wanted to have a
public way or a town around the gravel pit. Thus, the Court in
Miller quite properly stated (as it might have in all the other cases)
that the problem was choosing which use was the most valuable to the
community as a whole-which use contributed most to individual
welfare.
But then, why no compensation? In all the cases the legislature
and the courts were being asked to respond to changes in external cir-
cumstances-the onset of cedar rust, the growth of a town, the legisla-
tive decision to build a highway-against the background of an existing
configuration of property rights. If the Court had merely affirmed
those rights (invalidated the legislation), the full economic impact of
the change in circumstances would have been borne by someone other
than those who ultimately bore those costs because of the decision.
The Court, in other words, made two essentially separate decisions. It
validated the legislative decision to relieve the highway users, the
homeowners and the apple growers from bearing the costs of safety (or
lack of safety) on the highway or in the town or of protecting their
apple trees. It permitted the existing configuration of property rights
to be changed. By refusing to require compensation, the Court also
permitted the legislature to shift those costs, not to the community as
a whole, but to the railroads, and to the gravel pit and cedar tree
owners, the very people protected from bearing those costs by the exist-
243. Miller emphasizes the difficulties attending the distinction between a regulatory
taking and an expropriation and between confiscatory and non-confiscatory depriva-
tions. Would the government have had to compensate if it, rather than the private
owner, had destroyed the trees? Such a result would have been absurd. Did the fact
that the owner could use the cut trees for lumber or firewood, save the law from being
confiscatory? If so, the word loses its meaning.
244. 276 U.S. at 279.
[Vol. 1976:807
ACT OF STATE
ing configuration of rights. Why should this be so? If the answer is
that the community (i.e., the legislature) refused to pay, then the ques-
tion is more fundamental. Why did the Court, as guardian of the con-
stitutional order, abandon compensation as the acid test of whether the
gains to the community from protecting highway users and apple
growers actually outweighed the losses to the community from the
failure to grant that protection-whether the protection actually served
a public purpose? In other words, why did the Court not recognize
that in its refusal to pay, the legislature's assertion of a public purpose
may have simply been rhetoric signifying political capitulation to special
interests at the expense of the general welfare?
The thought that an explanation may be found in the theory of
externalities-that private markets, being incapable of internalizing all
costs, overstate the value of the extant use so that the law must pay
only the true value-will not do.245  Nor is it possible to evoke vague
references to imperfect markets. The market is not at issue here.
Such matters as transaction costs and free-rider problems may make
resort to public authority appropriate.246 They cannot, however,
explain the failure to pay compensation. To explain the results as a
245. If we characterize the object as merely securing a social gain, market value
compensation must be paid; if it is characterized as eliminating a harm, that measure
of compensation is to be reduced. Which is it, or is it both? Even accepting the possi-
bility that externalities do exist, the point is that the margin of overstated market value
is at once a measure of the harm being eliminated and of the minimum benefit being
derived by society from eliminating that harm. If society is unwilling to pay the private
owner the margin of overstated value, then plainly we have proof, under the just com-
pensation assumption, that the elimination of those external costs is far less valuable to
society as a whole than permitting the owner to continue with his use of the property
and having society pay those costs. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Costs,
3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). Stated another way, the benefit the private owner derives
(the added return on his investment) from not having all costs internalized is the margin
required in order to keep him using his property in a way that, according to our assump-
tions, the community itself (by its unwillingness to pay) has said provides the greatest
gains to the welfare of the whole. In short, the quarrel is with the requirement of com-
pensation per se as a proper test of relative welfare gains and losses, and not with market
value as a measure of compensation.
246. The sheer number of homeowners, road users or apple and cedar growers, the
uncertainties of determining with whom to trade, and the costs of negotiation-all may
constitute "transaction costs" which raise the cost of a market solution above the value
differential between the alternative resource uses. Their effect may in turn warrant gov-
ernmental action (depending, however, upon the often considerable costs of such ac-
tion), provided those compelled to give up their property are fully compensated. Addi-
tionally, under a free market regime, those engaged in the more valued activity will be
tempted to wait for others similarly situated to buy out the less valued use (i.e., to get
a "free ride" on the others). Theoretically at least, this behavioral phenomenon could
produce a total standstill in the trading process. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 24-27 (1972).
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manifestation of our general reliance upon the political system to assess
the general welfare begs the question. It is the purpose of constitu-
tional principles to establish a standard of reason to which political judg-
ments must adhere.
It is tempting to find a rational relationship between these denials
of compensation and the general welfare, in the belief that the
welfare of individuals in society as a whole can, under certain circum-
stances, be enhanced only by the transfer of wealth from one group
within society to another. Whether such possibilities actually exist in
the real world or not, it is far from clear how the highly subjective and
normative concept of an evil to be eradicated is probative, in any objec-
tive, empirically refutable sense, of a condition warranting resort to
such a principle.
This question is underscored by the aircraft overflight cases in
which compensation was required even though, as in the cases under
discussion, there was no literal taking for use. The difference in result
cannot be explained by the older, formalistic tradition. In United
States v. Causby247 and Griggs v. Allegheny County,248 the government
was required to compensate adjacent property owners for losses in
use and enjoyment suffered because of the noise, vibrations and fear
of injury resulting from the wartime operation of a military airbase
(Causby) and from a new airport built to handle jet traffic into
Pittsburgh (Griggs). Like the "evils to be eradicated" cases, it was
the government decision that in a temporal sense caused the injury;
the decision in Griggs to secure safer jet air service to Pittsburgh and
in Causby the decision to train pilots for the war. Since the continued
undiminished use by the owners of adjacent property would have frus-
trated those objectives altogether, it was an "evil" in the sense that it fore-
stalled the realization of a public good, no less than did railroads which
obstructed a safe road for travel or the gravel pit which interfered with
a safe town for children. If measured by the urgency or public impor-
tance of the community use which the adjacent owners might have fore-
stalled, this would seem clear. Certainly, there would not appear to
have been any economic reason to justify a wealth transfer in one case
and not in the other. If there was some discrete social objective to
be served by such a transfer in the railroad and gravel pit cases, it would
seem to obtain equally in the airport cases, unless it is because railroads
and gravel pit owners are generally wealthier than farmers and home-
247. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
248. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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owners.249 The rhetorical device of "evils to be eradicated" is not being
employed, in short, as an objective test for determining when a redis-
tribution of wealth might be thought to enhance the general welfare.
Possibly, then, the aircraft overflight cases were just wrong; or per-
haps the railroad and gravel pit decisions missed the mark. If so, our
law is badly skewed. This is a possibility not to be dismissed lightly.
The cases may reflect no more than our profound ambivalence towards
private property, our propensity to abhor the larceny of government
while insisting that some larceny be directed at some people without
any rational principles to govern precisely when this should occur.
Yet there is another view. Perhaps the cases are not to be
approached as posing a problem in the rational consistency of rules, but
rather as offering a lesson in the judicial use of rules as a mechanism
of social control. Ironically, to decry our ambivalence toward private
property as essentially arbitrary, even wasteful and destructive of incen-
tive, may itself be arbitrary. The very persistence with which that
ambivalence recurs in society serves to warn that at some point to deny
the ambivalence may, by undermining the consensual underpinnings of
all order, be the more arbitrary and wasteful course of action. The
redistributive principle may under proper circumstances be a self-
proving proposition. And whether articulated as such or not, the test
of "evils to be eradicated" and the magnitudinal test may be seen as
yielding some rough sense of the cases in which a court cannot risk the
possibility of such an occurrence. They may stand as crude guides to
that case where the judiciary, as the least representative of our govern-
mental institutions, must yield to the political demand for the redistribu-
tion of wealth for fear that the compensation requirement's denial of
that demand may result in the very diminution in the general welfare
against which it was otherwise intended to protect.
Viewed from this perspective, the tests may not be too far wide
of the mark. Both speak in terms of public expectations. The magni-
tudinal test tends to measure a point where the costs of the governmen-
tal purpose (i.e., the loss of value in existing property rights) are likely
to be outweighed by the costs to the basic consensual order if public
expectations are frustrated. The "evils to be eradicated" test, while
less readily justified, is also couched in terms of public expectations.
For this purpose, forestalling a public good is too imprecise a definition
249. Compare the defense of Miller v. Schoene in Samuels, Interrelations Between
Legal & Economic Processes, 14 J. LAw & ECON. 435 (1971) with Buchanan, Politics,
Property, and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al v. Schoene, 15 J.
LAw & ECON. 439 (1972). Neither author undertakes any analysis of other cases.
Vol. 1976:807]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of an evil. There is something far more ethical at work here, quite
independent of the innocence of the perpetrator. Railroads injuring
people, cedar trees destroying apple orchards, gravel pits hurting chil-
dren are evils; property owners forestalling construction of an airport
or gold mines forestalling the shift of men and machines to other higher
priority production are not evils. 250  Most would sense it. Whether
fully rationalized or not, we may be confronting in this rhetorical device
a positive force, which, so long as consensus supports the characteriza-
tion, is a reasonably accurate indicator of when we expect our institu-
tions of governance to engage in the larceny we otherwise abhor. If
so, it is an indicator the courts cannot ignore. And as such an indicator,
it is of considerable moment to our subject.
Even now, the argument that foreign ownership of American
resources is an "evil to be eradicated" is making its ominous way in
the land. Foreign owners, it is said, pose a threat to our economic sys-
tem (by a tolerance for their own monopoly exactions and a penchant
for financial manipulation). They are a threat to our workers' welfare
(displaying a greater disposition to locate production abroad), and to
our moral values (harboring racial and religious biases we purport to
spurn). They are, it is argued, a threat to our technology (exhibiting
a propensity to keep research and development at home) and to our
foreign policy (exhibiting a greater responsiveness to the policies of
their own governments). The point is not that we have come to view
foreign ownership in this way. It is that, should we do so with sufficient
intensity, the courts are virtually certain to accord a large measure of
flexibility to the government in fashioning a response. Divestiture of
stock, transfers of assets at depreciated values, even direct expropri-
ations with payment in long-term bonds without any index to changing
price levels, are only illustrative of measures which are likely to visit
major financial losses upon foreign owners; however, they are measures
which, more probably than not, will survive constitutional attack. And
as the magnitude of the purported "evil" grows, so will the magnitude
of the permissible deprivation. Perhaps it must be this way. But if
so, it confronts the American courts with some singular choices in
deciding how to deal with the comparable acts of foreign governments.
B. The Consequences of Judging
The central fact with which the American courts must deal seems
rather clear. There is a potential divergence of major significance
250. In Eureka, Justice Burton did not attempt to meet Justice Harlan's contention
that the absence of an "evil to be eradicated" further undercut the Government's claimed
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between constitutional precept and the traditional non-discriminatory,
full, prompt and adequate compensation standard of international law.
The two will no doubt conform in many cases, but not in all.
There should, of course, be nothing surprising in all of this. The
American government and the American people are not immune from
the sensitivity that other people exhibit when purported legal standards
threaten important public purposes. Nor can it be assumed that the
courts will ignore this sensitivity-that they will enunciate constitutional
standards without concern for their effects. And within limits, the
nation's commitment to the rule of law demands precisely such sensi-
tivity, since there can be no such rule unless the consensual nature of
all law is clearly acknowledged. In other words, an American confis-
catory act as momentous as those undertaken by many foreign govern-
ments could well be held exempt from the Constitution's just compensa-
tion requirement. If the judicial invalidation of such an act would also
seriously contravene important American foreign and domestic policies,
it is to be expected that the courts will either find a way under established
principles to validate the act or withdraw from the controversy
altogether.
1. Where Standards Diverge
Against this background, the American courts cannot, it must be
urged, enforce traditional international norms against a foreign govern-
ment in any case where the constitutional standard would differ. To
do so would only invite an international law attack upon comparable
acts of the American government. The courts could no more sustain
such an attack than they might sustain an attack under a like constitu-
tional norm. The only way to preserve the traditional international
standard in such a case, therefore, would be to abandon all pretense
of judging like cases alike according to reasoned principles, or, alterna-
tively, to abstain from judging altogether. If unprepared to do either,
they could only scuttle the traditional international norm and search for
an international consensus sufficient to support a rule which conforms to
the Constitution. For present purposes it is assumed that such a search
is a reasonable alternative; Justice Harlan's skepticism of the tradi-
tional law supports the assumption, and Justice Powell's exhortation is
an invitation to undertake the search. It is the consequences of doing
so that are of immediate interest.




Foremost among these consequences is the devastating effect which
the espousal of such a rule would have on the prospects for a favorable
diplomatic settlement of international investment disputes generally.
Whether, in any case, the foreign government's action would be judged
valid or not by an American court acting under an emergent inter-
national standard is beside the point. In any case involving a signifi-
cant deprivation, American interests and international economic inter-
course will have suffered, and both justice to those injured and the
cause of good order in transnational affairs demand as broad a settle-
ment as possible. This is the province of diplomacy. If in the past
the diplomats have been inept or insufficiently aggressive, that is for
Congress and the President to correct. For the courts, the fundamental
necessity is to preserve the credibility of the traditional non-discrimina-
tory, full, prompt and adequate compensation standard of international
law. That standard can and has played a vital role in the settlement
of such disputes-so much so that one must attribute to the Legal
Adviser a willingness to see Sabbatino overturned only upon the
assumption that the courts would uphold the traditional norm. Other-
wise, his suggestion was entirely out of place.
The point is, at bottom, a matter of legal perspective. If it be
recognized that the establishment of a norm of international law need
not be committed to judicial authority, but to diplomacy as the appro-
priate remedial institution within the larger .framework of the inter-
national legal system, judicial abstention 25 1 can easily be seen as neces-
251. The ambit of this suggested abstention must be clarified. It is only intended
to mean that the courts should abstain from judgment on the merits, and not to imply
that they should abstain from all exercise of the judicial power. In fact, cases will arise
where, having abstained on the merits, they must, under act of state, affirmatively en-
force the foreign state act as the rule of decision in the case. Act of state can, in other
words, import its own conflicts of law rule, precisely as, in the political question cases,
the courts not infrequently.enforce the political departments' decision as the controlling
rule of decision. See notes 128, 146 supra.
As noted, there is no anomaly in the political question cases at all. Subject to a
possible exception where the legitimating function of the Supreme Court is a matter of
concern, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-56 (1944); (Jackson, J., dis-
senting); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 187-88 (1962), it is the contrary
posture that would present the anomaly. Failure to enforce the political departments'
decisions could undermine the very decision whose integrity made abstention necessary
in the first instance. In Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 257 (1829), Chief
Justice Marshall makes the point explicit by discussing a hypothetical case in which the
parties were reversed. Id. at 309. In Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415
(1839), it may have been true, as Dickinson has suggested, that the Court could have
determined the plaintiff's right to recovery upon an examination of the de facto situa-
tion. Dickinson, supra note 130, at 456. Yet given the Court's assumption that the
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sary to the progress of law among nations. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, the consensus necessary to sustain a rule of customary inter-
national law need not be composed of decisions made by courts, which
was not possible, to have denied plaintiff his relief would have impaired the integrity
of the very political department decision that it was constitutionally bound to preserve.
The parallel between act of state and political question, however, is not complete.
As pointed out in note 128 supra, the policies of the American government that are
being protected cannot supply the controlling rule of decision in the act of state case.
The question, therefore, is whether the foreign state act can do so. Here cases like
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818), are instructive. In that case,
indictments brought by federal authorities against defendants for highseas piracy against
a Spanish vessel were dismissed. The reason was that the United States had recognized
the existence of a civil war between Spain and the colony under whose authority defend-
ants claimed to act and had adopted a policy of neutrality toward the conflict. To judge
the defendants guilty (under United States statutes) would be, the Court said, to decide
"that the war prosecuted by one of the parties was unlawful." It would "arrange the
nation . . against that party," in a fashion that would "transcend the limits proscribed
to the judicial department." Id. at 634; accord, The Santissima Trinidad, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 337 (1822). Thus, contrasted with cases like Nielson and Suffolk,
the political question in Palmer was not in the first instance the substantive legal issue
raised by the pleadings. Defendants' alleged violation of the piracy statutes posed a po-
litical question only derivatively as a result of the prior conclusion that because a court,
being independent, might arrive at a judgment of guilt, the act of judging itself posed
an unacceptable threat to the controlling policy of neutrality. This is the exact parallel
to act of state; consideration of the issue of the legality of the foreign state act is pro-
scribed derivatively, because of the dangers an adjudication might pose to policy.
Thus, if judging a foreign state act to be invalid poses a proscribed threat to policy,
and if a denial of controlling effect to that act would pose no less a threat, then under
Nielson, and Suffolk with the Palmer variant, the judicial power must be affirmatively
exercised when necessary to give that act controlling effect. Act of state imports its
own conflicts of law rule. Certainly, a denial of controlling effect to a foreign state
act will generally pose no smaller threat to policy than a judgment invalidating that act.
Otherwise one must believe that a foreign government will act contrary to American in-
terests--disrupt policy-if its laws are declared invalid, but not if its laws are merely
denied the effect of valid laws; that it will defend the substantive legality of what it
has done while confessing the lack of jurisdictional authority to do it. If, arguendo, a
situation might arise where only the act of judging-not the denial of controlling effect
-poses a threat to policy, that is for the political departments alone to determine.
Where a judgment of validity poses the proscribed threat to policy the issue becomes
more intricate. A refusal to judge on the merits will largely secure against the adverse
effects already considered under the Sardino formula. Likewise, such refusal will largely
secure against the dangers of an adjudication to a negotiated settlement discussed here.
Yet this latter concern may also necessitate affirmatively enforcing the foreign govern-
ment's title to property. There is also a concern for the rights of other claimants in
the Citibank situation. Thus, the use or non-use of the judicial power to enforce the
foreign state act would appear to depend upon the position of the parties in the case.
If the foreign government, or its successor in interest, is plaintiff in an action for the
recovery of particular property, acceptance of that government's acts as the controlling
rule of decision in the case would seem necessary in order to avoid prejudicing a negoti-
ated settlement or to secure the larger community of American claimants in their rights.
That uninformed observers may assign to the Court's action an implied validation of
the foreign government's act would not seem a sufficient reason to bar such a judgment.
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may be concerned for their own integrity. Rather, it may be found
in the standards deemed sufficient by political authorities to trigger an
obligation to enter upon serious negotiations for the redress of griev-
ances. And from this perspective, if it is this process of claim and
counterclaim that promises to be the more adequate mode for the
settlement of international disputes, national courts have a positive
responsibility not to undermine that rule which lends to the process the
maximum possibilities for action.
By this latter standard, it cannot be doubted that a strictly inter-
preted non-discriminatory, full, prompt, and adequate compensation
standard is to be preferred. Without question it embraces, within its
implied claim of a right to redress, the widest variety of confiscatory
actions; few, if any, exhibiting some element of deprivation can escape.
Claiming venerable antecedents and supported by a considerable
rhetorical (if not behavioral) consensus, it remains an invaluable pos-
tulate of the international legal system. But it can only remain so if
the courts of the United States refuse to intrude upon any controversy
where they might be required to undermine the credibility of that
norm. To ignore this, to assume an inevitable dependence of law upon
judicial action, reflects a careless disregard of international law. In
short, it is the dependence of international law upon the act of state
doctrine that reveals the independent "underpinnings" of the doctrine-
underpinnings rooted in the search for a more viable international order.
2. Where Standards Conform
At this point, it seems plain that a substantial part of the gap
between Sabbatino and its precursors, on the one hand, and Justice
Harlan's broad interdiction, on the other, has been closed. The courts
must apply act of state in any case where the decision to judge raises
a serious prospect of announcing a less rigorous standard than the tradi-
tional international law on the subject. The question remains, how-
ever, whether the courts should judge if they are confident of upholding
that norm. Stated another way, can the courts decide whether or not to
judge, without actually judging and thereby undermining the credibility
of the more rigorous rule?
The context, it will be recalled, does not raise the prospect of
granting an unfair preference to those claimants immediately before the
The Court would not, in fact, have validated the foreign act. If the foreign government
is defendant, then the need to avoid disrupting a negotiation or to protect other claim-
ants' rights would appear to render total abstention the better course.
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court. Moreover, the Supreme Court is even now agreed that, where
the Executive is silent, a judicially self-imposed rule of abstention is
appropriate if the unrepresented interests are in fact the larger commu-
nity of Americans to be affected by an adjudication. But this is a
matter which could readily be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Likewise, if judgment involving a minor foreign act would embarrass
wider American interests, this too would seem a matter appropriate for
case-by-case decision, with the Executive giving guidance. The only
question is whether the integrity of the traditional international norm
can be preserved if the courts proceed to differentiate case-by-case
between those instances where they can confidently uphold that norm
and those where to judge at all would be to impair its credibility. In
other words, must the whole subject be governed by a blanket
interdiction?
Unfortunately, to acknowledge that the American courts might
judge in cases where an adjudication would not undermine traditional
norms may be to do exactly that. Even were the courts to hold firmly
against attempting to draw fine and discriminating lines, relying solely
upon the broad indicia used here to illustrate the potential divergence
between constitutional and international precept, the danger would
remain. The very act of deciding whether or not to judge would be an
acknowledgement of the existence of the divergence. Indeed, there
is in Justice Harlan's opinion an intriguing undercurrent which suggests
his concern with this problem. His expressions of skepticism regarding
the traditional standard hardly served to strengthen that standard, as
Justice White was quick to point out. Given, however, that he was
writing only a few years after his vigorous dissent in Eureka, one can
read this expression as an elliptical way of explaining the problem so
as to minimize the damage he sought to avoid-a subtle reminder that
any access to the courts might destroy the traditional norm altogether.
Were the Supreme Court to unleash all the American courts to decide
the issue on a case-by-case basis, the destruction would be virtually
certain.
Cases such as Holzer252 and Bernstein,5 3 involving the Nazi racial
decrees, illustrate the point nicely. Those acts were blatantly offensive
to fundamental American conceptions of justice. To adjudicate, the
courts would not have had to draw any fine line based upon the largeness
252. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798
(1938). See note 189 supra.
253. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr~res S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 772 (1947). See notes 189 and 201 supra.
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of the German government's purposes or the degree of deprivation.
Arguably, in other words, they should have simply decided the cases,
explaining that there was an exception to the act of state doctrine where
the purpose of the foreign act, not its confiscatory character, was
patently offensive to basic principles of American and international
justice. But then what of a case charging that a foreign act discrim-
inated against Americans or illegally retaliated against American gov-
ernmental actions? Such acts may not, as Sardino pointedly illustrates,
offend American constitutional precepts. By refusing to create an ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine in these latter instances, while doing
so in a Bernstein situation, the American courts would be pointedly
announcing that any State Department claim for redress on the grounds
of discrimination or retaliation may be without foundation in American
justice.2' 4
In sum, the invitation to judge cannot be accepted or rejected
without acknowledging, in one way or another, the existence of a stand-
ard which would destroy the credibility of executive claims under a
strict view of the traditional law. If this is so, to accept an invitation
to judge, because justice in a particular case favors an adjudication, is
to view the question of justice from an impermissibly narrow perspec-
tive, a perspective which ignores the problem of justice in all future cases.
One can only hope, in other words, that the Supreme Court
will eventually see the .wisdom of reaffirming that the courts of the
nation, state and federal alike, are not to judge whether an expropria-
tory decree of a recognized foreign government is valid under custom-
ary international law in cases where the property in issue was located
within that government's territory. One may even hope that it will
extend this holding to all other forms of confiscatory action against
which the Executive might legitimately tender a claim of international
illegality under traditional norms.2 55
On the other hand, in this context, removed from the very particu-
lar circumstances of the Cuban cases, it would not appear that act of
state signals a non-justiciable political question. Rather, it appears to
rest upon constitutional underpinnings alone. If so, the courts would
seem bound to obey any congressional directive to adjudicate, doing so,
however, only in accord with such international standards as might con-
254. See note 257 infra for a discussion of the "Bernstein exception."
255. See, e.g., French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704,
295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).
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form to constitutional precept.256 In like fashion, the doctrine might
in this context be set aside by executive intervention. But in no event
could it be set aside unless the Executive were to make clear its willing-
ness to abide by whatever decision was forthcoming, including a deci-
sion that the traditional international legal standard did not conform to
the American view of that law as applicable to the case.
257
C. The Territorial Limitation
Thus far, the analysis has worked largely within the bounds of the
territorial qualification of Justice Harlan's broad rule. The analysis of
Dunhill, however, has already suggested the possibility of deviations
from that limit. The basic thesis of this Part brings the issue to the
fore.
Generally, because the realities of national power, national con-
cerns and national expectations result in a differentiation between
people and objects within a nation's territory and those without, it can
be expected that a judicial denial of extraterritorial effect to a foreign
state act will not precipitate those direct embarrassments to policy
which would otherwise compel its recognition. Exceptions will, of
course, have to be acknowledged, as the Litvinov Assignments cases
pointedly illustrate. 25 8 But these instances, no less than such cases as
Dunhill or cases in which an adjudication would intrude the courts into
the political realm, as in our Cuban variant, must be regarded as rare
prospects at best. The central problem lies instead in the fact that even
256. We leave aside the question of how the courts should respond should Congress
attempt to lay down a contrary international rule under its power "To define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Na-
tions," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. It is to be noted that no such attempt was made
in the Hickenlooper/Sabbatino Amendment.
257. This is the basis for a distinction between the very narrow Bernstein setting and
the more general case, especially where the measure of compensation is the principal
defect in the foreign state act. In both cases the court can announce that there is in-
deed a "Bernstein exception" to the doctrine. See note 201 supra. In the Bernstein set-
ting the Executive need give no assurances regarding the standard to be employed, confi-
dent that the foreign act will be declared invalid. The court, without more, can declare
the law patently offensive to international justice without engaging any of the difficult
questions discussed above. In all other cases, if the Executive is silent-which it must
be in order to preserve the credibility of the traditional norm-the court will be com-
pelled either to question the Executive or, confident of the latter's distaste for anything
but the traditional norm, to decide whether it will be able to judge according to that
norm, inviting precisely the dangers against which act of state is designed to secure.
258. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1943); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937). Note especially Justice Stone's dissent in Pink, his concurring opinion in
Belmont, and Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Pink.
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in an extraterritorial case, the courts must maintain their own integrity
without announcing a standard of judgment which effectively contradicts
the traditional international norms on the subject.
The mere fact that property, by some appropriate choice of law
test, has its situs in the United States does not foreclose all claims that
the control and disposition of the property should be determined as a
foreign state has decreed, wholly without regard to the act of state doc-
trine. Such a claim may be predicated upon the normal rule of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction, as in Republic of Iraq v. First National City
Bank.1 9 It may rest upon the normal right of a firm, or its managers
and owners, to firm property, as in Dunhill and many of the Soviet
cases.20 0  It may rest upon a claim of excuse for non-performance
of a contract by reason of the foreign government's action, even though
the proper law of performance may be the American law.2 " Other
examples undoubtedly exist. But whatever the predicate, the Ameri-
can courts will not infrequently find the claim to be a compelling one,
not to be denied unless some reason in their own national policies
requires it.
Typically, this has led the courts to inquire whether the foreign
act offends what is called American public policy, a concept almost
invariably given a highly normative content262 and a concept which,
were it ever interpreted in a scrupulously evenhanded fashion, could
certainly lead to the enunciation of standards no less destructive of exec-
utive credibility than like pronouncements regarding international law.
Or, to make the point obvious, assuming interpretive integrity, act of
state would seem to be applicable to claims of extraterritorial prescrip-
tive right no less than to purely territorial assertions, unless the courts
can find some other, non-normative basis in policy for the refusal to
recognize such claims.
It is possible, of course, that public policy could be interpreted to
exclude any normative implications. It might be defined as a straight-
259. 253 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965) (attempt by government of Iraq to expropriate
funds of its deposed monarch held in a New York bank).
260. See, e.g., Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 716
(5th Cir. 1968); Zwack v. Kraus Bros., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956); Vladikavkazsky
Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934); Petrogradsky Mej-
dunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479
(1930).
261. See the discussion of the Cuban Insurance Cases in text accompanying note 89
supra.
262. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965);




forward assertion of self-interest-a simple refusal to aid a foreign
government which has injured Americans or other aliens-and, as such,
an assertion devoid of any suggestion that the foreign act is immoral,
unjust, or illegal, or that the United States would never behave in kind.
This, however, is not what is usually meant by the phrase, and until
the courts are prepared to posit such a definition, some other policy
must be found.
Here the traditional refusal of the courts, as Justice Marshall
phrased it, to "execute the penal laws" of another state,2 63 would seem
to supply an answer. It is a rule firmly rooted in Anglo-American legal
history. Some of its earliest applications involved foreign confiscatory
acts.264 Its origins can be traced to the special nature of the English
common law jury, and its survival to notions of sovereignty and other
more pragmatic concerns.2 65 In its more orthodox expressions, the rule
has been extended beyond traditional common law crimes to foreign
revenue laws, to the whole realm of foreign public law and to such non-
criminal penal cases (to use Leflar's apt phrase) 26 6 as actions on offi-
cial bonds and for wrongful death, punitive damages and family
support. In its orthodox use, the rule was said to bar not only the
affirmative enforcement of a penal claim (i.e., its execution) but all
forms of recognition.2 6 7
It is, of course, true that particularly in the United States this ortho-
doxy has come under severe and well-taken criticism. The rule, at
least in the area of non-criminal penal cases, has been increasingly
abandoned. When the Court in Huntington v. Attril1268 required that
full faith and credit be given those sister state judgments that were
intended only to "afford a private remedy," although penal in nature,
and not intended to "punish an offense against the public justice of the
state," it supplied a definition helpful in circumscribing the older ortho-
doxy. Nevertheless, it would still appear axiomatic that the American
courts will not entertain a foreign government's claim to money or prop-
erty prescribed as a penalty for the commission of a crime under foreign
263. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
264. See Wolff v. Oxholm, 105 Eng. Rep. 1177 (K.B. 1817); Folliott v. Ogden, 126
Eng. Rep. 75 (C.P. 1789), aff'd, 100 Eng. Rep. 825 (K.B. 1790), aff'd, 2 Eng. Rep.
75 (H.L. 1792).
265. On the impact of the English jury see Sack, Conflicts of Law in the History
of English Law, in THE LAw: A CENTuRY OF PROGRESS (1937). For a more specific
treatment of the penal law rule, see Katzenbach, supra note 61, at 1140-47.
266. See Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46
HARV. L. REv. 193, 202 (1932).
267. See A. DICEY & J. MoRms, THE CONFUCr OF LAWS 77-78 (9th ed. 1973).
268. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
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law. 260 Nor would they be likely to recognize a foreign judgment for
such a penalty even if the proceedings otherwise met all the requisites
of jurisdiction, fairness and conformity to public policy. 70 It is also
doubtful that they would permit a foreign criminal conviction to be
pleaded in a subsequent civil action as either prima facie or conclusive
proof of the facts adjudged, even if prepared to grant such collateral
estoppel effect to their own or sister state convictions. It should not
be too difficult to fit a foreign confiscatory statute or regulation into
this pattern, where the deprivation is for the benefit of the foreign
government and purports to be in furtherance of some public purpose.
Such an application is readily distinguishable from the non-
criminal penal cases which have engendered the bulk of the criticism of
the rule. Nor would such an application necessitate extending the rule
to the whole of a foreign government's public law, but only to such laws
which as a matter of fact deprive aliens of established property rights.
Whether or not there is any continuing vitality to the traditional ideas
of sovereignty which sustained the rule in the past, it finds ample justi-
fication as a statement of policy for our subject. It is historical and
normatively neutral. It would permit the courts to refuse aid to a
foreign government that has injured private American interests without
having to compromise the credibility of American diplomacy by the
issuance of normative assessments conforming to a more objective view
of American justice. Being normatively neutral and confined to
attempted extraterritorial deprivations, such a denial of aid is not likely
to be so offensive to a foreign government as to endanger the wider
interests of the nation. And given the larger purpose of preserving the
credibility of the diplomatic mechanism, the mere fact that a particular
foreign act may comport with American public policy is no reason to
recognize that act. If America's political interests require recognition,
then, as in Pink and Belmont, act of state should be applied.
Thus, for example, in Republic of Iraq, when Iraq claimed King
Faisal's New York bank accounts after the King was killed in a revolu-
tion, Judge Friendly, rather than searching in the constitutional prohibi-
tion against bills of attainder and elsewhere for the American standard
of justice, might simply have refused to recognize the government's
claim as "penal" and proceeded to apply the normal rule, under the
law of New York (the situs), that assets belonging to an individual at
death pass to his estate. In cases involving a claim to the assets of an
expropriated firm, the court, announcing its refusal to recognize the
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 89 (1971).
270. Id. § 120, comment d at 345-46.
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take-over as penal, would simply proceed to apply the normal rules
under which the former shareholders and directors of a company are
entitled to the possession of firm assets located in this country whenever
the divestiture of their ownership is not recognized by the American
courts. 71 In a contract case, the foreign state act would, on like
grounds, be rejected as a recognized excuse for non-performance and
the contract enforced according to its "proper law."
Obviously, the penal law rule cannot be used to circumvent the
act of state doctrine as Justice Harlan defined its ambit (i.e., in the
territorial case). If an American court determines, according to its own
conflicts of law rules, that a foreign act is territorial, it would be
anomalous to deny that law controlling effect. Only if the latter offends
international law or some normative postulate of American law might
it do so. Yet it is precisely such normative assessments that act of
state forbids. For a court to deny recognition on such non-normative
bases as the penal law rule would still leave open the question of who
wins (i.e., is the government or the private claimant entitled to the
property, or the latter to damages)-an issue to be decided according to
some law.2 72  Unlike -the extraterritorial case where its own law can
be applied, or the case where some other normative standard may serve
to supply a rule of decision (e.g., Citibank's claim in "international
tort"), the court, foreclosed from all normative assessments, is forced
to concede exclusive prescriptive rights to the foreign government. To
arbitrarily intrude its own substantive law, or -the pre-existing rule
under foreign law, would, in addition to implicitly invalidating the later
act of that government, be a total denial of the very legislative authority
which it has already admitted and which it claims for itself. And to
issue such a denial without any normative bases, and only because it
is displeased with the way the foreign government has exercised its pre-
clusive rights, would be to undermine the whole structure of inter-
national order. If there is displeasure, diplomacy is the recourse.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis there remains a certain larger choice.
Undoubtedly the American courts could "get away" with continuing to
271. See Zwack v. Kraus Bros., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956); Vladikavkazsky Ry.
v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934).
272. This supplies a critical operational distinction between cases involving foreign
expropriatory acts and those involving foreign revenue laws. The latter need no further
"rule of decision" to settle the controversy, raising the distinct possibility that act of state




moralize against foreign governments while indulging their own. The
State Department could certainly sort out the statements useful to it.
Foreign governments will continue to take property and settle disputes
over the taking as their interests, and not American judicial pronounce-
ments, dictate. So long as the American courts hold fast to traditional
norms in dealing with the acts of those governments, any perceived in-
consistency in dealing with the acts of the American government will
be, at best, a mere peccadillo in a process where economic and political
power counts most. And out of this, a few Americans may recover some
part of that which they would otherwise have lost.
On the other hand, some of the strength, even the majesty, of
American law would surely be lost if it were continuously washed in
such cynical acids. In the longer view we would all be diminished. It
is not inappropriate, therefore, to urge that the Court, still laboring to
see where it should go in the long progress of American law, pause
to celebrate Justice Harlan's work: the larger and more objective view,
the ethical acuity, that could offer so plain an affirmation of principle
at the very height of political excitement against its immediate benefi-
ciaries.
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